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Family firms are ubiquitous around the world. Family involvement in family
businesses gives rise to unique features that not only make family firms behave
distinctively from their nonfamily counterparts but also lead to great variations among
such firms. From an innovation perspective, while family firms are regarded as
conservative businesses that lack an innovation spirit in some studies, others recognize
family firms as key economic drivers demonstrate entrepreneurial spirit.
This dissertation is an attempt to advance the understanding of family firm
innovation heterogeneity by focusing on the role of family CEOs. In particular, this
research explores what idiosyncratic resources and capabilities are generated from family
management, specifically when a family member holds the CEO position. Employing a
capability-based perspective of firm innovation, this research posits that the impact of a
family CEO on firm innovation is two-fold. Family CEOs have a direct impact on firm
innovation due to the distinctive resources possessed and the unique goals pursued.
Family CEOs also have an indirect impact on firm innovation via the configuration and
orchestration of other top management team (TMT) members’ competencies, which

manifests as high-order, idiosyncratic managerial capabilities. Therefore, superior or
inferior family firm innovation is the result of both TMT members’ unique competencies
acquired and developed by family firms as well as family CEOs’ idiosyncratic
managerial capabilities.
A randomly selected sample of 250 high-technology firms was used for the
empirical tests. Findings suggest that family CEOs have a direct impact on firm
innovation input and output and that family CEOs configure and orchestrate TMT
resources distinctively compared to their professional counterparts. The results reveal
theoretical implications for both family business and firm innovation and offer practical
implications for leaders of family firms.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Innovation is critical to firm growth, profitability, and survival (Crossan &
Apaydin, 2010; Damanpour, 1991; Kimberly, 1981). It is based on firms’ abilities to
identify innovation opportunities externally and to recombine resources internally to seize
these opportunities, which primarily depends on top managers’ competencies (Adner &
Helfat, 2003; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Teece, 2007). Currently, organizational literature
emphasizes the importance of the firm’s adaptation to changing environments and
highlights dynamic innovation as one critical source of competitive advantage (Helfat,
Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece, & Winter, 2009). Accordingly, the
heterogeneity of firm innovation not only depends on a variety of sustainable unique and
valuable resource endowments (Barney, 1991), as suggested by the resource-based view
(RBV), but also relies on the firm’s abilities to “change the product, the production
process, the scale, or the customers (markets) served”, namely, firm dynamic capabilities
(Winter, 2003: 992). The firm’s adaptation to changing environments by innovation
primarily depends on the top management team’s (TMT) competencies to sense and seize
opportunities externally and to transform resources internally (Adner & Helfat, 2003). As
a central strategic decision maker and integrator of disruptive change, the CEO sits at the
strategic apex of the firm and possesses power and legitimacy to shape and facilitate
strategies (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Kitchell, 1997; Yadav, Prabhu & Chandy, 2007).
1

The CEO also has a central role in configuring and orchestrating TMT managerial
competencies (Kor & Mesko, 2013) because recruiting and promoting TMT members is
within the CEO’s responsibility (Hambrick, 1995). Employing a capability-based
perspective, the firm’s dynamic capabilities are largely influenced by the CEO, especially
the way the CEO reconfigures the TMT members’ externally-linked and internally-linked
resources and orchestrates the resources to achieve effective integration (Kor & Mesko,
2013).
Family firms are ubiquitous around the world (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Family
involvement creates unique features in a firm, leading to distinctive behavior patterns in
general and influencing firm innovation in particular (e.g., Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma,
1999; Duran, Kammerlander, van Essen, & Zellweger, 2015). The literature on family
firm innovation usually employs an innovation input-output model, exploring the
distinction between family firms and their nonfamily counterparts (De Massis, Frattini, &
Lichtenthaler, 2013). While a negative relationship between family ownership and firm
innovation input is dominant in prior studies (Block, 2012; Chen & Hsu, 2009; Chrisman
& Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía, Campbell, Martin, Hoskisson, Makri, & Sirmon, 2014),
mixed findings generally surface regarding the relationship between family involvement
and firm innovation output (De Massis et al., 2013). Family business scholars
predominantly draw on agency theory, attributing low levels of innovation input to the
risk-aversion propensity arising from ownership concentration and to family owners’
pursuit of noneconomic goals. These scholars further suggest that the superior innovation
output observed in family firms is a result of effective family governance mechanisms
(De Massis et al., 2013; Duran et al., 2015). Therefore, family firm innovation is
2

described as a paradoxical phenomenon: family owners are “unwilling yet able to
innovate” and family firms can “do more with less” (Chrisman, Chua, De Massis,
Frattini, & Wright, 2015; Duran et al., 2015). However, the existing research does little to
further the understanding of the family firm’s ability to innovate or to explain when, how,
and why family firms are able to “do more with less”. Recent family business research
has recognized this limitation and calls for efforts to explore family firm innovation by
employing the RBV (Carnes & Ireland, 2013).
To further this line of inquiry, this research suggests that family involvement in
management (i.e., family CEO) is the key to understanding heterogeneous innovation
capabilities associated with family firms. This research compares family CEOs with
professional CEOs to explore when, how, and why family firms can “do more with less”
in terms of firm innovation. In particular, this research posits that idiosyncratic resources
and capabilities underlying family firm innovation manifest when a family member takes
the CEO position (i.e., a family CEO). Drawing on a capability-based perspective of firm
innovation, this research answers the why question by arguing that TMT members’
externally-linked and internally-linked resources are among the determinants of the
firm’s capabilities to identify innovation opportunities and to pursue these opportunities
through resource transformation and that the family CEO configures and orchestrates
these TMT resources in a distinctive way. In addition, the how question is explored by
addressing the idiosyncratic resource endowments and/or constraints that a family CEO
creates and the superior and/or inferior managerial capabilities that a family CEO
possesses. In so doing, this research shows that an agency perspective used to explain
family firms’ distinctive behavioral propensities with regard to firm innovation, as is
3

common in family firm studies, is restrictive to the understanding of the paradoxical
effect of family firm innovation. This research attempts to mitigate this restriction.
In summary, this introduction details the literature gap this research seeks to fill—
when, why, and how family firms can “do more with less” in terms of firm innovation—
and discusses the utility in relation to the ongoing investigation of family firm innovation.
In all, this study explores a CEO’s role in firm innovation, particularly the way in which a
family member acting as the CEO (i.e., a family CEO) has a distinctive impact on firm
innovation. This investigation employs the RBV in general, and a capability-based
perspective of firm innovation in particular, exploring the distinctiveness of family firm
innovation that partly derives from family involvement in management. The remainder of
this chapter is organized into seven sections: (1.1) definitions of key terms, (1.2)
statement of the research problem, (1.3) significance of the study, (1.4) research
approach, (1.5) limitations, (1.6) outline of subsequent chapters, and (1.7) chapter
summary.
1.1

Definitions of Key Terms
To clarify the scope of this research, this section first highlights the research

context, which is important in order to appropriately explore the impact of family CEO
on innovation in high-technology firms. High-technology firms are usually defined by
industry sectors; the following features are widely observed in these firms, including high
demand for R&D, fast diffusion of technological innovations, and intense use of technical
knowledge (Zakrzewska-Bielawska, 2010). Given innovation is one of the most critical
factors leading to the success of these high-technology firms, setting the research
4

boundary within this scope helps to control the variations across industries and to identify
idiosyncratic resources and capabilities underlying firm innovation.
To conceptualize the theoretical blocks of the research model, the following terms
are defined and discussed in this section: (1.1.1) CEO type, (1.1.2) TMT managerial
resources underlying firm innovation, (1.1.2.1) externally-linked TMT resources,
(1.1.2.2) internally-linked TMT resources, (1.1.3) CEOs’ managerial capabilities,
(1.1.3.1) configuration of TMT resources, (1.1.3.2) orchestration of TMT resources,
(1.1.4) firm innovation, (1.1.4.1) innovation input, and (1.1.4.2) innovation output.
1.1.1

CEO Type
Firms may be managed by family CEOs or professional CEOs. A family CEO is

defined as a member of the controlling family who acts as the CEO of the firm. In
contrast, a professional CEO is defined as a non-family member hired to act as the CEO
of a family-owned firm or a nonfamily-owned firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Naldi,
Cennamo, Corbetta, & Gómez-Mejía, 2013). Family firms are defined as firms governed
and/or managed by multiple family members at the same time or over the life of the firm
(Chua et al., 1999; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007). While the
literature on family businesses widely agrees that firms managed by family CEOs are
different in terms of behavior and performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller,
Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013), there is no consensus regarding the impact of family CEO
management. A number of studies find that a firm managed by a family CEO has
superior performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) primarily due
to the family CEO’s substantial power to control (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), the creation of a stewardship atmosphere in the firm (Davis, Allen, &
5

Hayes, 2010), and the generation of firm-specific knowledge (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
However, a negative effect of family CEOs on firm performance is also observed. This
can be attributed to the family CEO’s pursuit of family-related socioemotional wealth
that may hurt firm performance (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, &
Moyano-Fuentes, 2007) and less competent family employment which is an outgrowth of
the entrenchment of family management and nepotistic appointments (Morck, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1988; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). This research compares
family-CEO-managed firms with professional-CEO-managed firms in terms of firm
innovation and explores the role of the family CEO in firm innovation.
1.1.2

TMT Managerial Resources underlying Firm Innovation
Top managers (including the CEO and non-CEO TMT members) are identified as

critical innovation drivers due to their substantial role in decision-making and resource
allocation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Qiang, Maggitti, Smith,
Tesluk, & Katila, 2013). Prior studies suggest that the experiences, skills, and cognitions
of top managers reflect their beliefs and values, and, in turn, shape a firm’s vision of
innovation and help predict innovation strategies (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010). As top
managers need to collaborate to formulate and implement strategies, the composition of
their experiences, skills, and knowledge and their interactions provide a strong
explanation for firm innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Crossan & Apaydin, 2010).
In high-velocity environments, top managers responsible for leading a firm in
adapting to change have a salient role in organizational learning and firm innovation
(Augier & Teece, 2009; Teece, 2012). TMTs need to identify new opportunities, explore
possible solutions for newness creation (that is, innovation), and implement decisions and
6

innovation strategies (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). The substantial expertise and skills
possessed by TMT members are fundamental in determining the speed of complex
information processing and the search scope for newness. Thus, firm innovation
primarily relies on top managers’ discretion (Augier & Teece, 2009) and is largely
determined by their capabilities in terms of identifying new opportunities and integrating
new ideas and knowledge with the existing capabilities (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000).
Due to top managers’ essential role in firm innovation, this research explores how the
managerial resources associated with TMT members allow a firm to innovate and to
revitalize. This research categorizes TMT members’ managerial resources that underlie
firm innovation into externally-linked TMT resources (1.1.2.1) and internally-linked
TMT resources (1.1.2.2).
1.1.2.1

Externally-Linked TMT Resources
Various formal and informal managerial social connections with other firms can

bring in information and resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Goodwill derived from
external connections, known as bridging social capital, can be used to obtain valuable
resources (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) that are critical in sensing
and seizing opportunities. From this perspective, externally-linked resources associated
with TMT members tend to impact firm innovation input (Kor, 2006). For the purpose of
this research, externally-linked TMT resources are measured as TMT members’ prior
organizational experiences and current external connections (e.g., the directorship in
other firms).
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1.1.2.2

Internally-Linked TMT Resources
Internally-linked TMT resources consist of substantial knowledge, experience,

skill, and education that TMT members have gained within the firm. These managerial
resources have a role in facilitating knowledge sharing and enhancing cross-functional
coordination (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Simsek, 2007). For instance, while shorttenured managers can bring in new managerial insights that are beneficial to the newness
creation, top managers with prolonged tenure usually have accumulated firm-specific
tacit knowledge that allows them to make resource allocation decisions specific to the
firm and to find possible solutions suitable to the firm (Kor & Mahoney, 2005). Thus, top
managers with diverse tenure are critical to predict firm decisions on innovation (e.g.,
Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Further, top managers gain diverse firm-specific expertise after
holding various managerial positions within the firm (Finkelstein, 1992; Damanpour &
Schneider, 2006). The expanded network of the ties within the firm also helps these top
managers shape a better understanding of routines across functional departments. For the
purpose of this research, internally-linked TMT resources are measured as TMT
members’ firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm career variety. From this perspective,
these resources tend to have an impact on innovation output (Damanpour & Schneider,
2006).
1.1.3

CEOs’ Managerial Capabilities
The CEO of a firm is identified as a central strategic decision maker and an

integrator of disruptive change who sits at the strategic apex of a firm (Barker & Mueller,
2002; Kitchell, 1997; Yadav et al., 2007). In high-velocity environments, the CEO of a
firm is the most powerful and influential leader among the TMT members, having the
8

authority and responsibility to lead the firm in adapting to changing environments (Adner
& Helfat, 2003). Compared with other TMT members, the CEO influences strategic
change in general, and firm innovation in particular, due to the CEO’s managerial
function of configuring and orchestrating TMT competencies (Kor & Mesko, 2013). In
an attempt to investigate the family CEO’s impact on innovation, this research posits that,
while the family CEO has a direct impact and an indirect impact on firm innovation, the
indirect impact is manifested as the distinctive way in which the family CEO configures
and orchestrates TMT resources, indicating the family CEO’s distinctive managerial
capabilities.
1.1.3.1

Configuration of TMT Resources
The configuration of TMT resources describes the process through which the

CEO shapes the composition of TMT competencies (Kor & Mesko, 2013). Prior
literature suggests that the CEO of a firm is considered the architect of the TMT and has
the power and authority to influence TMT composition and TMT diversity (Cannella &
Holcomb, 2005; Finkelstein, 1992). This managerial function of a CEO is manifested
when the CEO identifies, recruits, promotes, and recombines the managerial skills and
expertise of TMT members (Kor & Mesko, 2013; Shen & Cannella, 2002).
TMT resource configurations in family-CEO-managed firms are different from
those in professional-CEO-managed firms. For example, in a family-CEO-managed firm,
the unique goals pursued by the family CEO, such as maintaining family control and
transgenerational succession, influence TMT recruitment and promotion (Chrisman,
Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Gómez-Mejía, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011). The
divergent interests between the family CEO and nonfamily TMT members, as well as the
9

limited career potential of nonfamily TMT members (Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2014),
result in the recruitment of less competent TMT members and lead to restricted
externally-linked TMT resources. In addition, in a family-CEO-managed firm, TMT
members tend to develop superior internally-linked resources during their terms, such as
high levels of intrafirm career variety and tenure diversity, primarily due to the family
CEO’s managerial discretion and firm-specific knowledge (Le Breton-Miller & Miller,
2006). For the purpose of this research, the role of the family CEO in the configuration of
TMT resources is examined as the mediation effect of TMT resources on the family CEO
and firm innovation relationship.
1.1.3.2

Orchestration of TMT Resources
The orchestration of TMT resources describes the process through which the

CEO, acting like an orchestra conductor, elicits harmonious performances from TMT
members and integrates specialized knowledge to achieve better group-level performance
(Kor & Mesko, 2013). Prior literature suggests that the CEO’s firm-specific knowledge
and managerial discretion are critical to enhancing coordination and nurturing synergies
(Hernandez, 2012). This managerial function of the CEO can be facilitated effectively
when the CEO provides a clear firm vision, nurtures an innovation culture, and enhances
resource coordination (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011).
In a family-CEO-managed firm, the orchestration of TMT resources is unique due
to the family CEO’s salient managerial discretion (Carney, 2005; Le Breton-Miller &
Miller, 2006), the firm-specific knowledge generated through family education (Sirmon
& Hitt, 2003), and the use of generalized exchange systems to govern TMT interactions
(Ensley & Pearson, 2005; Long & Mathews, 2011). For the purpose of this research, the
10

role of the family CEO in orchestrating TMT resources is examined as the moderating
effect of family CEO on the TMT resources and firm innovation relationship.
1.1.4

Firm Innovation
Innovation has been the focus of intense research due to its great impact on both

economic growth and firm performance (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Damanpour, 1991;
Kimberly, 1981). In organizational studies, innovation is regarded as a critical tool of a
firm to exploit opportunities by providing newness (e.g., improved products, services,
and production processes; Drucker, 1985). Firm innovation carries many meanings in
prior studies. It denotes (a) a set of activities through which a firm identifies new
opportunities and generates, accepts, and implements new ideas (Thompson, 1965); (b) a
variety of outputs, taking the form of new products, processes, or services (Kimberly,
1981); and (c) an attribute of an organization that reflects a firm’s willingness or ability
to innovate (that is to say, innovativeness). This research takes this multi-faceted
perspective, emphasizing the underlying role of resources and capabilities relating to firm
innovation. A firm relies on a variety of resource inputs and conducts distinctive
innovation activities in an integrated way through which innovation capabilities are
developed and newness is generated, accepted, and implemented.
Successful innovation contributes to firm competence. However, in high-velocity
environments, a firm needs to innovate to achieve a better fit between the firm and the
environment. Innovation, reflecting a firm’s capacity to learn (Auh & Menguc, 2005), is
a critical source of the firm’s capability to maintain competitiveness (Helfat et al., 2009).
In an attempt to employ this dynamic perspective of innovation, this research
conceptualizes firm innovation as both innovation input (1.1.4.1) and innovation output
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(1.1.4.2), and explores firm innovation as an outcome of the firm’s dynamic managerial
capabilities.
1.1.4.1

Innovation Input
Innovation input is defined as an activity used to exploit innovation opportunities

and linked to offering the newness such as new products, services, and production
processes (De Massis et al., 2013). Research and development (R&D) investment—
comprising critical activities in terms of developing new knowledge and turning it into
new products, services, and processes (Chiesa, 2001)—is widely used as the measure of
innovation input in firm innovation literature (Fritsch & Franke, 2004; Tang, 2006). In
this research, innovation input is measured as R&D investment in the firm.
1.1.4.2

Innovation Output
Innovation output describes the outcome resulting from innovation input (Crossan

& Apaydin, 2010). Innovation requires more than R&D investment; it also includes the
adoption of best practices and the delivery of superior products and services and requires
the implementation of complementary organizational activities and cross-functional
managerial coordination (Teece, 2007). During this process, resources and assets are
recombined and orchestrated in the firm, while firm-specific routines and procedures are
reframed and redeveloped (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). In this research, innovation
output is measured as total sales (Block, 2012).
1.2

Statement of Research Problem
The main research objective of this research is to further the current

understanding of family firm innovation. Prior family business studies identify a
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paradoxical effect in family firm innovation—“doing more with less”—and attribute this
effect to family governance, through which idiosyncratic resources and capabilities are
generated and unique goals are pursued (Chrisman et al., 2015; Duran et al., 2015). This
research posits that family firms are heterogeneous concerning firm innovation and that
the heterogeneity derives from various forms of family involvement in the business, such
as family ownership and family management. In addition, family management, especially
a family member holding the CEO position, allows one to understand the idiosyncratic
resources and capabilities that underlie firm innovation in rapidly changing
environments. Therefore, this research employs the RBV in general, and a capabilitybased perspective of innovation in particular, to explore idiosyncratic resources and
capabilities deriving from family management (i.e., family CEO). This research posits
that the way in which family CEOs influence firm innovation is different from
professional CEOs; the difference is based upon the unique goals, idiosyncratic
resources, and capabilities of family CEOs. The research questions of this study are as
follows:
Research Question 1: Why does a family CEO have a distinctive impact on firm
innovation?
In pursuit of the answer to this research question, this research (a) reviews family
business literature and (b) presents a capability-based perspective of firm innovation. The
goal of the review is to explore what unique goals and idiosyncratic resources arise from
family management (i.e., family CEO) and underpin firm innovation. The presentation of
a capability-based perspective of firm innovation aims to provide a justification of why
these idiosyncratic resources generated through family involvement (i.e., family CEO)
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influence firm innovation. The literature review serves as the foundation for the
following research questions.
Research Question 2: Compared to a professional CEO, how does a family CEO
have a distinctive direct impact on firm innovation?
In pursuit of the answer to this research question, this research draws on family
business literature, exploring the firm-level outcome (i.e., firm innovation) of the
presence of family CEOs. Family business studies have observed that family involvement
in a business takes various forms (Chua et al., 1999). When a family member holds the
CEO position, unique goals and idiosyncratic resources are generated in these firms,
which contributes to the understanding of heterogeneous family firm innovation. The
exploration of the family CEO’s direct impact on firm innovation is essential to
understanding the heterogeneity of family firm innovation.
Research Question 3: Compared to a professional CEO, how does a family CEO
have a distinctive indirect impact on firm innovation?
In pursuit of the answer to this research question, this study draws on a capabilitybased perspective of firm innovation to explore the family CEO’s indirect impact on firm
innovation that is primarily facilitated by their managerial capabilities in terms of the
configuration and orchestration of TMT resources. TMT member recruitment, promotion,
and resource recombination are within a CEO’s managerial discretion (Kor & Mesko,
2013). The presence of a family CEO in the firm not only has a firm-level impact in
terms of innovation but also influences interactions within the TMT. While TMT
resources are among the critical predictors of firm innovation, the exploration of (a) the
mediation effect of TMT resources on the family CEO and firm innovation relationship
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and (b) the moderation effect of the family CEO on the TMT resource and firm
innovation relationship can advance the understanding of unique capabilities associated
with the family CEO.
1.3

Significance of the Study
This research explores the distinctive role of the family CEO in firm innovation.

In particular, this research expands on current approaches to the study of family business
by examining when distinctive resources and capabilities underlying firm innovation are
generated and why and how these resources and capabilities impact firm innovation.
Specifically, this study employs the RBV approach in general, and a capability-based
perspective in particular, and contends that the family CEO’s distinctive role in
innovation is twofold: (a) a direct impact on firm innovation due to the unique goals and
the idiosyncratic resources generated by family management and (b) an indirect impact
on firm innovation through the CEO’s managerial capabilities on TMT resource
configuration and orchestration. In so doing, this research contributes to family business
literature by extending the analytic perspective from an agency perspective to a
capability-based perspective and by exploring the TMT members’ resource endowments
(constraints) and the CEO’s capabilities (higher-order capabilities) generated through
family management (i.e., family CEO).
This research also expands current approaches to the study of innovation by
employing a capability-based view and emphasizing top managers’ salient role in family
firm innovation. According to such a capability-based view, a firm’s competitive
advantage of innovation primarily lies in the firm’s dynamic and higher-order capabilities
(Leiblein, 2011), which reflect the firm’s capacity for change and the dominant
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coalition’s vision of how to adapt to rapidly changing markets through its internal
renewal (i.e., innovation). While dynamic capabilities, as a firm-level construct, are
critical to firm growth and survival in high-velocity environments, idiosyncratic dynamic
managerial capabilities associated with top managers can predict more variations in firm
innovation. Therefore, firm innovativeness is more of an intrinsic characteristic of the
owners and/or managers than of the company (Verhees & Meulenberg, 2004).
Managerial resources not only reflect the owners and/or managers’ values, cognitions,
and perspectives on innovation, as upper echelons theory suggests (Hambrick & Mason,
1984), but also indicate top managers’ capabilities of opportunity sensing, seizing, and
resource transformation. This research advances the understanding of firm innovation by
utilizing the capability-based view within the context of family firms and by highlighting
the role of top managers’ managerial resources in this process.
The literature on family businesses reveals a paradoxical phenomenon in relation
to family firm innovation: family firms have superior ability but are less willing to
engage in innovation (De Massis, Frattini, Pizzurno, & Cassia, 2015; Duran et al., 2015).
However, heterogeneity exists widely in family firms in terms of both willingness and
ability (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012; Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, &
Kellermanns, 2012). While a great number of studies predominantly draw on governance
literature and agency theory to explore the way in which various types and degrees of
family involvement (e.g., family ownership and family management) give rise to
distinctive goals that a firm is willing to pursue (Chrisman, Sharma, Steier, & Chua,
2013; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Minichilli, Corbetta, & Pittino, 2014), few studies
investigate the variety of resources and capabilities generated by family involvement.
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Without integrating the ability perspective into the explanation of family firm innovation,
the literature on family businesses may result in a paradoxical understanding of family
firm innovation: family firms’ unwillingness to invest in R&D exists even for those in
high-technology industries where R&D investment is of the greatest importance (GómezMejía et al., 2014). This research posits that family firms are heterogeneous in terms of
innovation capability; instead of an unwillingness to innovate, a family firm with
resource constraints and inferior managerial capabilities is unable to sense and seize
innovation opportunities. In so doing, this research responds to calls for further efforts to
advance knowledge about family firm heterogeneity (Chua et al., 2012) and helps to form
an integrated picture of family firm innovation (Duran et al., 2015) by addressing both
the willingness and the ability of a family firm to innovate.
This research has practical implications for both family and nonfamily firms.
First, it suggests that TMT competencies have various dimensions that may affect firm
innovation input and output differently. While TMT members with more externallylinked resources are critical for high-technology firms aiming to enhance their R&D
status in the industry, TMT members with salient internally-linked resources are valuable
for high-technology firms whose goal is to improve the conversion from R&D
investments into firm sales. Second, this research posits that the CEO influences TMT
competencies during two stages: the TMT member recruitment stage and the TMT
member retention stage. Studies of family businesses suggest that the presence of the
family CEO in a family firm may negatively influence TMT recruitment and result in less
talented top managers being hired by the firm, whereas the family CEO can enhance
these TMT members’ competencies during their tenure by creating more internally-linked
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resources for the TMT members. As such, even though less likely to hire high profile top
managers, a family CEO-managed firm can nurture a management cadre internally and
eventually build competent professional executive teams through TMT resource
configuration and orchestration.
1.4

Research Approach
The primary empirical goal of this research is to examine how the family CEO

has an impact on firm innovation both directly and indirectly. There are several
challenges in achieving this goal, but the research approach of this study is designed to
solve these challenges.
First, measures of externally-linked TMT resources (i.e., prior organizational
experiences and current external connections) and internally-linked TMT resources (i.e.,
firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm career variety) are proxies of TMT managerial
competencies (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Gwynne, 2003). These measures are better fitted
to the RBV approach and reflect the firm’s resource endowments (constraints) associated
with top managers. In addition to examining the direct effect of the family CEO on firm
innovation, this research employs a capability-based perspective of firm innovation to
examine the mediation effect of TMT resources and the moderating effect of the family
CEO, which reflects the CEO’s managerial capabilities denoted as TMT resource
reconfigurations and orchestrations. Details are discussed further in Chapter III.
Second, firm innovation varies greatly across industrial sections. This research
draws its sample from publicly traded firms in high-technology industries that are listed
on the U.S. stock market with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes such as 357,
365, 366, 367, 381, 382, 384, and 386. The definition of a high-technology industry
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comes from the AeA, the largest association of high-tech companies in the United States,
and the sample has been used in prior studies on firm innovation (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et
al., 2014; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008). Firms in these industries are ideal for research
on firm innovation as the survival and profitability of these firms are critically dependent
on their ability to create and commercialize innovations quickly and efficiently. A family
firm is identified as in prior literature on family business. When a family owns 5% or
more of a firm’s stock and at least one family member (a person related by blood or
marriage to the owning family) is on the TMT or the board of directors, that firm is
defined as a family firm (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Jones, Makri, & Gómez-Mejía,
2008).
Third, the hypothesized relationships are tested using regression modeling. All the
models are tested using two samples: (1) high-technology firms that include both family
and nonfamily firms and (2) family firms identified by using the above-mentioned
criteria. The measure of all the variables, including independent, dependent, mediator,
moderator, and control variables, are collected from the Compustat database, firm annual
reports (10-K), proxy statements (DEF 14), and other databases. Details are discussed
further in Chapter IV.
1.5

Limitations
This research is bound by several limitations, which offer opportunities for future

research. First, this research distinguishes the family CEO, a critical component of family
involvement, from other types of family involvement (e.g., family ownership and family
involvement in TMT) and measures the family CEO as a binary variable. However,
family CEOs may be heterogeneous as well. Family-related features associated with
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family CEOs (e.g., founder family CEOs or later generation family CEOs) may cause
variations across firms with regard to innovation input and output.
Second, this research draws on the study of dynamic capabilities to apply a
capability-based view of innovation within the context of family firms. By following
prior literature (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Helfat & Martin, 2015), this study examines
top managers’ externally-linked resources (i.e., prior organizational experiences and
external connections) and internally-linked resources (i.e., firm tenure, team tenure, and
intrafirm career variety) as proxies of managerial resources that underlie firm innovation.
However, using different types of proxies leads to various outcomes. The value of using
the current measures of TMT resources is fully discussed in Chapter III.
This research uses firms in narrow industry sections (with SIC codes such as 357,
365, 366, 367, 381, 382, 384, and 386) to answer the research questions. While this
sampling design can enhance the reliability of the study, it has limitations due to the
assumption that firm innovation patterns found in these industry sections can be
generalized to others. Further considerations and discussions will be presented in Chapter
IV and Chapter V.
1.6

Outline of the Study
This research explores the family CEO’s distinctive roles in firm innovation. In

particular, this research contends that in rapidly changing environments, the firm’s
competitive advantage in terms of innovation arises from its adaptation to emerging
products and market changes, which is based on top managers’ resources and dynamic
managerial capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat & Martin, 2015). In accordance
with this capability-based perspective of innovation, the impact of the CEO on firm
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innovation is both direct and indirect; the indirect effect draws upon the CEO’s
configuration and orchestration of TMT resources. Therefore, the role of the family CEO
in firm innovation is influenced not only by unique goals and idiosyncratic resources
derived from family management but also by the distinctive way in which the family
CEO configures and orchestrates TMT resources. This research addresses these issues in
the following chapters.
Chapter II reviews the existing literature on family firm innovation and presents a
capability-based perspective of firm innovation. While each component topic of inquiry
provides insights into the exploration of innovation in family firms, the overlap in the
study is the most relevant to this research and is also arguably the least developed as a
field of study. Building from the review presented in Chapter II, Chapter III develops
hypotheses concerning the family CEO’s distinctive impact on firm innovation. To
accomplish this goal, Chapter III details the relationships among constructs. Chapter IV
describes the sampling approach and the measures, proceeds with data analytics and
reports the results of the analysis. Chapter V concludes the research with a discussion of
the results and provides an overall assessment regarding the appropriateness and the
contributions of this research, as well as future research opportunities.
1.7

Chapter Summary
Chapter I reviews a paradoxical effect of family firm innovation, that is,

unwilling, yet able to innovate” and “doing more with less”. The chapter then posits that
family firms are heterogeneous in terms of innovation capability. Further, exploration is
presented of when heterogeneous resources and capabilities are generated in family firms
and why and how these resources and capabilities influence firm innovation. This chapter
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provides definitions of key terms, the research question to be answered, the research
approach this study takes, the significance and limitations, and an outline of the following
four chapters.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of family firm and capabilitybased literature related to firm innovation. First, this chapter provides a review of family
firm innovation, especially family involvement and its consequences for firm innovation.
Next, a synthesized perspective of capability-based firm innovation is presented. In
particular, this research draws on the RBV in general, and employs dynamic capability
literature in particular, to explore managerial resources critical to firm innovation. The
goal of this chapter is to provide a theoretical foundation that will support the
investigation of the role of the family CEO in firm innovation within dynamic
environments that are to be detailed in Chapter III.
2.1

Family Firm Innovation: A Literature Review
Family firms are ubiquitous around the world. A significant presence of family

firms is observed in both publicly traded companies and medium-small sized private
firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Carney, Van Essen, Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2015; La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Family firms account for approximately onethird of the most competent companies, such as S&P 500 and Fortune 1000 companies
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2007), and as much as 90% of all businesses in
the US (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). While ubiquitous, family firms are heterogeneous in
nature (Chua et al., 2012). For example, family firms are characterized as conservative
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businesses that lack an innovative spirit and prefer the status quo (La Porta et al., 1999),
and family firms are also seen as key economic drivers filled with entrepreneurial spirit
(Morck & Yeung, 2003). The heterogeneous nature of family firms has provoked
increasing research attention in recent decades (Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et
al., 2007). Concerning empirical findings, prior studies continue to yield mixed results
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; De Massis et al., 2013; Duran et al., 2015), suggesting that
further work is needed to explore the factors that influence family firm innovation. This
chapter reviews family firm innovation literature in an attempt to provide a synthesized
summary and shed new light on family firm innovation.
The first section of this review describes the heterogeneity of family involvement.
Following it, this research employs an effort–ability framework widely used in family
business studies (Gedajlovic et al., 2012) to explore the heterogeneity of family firm
innovation. In particular, the second section addresses family firms’ unique intentions
that affect firm innovation, while the third section focuses on family firms’ idiosyncratic
abilities to engage in firm innovation. Finally, a summary of the research gap is
presented, shedding light on a possible solution to explain the paradoxical phenomenon
of family firm innovation. In brief, this review is organized into the following parts:
(2.1.1) the heterogeneity of family involvement, (2.1.2) family firms’ unique intentions
on firm innovation, (2.1.3) family firms’ idiosyncratic innovation abilities, and (2.1.4) a
summary of the research gap.
2.1.1

The Heterogeneity of Family Involvement
A critical question remains in family business studies concerning the effects of

family involvement on family firms. Family involvement in a business takes various
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forms and may uniquely influence firm behavior and performance (Chua et al., 1999,
2012; Gedajlovic et al., 2012). While family involvement can be observed as family
ownership and/or family management, the true essence of family involvement is reflected
in the unique goals and idiosyncratic resources that result from family presence
(Chrisman et al., 2012; Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003).
Family involvement observed in firm governance. Family involvement in a
business can be perceived as the extent to which ownership and control are unified within
a family (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). From this perspective, family involvement varies
broadly in terms of the level of family ownership and family member participation in
management. Family ownership and family management provide the family the power
and legitimacy necessary to pursue the family’s vision of the firm by influencing the
formation of the firm goals (Chrisman et al., 2012; Chua et al., 2012; Mitchell, Agle, &
Wood, 1997). Perceiving a firm goal as the outcome of interactions within the firm
coalition (Cyert & March, 1963), a high level of family involvement in ownership and
management exerts a significant influence on the goal negotiation processes (Chrisman et
al., 2013; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013), thus leading to the adoption of the family’s goal as
that of the firm. However, family involvement in governance varies greatly across firms
(Chrisman et al., 2012). When a family completely owns and manages a firm, the family
has absolute voting rights and possesses full control over the firm. Such authority and
autonomy does not exist in a firm in which both family and nonfamily members
simultaneously hold ownership and leadership roles. Therefore, family involvement in
firm governance can reflect the extent to which the family’s vision of the business shapes
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firm behavior due to the negotiation power associated with family members involved in
the firm (Chua et al., 2012).
Aligned with this notion, a family CEO is an important component of family
involvement and can provide great research valence in the study of family firm
innovation (Duran et al., 2015). As a central strategic decision maker sitting at the
strategic apex of a firm, the CEO possesses the power and legitimacy to shape and
facilitate innovation strategies (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Crossan & Apaydin, 2010;
Kitchell, 1997; Yadav et al., 2007). When a family member acts as a CEO of the firm, the
family CEO has greater power and legitimacy that are derived from family ownership
(Miller et al., 2013). Thus, a family CEO, through whom the family owners’ investment
intention is mirrored (Duran et al., 2015), will influence the way the firm revitalizes
itself.
Family involvement and goals pursued. Family involvement in ownership and
management can be easily observed; however, it is the essence of family business that
distinguishes family firms from nonfamily firms (Chua et al., 1999). The essence of
family business is manifested as the controlling family’s vision of the business and the
distinctive behavior shaped by that vision (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chua et al.,
1999). A family’s vision of the business emerges when the family regards the business as
a vehicle to achieve the desired future of the family (Chua et al., 1999). Under the
guidance of such vision, the goals adopted by the firm convey unique emotional values
and affective endowments that are not requisite for economic benefits (Gómez-Mejía et
al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Vision and goals vary across all firms, not only
family firms. However, the variation in family firms is greater than that in nonfamily
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firms because of the pursuit of noneconomic goals in the former (Chrisman et al., 2012,
2013). The idiosyncratic vision and goals in family firms reflect the controlling family’s
unique intentions, as well as the family owner-managers’ personal goals of achieving
wealth, power, status, and job security, which give rise to affective endowments denoted
as socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, 2011). The pursuit of such goals
may lead to unique firm behaviors, such as time-horizon and risk preference (Chrisman et
al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). Accordingly, the
heterogeneity of such goals can explain the greater variation of firm behavior observed in
family firms, including preferences toward R&D investments in family firms (Chrisman
& Patel, 2012).
While a family’s vision of the business is less observable, specific types of family
involvement may indicate the family’s distinctive intentions for the business. For
example, a family’s pursuit of sustainable control of the firm across generations is among
the central goals of many family firms (Chua et al., 1999). Such transgenerational
succession intention may influence the firm’s critical strategic decisions (Berrone, Cruz,
& Gómez-Mejía, 2012), such as those about family firm initial public offerings (IPOs)
(Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). Accordingly, multi-generational
involvement in a firm may influence the firm’s strategic decisions on innovation
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012), thus providing valuable research insights for the study of
family businesses.
Family involvement and familiness resources. The extent of family involvement
drives the family’s embeddedness in the firm; the family and the business are intricately
intertwined (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003). Family firms act as an inseparable unified system of
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the firm, the family, and the individuals, which creates synergies (Habbershon et al.,
2003). The interactions between the family and the business may facilitate the
development of “familiness”—deeply embedded resources and capabilities within the
firm (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003). Familiness as a bundle of
unique, inseparable, and synergistic resources and capabilities takes various forms,
including patient financial capital, idiosyncratic firm-specific human capital, strong social
capital (Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), and identification and
stewardship ( Davis et al., 2010; Zellweger, Eddleston, & Kellermanns , 2010).
Familiness has inconsistent effects on family firms, and may be a source of
competitive advantage or disadvantage in comparison to nonfamily firms (Habbershon &
Williams, 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003). Concerning firm innovation, the
distinctiveness of family involvement may manifest in forms such as (a) patient financial
capital due to the family’s long-term orientation associated with family involvement
(Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), (b) firm-specific human capital available through family members
that are beneficial to resource evaluation and enriching activities (Carnes & Ireland,
2013), and (c) strong social capital that brings in resources and facilitates intra-firm
communications (Marett, Marett, & Litchfield, 2015; Pearson et al., 2008). In contrast,
family involvement, with its unique feature of the closure of the family firm’s elite
network, excludes nonfamily members (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), thus hindering idea
generation and demotivating nonfamily members (Carnes & Ireland, 2013).
Familiness is less observable as well; researchers suggest that familiness is
particularly associated with family involvement in top executive positions (Minichilli,
Corbetta, & MacMillan, 2010). For instance, a family CEO is regarded as a source of
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distinctive familiness due to their managerial discretion (Minichilli et al., 2010) and role
in creating a stewardship atmosphere within the firm (Davis et al., 2010). A latergeneration CEO may receive strategic education during childhood, which helps to
cultivate idiosyncratic firm-specific knowledge denoted as distinctive familiness (Sirmon
& Hitt, 2003). However, family involvement in the TMT may create faultlines between
family managers and nonfamily managers (Minichilli et al., 2010), resulting in
constrictive familiness (Habbershon et al., 2003) that is detrimental to firm performance.
To summarize, family firms are not homogeneous; the heterogeneity of family
firms may develop through family involvement in these firms. Family involvement gives
rise to variation in (1) the combinations of family ownership and management, (2) the
goals pursued by the family, and (3) the idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. While
family ownership and family management are common operational measures of family
involvement, the unique goals and idiosyncratic resources—manifested as the distinctive
efforts and abilities associated with family firms—are essential to advance the
understanding of family firms’ pursuit of strategic behavior (Daspit, Chrisman, Sharma,
Pearson, & Long, 2017). Next, this research employs an effort–ability framework
(Gedajlovic et al., 2012) to explore family firm innovation. The following sections
review family firm innovation literature, highlighting unique intentions that arise from
family involvement and idiosyncratic abilities that are created through family
involvement.
2.1.2

Family Firms’ Unique Intentions Regarding Firm Innovation
A great number of family firm innovation studies primarily draw on agency

theory and behavioral agency theory, predicting that family involvement gives rise to
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distinctive agency concerns and leads to unique intentions concerning firm innovation.
These studies predominantly explore the distinction between family firms and nonfamily
firms rather than the heterogeneity among family firms. Family involvement is usually
operationalized as a binary variable (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; Muñoz-Bullón &
Sanchez-Bueno, 2011; Patel & Chrisman, 2014), which assumes that family firms are
homogeneous. In several studies, family involvement is measured as a continuous
variable of family ownership (e.g., Block 2012; Chen & Hsu, 2009; Chrisman & Patel,
2012). A negative relationship between family involvement (e.g., family ownership) and
R&D investment dominates these empirical findings (De Massis et al., 2013; Duran et al.,
2015).
According to agency theory, the unification of ownership and control in family
firms gives rise to unique behavioral propensities (Carney, 2005) and distinctive agency
concerns (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While family governance can mitigate traditional
agency problems (i.e., the agent’s opportunistic behavior) to some extent (Chrisman,
Chua, & Litz, 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), some agency problems arise specifically
in family firms. For example, the controlling family may engage in self-interested
behaviors through the firm (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
Concerning firm innovation, high levels of ownership concentration in a single family
may lead to risk aversion concerning firm innovation; accordingly, family firms tend to
invest less in R&D (Block, 2012; Duran et al., 2015). This agency problem may be
exacerbated when the controlling family lacks the self-control and possesses asymmetric
altruism toward family members (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003).
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Behavioral agency theory suggests that firms may actually be loss-averse rather
than risk-averse, and that family firms frame critical decisions around gains and losses
with socioemotional wealth as the reference point in the loss-gain evaluation when
making critical decisions (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; Wiseman
& Gómez-Mejía, 1998). Because firm innovation requires substantial investment
(Grossman & Helpman, 1993) and intense knowledge resources, the successful pursuit of
innovation may result in nonfamily members’ involvement in financial arrangements or
firm management and thus the sacrifice of family control (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014).
Family-centric noneconomic goals, such as maintaining the family’s control in the
business, discourage family firms from using external financial capital or hiring
nonfamily managers, which may enhance the firm’s innovation capabilities and longterm wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, 2011). As a result, family firms tend to invest
less in innovation than do their nonfamily counterparts (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chen &
Hsu, 2009). This trend is also observed in high-technology firms, where insufficient
innovation represents a risk to firm survival (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014).
In studies within this research stream, few efforts have been made to distinguish
various types of family involvement, including family management and multigenerational involvement (e.g., Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012). According to
agency theory and behavioral agency theory, principal–principal agency problems arise
and are exacerbated within family management in these firms, leading to family ownermanagers’ expropriation of other owners’ economic benefits (Singla, Veliyath, &
George, 2014; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). These behavioral
propensities are salient particularly when family members hold executive positions, such
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as the chairman of the board and/or the CEO position. Drawing on these arguments, a
family-owned and managed firm tends to invest less in R&D than a firm that is familyowned but not family-managed due to the family owner-manager’s risk-averse propensity
and the desire to pursue non-economic goals (e.g., the reluctance to cede control to
nonfamily members) (Duran et al., 2015). In addition, multi-generational involvement
may give rise to a wide range of goals family members aim to pursue through their firms.
Various goals can strengthen (or weaken) the family owners’ unwillingness to innovate,
resulting in a wide variation among family firms concerning firm innovation (Chrisman
& Patel, 2012).
To summarize, a number of studies on family firm innovation employ agency
theory or behavioral agency theory, usually measure family involvement as a
dichotomous or continuous variable of family ownership, and report a negative
association between family involvement and firm R&D investment (Block, 2012; Chen &
Hsu, 2009; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). Family business
researchers explain this finding as family owners being able but unwilling to innovate,
creating a paradox of family firm innovation (Chrisman et al., 2015; Duran et al., 2015).
However, according to family business literature, a family firm’s distinctive
behavioral propensity can be caused by both its unique efforts and idiosyncratic abilities
(Gedajlovic et al., 2012). As a critical driver of firm growth, profitability, and survival,
innovation is determined not only by a firm’s (un)willingness to innovate but also its
(in)ability to innovate. Therefore, a negative relationship between family ownership and
firm innovation may reflect the effect of family owners’ unique intentions regarding firm
innovation; it also can be a consequence of family managers’ lack of resources and
32

capabilities to revitalize the firm. While agency theory and behavioral theory help to
answer why family firms behave differently from nonfamily firms drawing on one
perspective (the owners’ intentions), these perspectives lack a comprehensive
conceptualization of family firm innovation. In the following section, this research
explores family firms’ idiosyncratic abilities concerning firm innovation from a unique
perspective.
2.1.3

Family Firms’ Idiosyncratic Innovation Abilities
A few empirical studies on family firm innovation employ the RBV, exploring

family firms’ idiosyncratic resources and capabilities as the source of competitive
advantages or disadvantages relating to firm innovation (Classen, Van Gils, Bammens, &
Carree, 2012; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011; Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, & Webb,
2008). In this research stream, family involvement is measured as family ownership
(Ashwin, Krishnan, & George, 2015), family management (Ashwin et al., 2015; Sirmon
et al., 2008), or generational involvement (Block, Miller, Jaskiewicz, & Spiegel, 2011;
Miller et al., 2011). These studies have largely reported mixed findings (De Massis et al.,
2013).
According to a number of conceptual studies employing the RBV, idiosyncratic
resources and capabilities are generated in family firms and impact firm behavior in
general (Habbershon et al., 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) and firm innovation in particular
(Carnes & Ireland, 2013). Among the various types of family involvement in the
business, family management is the typical focus in terms of the creation of such
idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. First, the unification of ownership and
management gives rise to an effective governance mechanism, family governance,
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through which decisions can be made in a parsimonious, particular, and personal way
(Carney, 2005). In addition, family members’ embeddedness in the business enables the
flow of social capital from the family into the firm (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007;
Pearson et al., 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), creating trust, cohesion, and stewardship
within the firm (Davis et al., 2010). The goodwill associated with a family member’s
external connections can bridge new knowledge and information into the firm, thus
contributing to new opportunity identification. In addition, strong bonding social capital
can facilitate tacit knowledge sharing within the firm (Pearson et al., 2008), leading to
effective innovation implementation. In particular, when family owner-managers have
grown up with the business, a profound understanding of the business may be developed
that shapes their idiosyncratic firm-specific human capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). These
deep firm-specific tacit knowledge resources can extend the firm’s current capabilities
and allow the firm to explore new opportunities through enriching activities (Carnes &
Ireland, 2013).
A few empirical studies show direct or indirect evidence to support these
arguments (Ashwin et al., 2015; Hsu & Chang, 2011; Llach & Nordqvist, 2010; Sirmon
et al., 2008). Using data from India and comparing family firms with nonfamily firms,
Ashwin and colleague (2015) find that family-owned firms invest more in R&D and
attribute this positive effect to the stewardship orientation created in these firms. Llach
and Nordqvist (2010) find that family firms have more qualified employees and that
qualified employees are positively related to R&D (Llach & Nordqvist, 2010), suggesting
resource endowments associated with these surveyed family firms. In addition, Hsu and
Chang (2011) argue that strong social capital in family firms encourages the use of
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behavioral strategic controls (e.g., formal and informal meetings), which is positively
related with firm innovation. Further, firms that are family-owned and managed are less
rigid when responses are needed in environments with high external imitation threats,
indicating superior managerial capabilities associated with these firms (Sirmon et al.,
2008).
However, familiness may be distinctive or constrictive (Habbershon et al., 2003).
Despite family CEOs’ salient managerial discretion, a number of studies regard family
CEOs as less competent compared to their professional counterparts (Pérez-González,
2006), indicating resource constraints in family CEO-managed firms. In addition, high
levels of familiness may result in rigid mental models in family firms (König,
Kammerlander, & Enders, 2013), reinforcing the firms’ commitment to the status quo
(Gómez-Mejía, Nuñez-Nickel, Gutierrez, 2001) and leading to the pursuit of stabilizing
activities (Carnes & Ireland, 2013). Further, the closure of family firms’ elite networks
derived from familiness excludes nonfamily members (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), thus
hindering idea generation and new product exploration in the firms (Carnes & Ireland,
2013). Finally, while cohesion is suggested to exist in the TMTs of family firms, conflicts
also may arise with the involvement of multiple family members’ (Ensley, Pearson, &
Amason, 2002).
A few empirical studies show limited evidence for these arguments (Classen et
al., 2012; Miller et al., 2011). Classen and colleagues (2012) suggest that family firms
have a narrow search breadth concerning innovation, while family CEO education and
the percentage of nonfamily members on the TMT tend to mitigate such negative impact.
In addition, family CEO-managed firms are more likely to have conservative growth
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strategies (e.g., firm innovation as one dimension of such growth strategies) than lonefounder CEO-managed firms, indicating that a nurturer identity is developed in the
former and an entrepreneurial identity is developed in the latter (Miller et al., 2011).
To summarize, few studies employ the RBV, highlight family firms’ abilities to
innovate, and explore idiosyncratic resource endowments or constraints in terms of
innovation (Classen et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2011; Sirmon et al., 2008). While some
studies compare family firms with nonfamily firms and attribute the positive relationship
to the family firm’s possession of distinctive familiness (e.g., stewardship orientation;
Ashwin et al., 2015), other studies attempt to identify idiosyncratic resources and
capabilities associated with family firms (Classen et al., 2012; Hsu & Chang, 2011; Llach
& Nordqvist, 2010; Miller et al., 2011). However, inconsistent findings usually surface in
these studies.
Given that familiness may be either distinctive or constrictive (Habbershon et al.,
2003), the impact of family involvement on firm innovation is more likely depending on
heterogeneous resources and capabilities that are generated through various types of
family involvement. In addition to relying on a model that only investigates family
owners’ unwillingness to innovate, research lacks a broad understanding of the ability
that exists within family firms in terms of resources and capabilities. Accordingly, as a
complementary perspective, the RBV offers a foundation for explaining the relationship
between family involvement and firm innovation. Because familiness is usually
associated with family members’ involvement in top executive positions (Minichilli et
al., 2010), family CEOs—as critical components manifesting the heterogeneity of family
involvement—can influence firm innovation ability distinctively compared to nonfamily,
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professional CEOs. In the following section, this research summarizes the research gap in
family firm innovation literature and describes the value of a study exploring the role of
family CEOs in firm innovation.
2.1.4

A Summary of Research Gap
The first section of this chapter reviews two schools of inquiry that explore family

firm innovation. One (i.e., the intention perspective) primarily draws on agency theory
and/or behavioral agency theory, compares family firms with nonfamily firms, and
explores how family owners’ distinctive intentions affect firm innovation (Block 2012;
Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). The other (i.e., the ability
perspective) employs the RBV, primarily compares family firms with nonfamily firms,
and investigates family firms’ idiosyncratic abilities to innovate. The intention school
predominantly reports a negative relationship between family involvement (e.g., family
ownership) and firm innovation (e.g., R&D investments), suggesting that family firms are
able yet unwilling to innovate. There are mixed findings regarding the ability school,
indicating the heterogeneity associated with family firms’ ability to innovate. While both
schools of thought contend that family firms can “do more with less” (Duran et al., 2015),
when this occurs remains less clear.
Innovation is more than R&D investment (Teece, 2007); innovation requires
intense knowledge and various types of capabilities to identify new opportunities
externally and to pursue these opportunities (Winter, 2003). Family firms tend to possess
distinctive resources and capabilities generated through family management, such as a
family member holding the CEO position (Minichilli et al., 2010). Therefore, family
CEOs may behave distinctively with respect to firm innovation due to these idiosyncratic
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capabilities deriving from family management, rather than merely from family
ownership. Consequently, family CEOs may have a critical impact on innovation
opportunity identification, pursuit, and resource orchestration. Research exploring why
and how family management gives rise to idiosyncratic resources and capabilities and has
an impact on family firm innovation can provide valuable insights.
To fill this research gap, this research focuses on the role of family CEOs in firm
innovation and extends prior studies of the heterogeneity of family firm innovation. By
employing this perspective, this research argues that the presence of family CEOs in
firms may give rise to idiosyncratic capabilities to innovate. Next, this research presents a
capability-based perspective of firm innovation to explore the top manager’s role in firm
innovation, thus, providing theoretical underpinnings for the development of hypotheses
in the next chapter.
2.2

A Capability-Based Perspective of Firm Innovation
To understand firm innovation, scholars broadly draw on a set of theoretical

perspectives (e.g., the RBV, organizational learning literature, and network theory) to
explore how a variety of innovation determinants impact different dimensions of firm
innovation (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010). The RBV, one of the most prominent
perspectives in firm innovation literature, is employed to identify sustainable, unique, and
valuable resources and capabilities as the sources of competitive advantage (Barney,
1991) in terms of firm innovation. However, distinctions exist between resources and
capabilities. While resource endowments—referring to all of a firm’s assets and
organizational attributes (Barney, 1991)—are critical for new product and service
development, innovation capabilities denote a special type of resource that is generated
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by combining and recombining resources to make a firm dynamic (Amit & Schoemaker,
1993). Therefore, innovation capabilities, compared with resource endowments, are more
critical to a firm’s adaptation to changing environments. Aligned with this distinction,
organizational literature emphasizes the dynamic nature of firm innovation and highlights
the importance of continual innovation (Helfat et al., 2009). Accordingly, innovation
capabilities of a dynamic nature are central to understanding a firm’s competitive
advantage from innovation.
Innovation—a process of exploiting opportunities to commercialize new products,
services, and processes (Drucker, 1985)—reflects a firm’s capability to respond to
changing environments (Brown & Duguid, 1991). Superior firm innovation is determined
by a firm’s dynamic capabilities to a great extent, which can be disaggregated into the
capacity of opportunity sensing, opportunity seizing, and resource transforming (Teece,
2009). In addition, these capabilities are associated with top managers and are derived
from their managerial attributes (Adner & Helfat, 2003). Drawing on prior literature
about firm innovation and dynamic capabilities, this section provides an integrated
capability-based perspective of firm innovation, in an attempt to explain how and why
firm innovation is influenced by top managers in a firm (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1

A Capability-Based Perspective of Firm Innovation: Resources and
Capabilities underlying Firm Innovation

Note: All possible relationships between concepts are not completely presented in this
figure. The dotted box highlights the focus of this research.
To present a capability-based perspective of firm innovation, this research first
reviews the RBV in general and distinguishes capabilities from resources (2.2.1). In the
following section, this research defines firm innovation (2.2.2), emphasizing the
capabilities underlying firm innovation. Dynamic capabilities (2.2.3) are then introduced,
highlighting the dynamic feature of firm innovation capabilities. Next, this research
reviews TMT managerial resources (2.2.4) on which these dynamic capabilities depend
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and highlights the leading role of a CEO in the TMT to explore the CEO’s managerial
capabilities (2.2.5), thus shedding light on what managerial attributes influence firm
innovation and why these attributes influence firm innovation. Finally, a summary of the
capability-based perspective of firm innovation (2.2.6) is presented, providing the basis
for theoretical development in the next chapter.
2.2.1

The RBV: Resources and Capabilities
Based on the assumption that a firm’s resources and capabilities are

heterogeneous and less transferrable across firms, the RBV contends that a firm’s
competitive advantage comes from unique resources and capabilities possessed by the
firm (Barney, 1986, 1991). To achieve sustainable competitive advantage, these
distinctive competencies must be valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable within
practical time and budget constraints (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Among the
various forms of competencies, such as physical assets, invisible capabilities,
organizational processes, information, and knowledge (Barney, 1991), the CEO of a firm
is identified as a particular form of firm resource that possesses idiosyncratic qualities
and general, industry-specific, and firm-specific skills that are critical to decision-making
and firm performance (Castanias & Helfat, 1991).
While distinctions exist between resources and capabilities (Amit & Schoemaker,
1993; Leiblein, 2011; Makadok, 2001), successful innovation can rely on unique
resources and/or capabilities. Innovation capabilities may take the form of resource
deployment, integration, reconfiguration, recombination, and divesture (Lee, 2008;
Sirmon & Hitt, 2009; Leiblein, 2011; Sirmon et al., 2011). In comparison to resources,
capabilities are more firm-specific, are deeply embedded in firms, and are less
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transferrable across firms (Makadok, 2001), allowing firms to reconfigure resources to
remain in congruence within a dynamic environment. As a consequence, capabilities are
more likely to be built within firms rather than bought externally and to be developed as
the source of competitive advantage (Teece, 2007).
Based on such distinctions, firms can create value through two different
mechanisms: resource-picking and capability building (Makadok, 2001). The resourcepicking mechanism primarily draws on managers’ information and cognition to “pick”
valuable and rare resources from external markets, while the capability-building
mechanism depends on managers’ “construction techniques” to deploy resources and to
transfer “raw materials” internally (Makadok, 2001). Concerning firm innovation, firms
may remain innovative through external technology acquisitions (Lichtenthaler, 2011;
Van de Vrande, De Jong, Vanhaverbeke, & De Rochemont, 2009), which reflect a
resource-picking mechanism. Alternatively, a capability-building mechanism for firm
innovation underlines the central role of internal R&D activities in forming firms’
competitive advantage.
2.2.2

Firm Innovation
In organizational studies, firm innovation refers to the adoption of changes within

firms (Knight, 1967) and is described as a critical tool of firms to exploit external
opportunities by providing newness (Drucker, 1985). Therefore, firm innovation consists
of a set of activities (e.g., R&D investments and/or technology acquisitions) through
which firms identify new opportunities and generate, accept, and implement new ideas
(Thompson, 1965). Innovation also can be observed through a variety of outcomes,
including improved products, services, and production processes (Kimberly, 1981;
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Knight, 1967). While firm innovation can be internally invented or externally acquired
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), this study focuses on internal firm innovation.
As one of the most critical firm behaviors that shape firm competitive advantage
and influence firm performance (Thompson, 1965), firm innovation has two features.
First, innovation is costly, given the required investments in critical resources and
capabilities (Kirzner, 1978). Firms need to recognize the necessity for change, determine
the search patterns and procedures, and find distinctive ways to respond to change
(Knight, 1967; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). During this process, new opportunities are
recognized and critical activities (e.g., R&D investments) are required to seize these
opportunities. Second, given the synergetic nature of newness generation, the essence of
firm innovation is resource (re)combination and knowledge creation (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990). This synergetic process can be observed within a functional department (e.g., in
the R&D department in which technological development is achieved), as well as for
cross-functional coordination (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Pisano, 1997). Therefore, the
outcome of firm innovation can be manifested as the launch of new products or as the
increased sales achieved by selling these new products; the latter form considers the risks
associated with the high uncertainty of customer acceptance of the new products
(Grossman & Helpman, 1993) and relies on cross-functional coordination (e.g., the
coordination among the R&D, production, and marketing departments) to a greater
extent.
Firms differ widely concerning innovation. The difference primarily derives from
firms’ capabilities for new opportunity identification and resource orchestration to create
the newness. When firms have superior opportunity recognition capabilities, they may
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engage in intensive R&D activities (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Pisano, 1997). Superior
innovation outcomes tend to be achieved when firms have greater integration and
knowledge absorbing capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996; Henderson &
Clark, 1990) to synthesize new streams of activities with the existing ones (Lawson &
Samson, 2001). Accordingly, successful firm innovation requires adopting the best
practices to create new products and delivering superior new products and services to
customers (Teece, 2007). From this perspective, innovative firms tend to invest intensely
in R&D (Teece, 2007) and to achieve superior innovation output in terms of converting
R&D investments into sales (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).
To summarize, firm innovation, recognized as a critical driver for firm growth
(Thompson, 1965), can be observed through innovation input (e.g., R&D investment) and
innovation output (e.g., firm sales). To have a sustainable competitive advantage, firms
must continually generate and implement complementary activities to respond to
environmental changes (Teece & Pisano, 1994). The variations across firms concerning
innovation are dependent primarily on firms’ dynamic capabilities that enable them to
sense and seize opportunities and to orchestrate resources to create newness (Teece,
2007). Not surprisingly, dynamic capability literature has been increasingly employed in
organizational studies to advance the understanding of firms’ competitive advantages in
terms of innovation (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010).
2.2.3

Dynamic Capabilities
Organizational capabilities can be categorized into various levels, including

ordinary capabilities and dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994). While ordinary capabilities
are embedded within firms’ value creation activities through day-to-day living, dynamic
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capabilities include the capabilities of opportunity sensing and seizing and asset
orchestration that allow firms’ adaptation to changing environments (Daspit, D'Souza, &
Dicke, 2016; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003).
According to the dynamic nature of competition, firms’ competitive advantages
concerning innovation are more likely derived from their superior dynamic capabilities
rather than from their ordinary capabilities, especially for firms in high-velocity
environments.
Dynamic capabilities can be disaggregated into the capabilities of opportunity
sensing, opportunity seizing, and resource transforming (Teece, 2007). The opportunity
sensing capability allows firms to continually scan, search, and explore—locally and
distally—to identify opportunities and threats. During this process, firms need to
overcome a narrow search horizon and to interpret new arising phenomenon in
technologies and markets (Teece, 2007). Opportunity seizing requires activities such as
R&D investments; investment patterns and timing are critical to superior opportunity
seizing (Teece, 2007). The skills and leadership of top managers influence firms’
resource orchestration capabilities, through which firms are able to recombine and
reconfigure assets and resources internally (Teece, 2007). While opportunity sensing and
seizing capabilities underpin firm innovation input, resource orchestration capabilities are
more likely to have an impact on firm innovation output.
To build dynamic capabilities, firms need extensive external communications to
sense necessary changes caused by external factors and to seize these recognized
opportunities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Further, firms require cross-functional
coordination and integration to orchestrate resources internally (Eisenhardt & Martin,
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2000; Teece et al., 1997). Drawing on these two mechanisms, firms can create new
patterns of activities through organizational learning and sustaining innovativeness
(Brown & Duguid, 1991; Kim &Mahoney, 2010; Lawson & Samson, 2001; Teece et al.,
1997).
Firms’ dynamic capabilities partially reside within their top managers (including
CEOs and other TMT members) (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Augier & Teece, 2009; Daspit,
Ramachandran, & D'Souza, 2014; Kor & Mesko, 2013; Teece, 2012) and are largely
determined by top managers’ abilities to identify new opportunities and integrate new
ideas and knowledge with the existing capabilities (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000).
Therefore, it is dynamic managerial capabilities—drawing on top executives’ human
capital, social capital, and cognition (Adner & Helfat, 2003)—that allow firms to
innovate and revitalize. The next section reviews prominent managerial resources (e.g.,
human capital and social capital) associated with top managers and explores why these
managerial competencies shape firms’ dynamic capabilities in terms of firm innovation.
2.2.4

TMT Managerial Resources
Due to their central role in decision making and resource allocation, top managers

are identified as innovation drivers of firms (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Barker & Mueller,
2002; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Qiang et al., 2013). Prior studies primarily draw on
upper echelons theory, exploring how the experiences, skills, and cognitions of top
managers shape firms’ vision of innovation and predict firm innovation strategies
(Crossan & Apaydin, 2010). According to upper echelons theory, the demographic
characteristics of top managers (e.g., age, education level, firm tenure, and functional
background) are proxies for the psychological constructs, such as values and beliefs, of
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firms’ adaptation to rapidly changing environments (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Barker &
Mueller, 2002; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
Recently, capability literature has attracted increasing research attention,
suggesting that top managers’ human capital and social capital are micro-foundations of
firms’ dynamic capabilities (Helfat & Martin, 2015). The leadership experiences and
skills of top managers shape firms’ opportunity identification and resource configuration
capabilities (Beck & Wiersema, 2013; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Teece, 2012).
Accordingly, top managers’ managerial attributes are predictors of firms’ abilities to
diagnose threats, their actions in response to changing environments, and their continual
seeking of activities to renew (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Teece, 2012). In addition, TMTs
are recognized as an integrated group within firms; therefore, the group-level
characteristics of TMTs tend to influence firm innovation.
The next sections review TMT managerial resources by (a) categorizing these
resources into externally- and internally-linked TMT resources and (b) discussing the
group-level characteristics of these resources. To achieve this goal, this section is
organized into two parts: (2.2.4.1) externally- and internally-linked TMT resources and
(2.2.4.2) group-level TMT characteristics. In doing so, this research provides answers to
the what question—what managerial attributes influence firm innovation—and sheds
light on why and how top executives impact firm innovation.
2.2.4.1

Externally- and Internally-Linked TMT Resources
Prior studies predominantly draw on upper echelons theory, positing that top

managers make innovation decisions depending on their psychological characteristics,
such as values and cognitions. Observable demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
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education, tenure, and functional background) are used as proxies of managers’ values
and cognitions (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
According to these studies, top managers’ education and firm tenure are critical
predictors of firm innovation (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Kor, 2006). For example,
while a long-tenured manager accumulates firm-specific knowledge, the manager is also
regarded as an insider lacking a new perspective of the business and tending to commit to
the status quo and is thus less likely to invest in R&D (Kor, 2006). Accordingly, studies
attempting to link top managers’ firm tenure and innovation have reported mixed results
(e.g., Auh & Menguc, 2005; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Camelo, Fernández-Alles, &
Hernández, 2010).
The literature on dynamic capabilities highlights top managers’ critical roles in
opportunity sensing, opportunity seizing, and resource transformation (Augier & Teece,
2009; Helfat & Martin, 2015). Unlike upper echelons theory, the literature on dynamic
capabilities contends that top executives’ knowledge, experiences, and skills are
measures of their human capital and social capital rather than proxies of their
psychological constructs, such as values and beliefs (Helfat & Martin, 2015). Human
capital—referring to an individual’s learned skills and knowledge relating to their
cognitive abilities—can be developed through prior experience, training, and education
(Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011). Consistent with strategic human capital literature (Wright,
Coff, & Moliterno, 2014), studies on firm dynamic capabilities suggest that the
substantial knowledge, experience, skill, and education possessed by top managers are
critical to firms’ search scope for newness, the speed of complex information processing,
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and the transformation of resources to launch new products or new services (Helfat &
Martin, 2015).
This research reviews these managerial resources, in an attempt to categorize
them into two subgroups that underpin innovation input and innovation output. This
research labels top managers’ prior organizational experiences and current external
connections (e.g., directorship in other firms) as externally-linked resources that shape
top managers’ perceptions of emerging innovation opportunities (Crossland, Zyung,
Hiller, & Hambrick, 2014) and allow them to seize these opportunities (Kor, 2006).
Conversely, firm tenure, team tenure, and intra-firm managerial variety—denoting
internally-linked resources possessed by top managers—predict firms’ resource
transformation capabilities, through which coordination and integration can be achieved
within the firms (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007).
Prior organizational experiences. A top manager who has rich prior
organizational experiences tends to have broad managerial insights. For instance, an
organization’s adoption of an innovation (i.e., the adoption of Total Quality Management
in a hospital) is positively related to its top managers’ previous exposure to such
innovation in other organizations (Young, Charns, & Shortell, 2001). In addition, with
high job variety in other organizations, a top manager tends to expand the network of ties
by establishing a link between the previous organization and the new one (Granovetter,
1973). As a consequence, a top manager’s migration across firms can expand the working
experience and broaden the search scope for newness, acting as a diffusion mechanism
for innovation to some extent (McKinney, Kaluzny, & Zuckerman, 1991). The evidence
also shows that the diversity of top managers’ prior (industry) experience decreases their
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information redundancy and enhances new information exposure and opportunity
recognition (Alexiev, Jansen, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2010). Therefore, top
managers’ prior experiences in other organizations can enhance their perception of
emerging innovation opportunities that underpin innovation input.
External connections. The goodwill embedded in top managers’ external
relationships can enhance firms’ opportunity sensing and seizing capabilities (Helfat &
Martin, 2015). Top managers’ external connections give firms access to new information
and knowledge, as well as human and financial capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002). For
instance, entrepreneurs’ social relationships abroad influence firms’ geographic
diversification (Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010), and managers’ social networks can lead
to superior firm performance (Acquaah, 2012; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Among
various forms of social relationships, top managers’ directorships at other firms have a
salient impact on strategic change (e.g., firm acquisition) through a learning process
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Haunschild, 1993). Regarding firms’ dynamic
innovation capabilities, top managers’ current external relationships at other
organizations may help them seek advice externally, find joint solutions with other firms,
and observe other firms’ critical strategic decisions. Firms in which top managers have
more external connections tend to invest more in R&D (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).
In summary, a top manager accumulates experiences and sharpens managerial
skills by working in other organizations previously and/or serving in other organizations
currently. These externally-linked resources are critical to firm innovation input because
top managers with high levels of these resources can sense opportunities in a timely
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manner and seize opportunities with required knowledge and resources. The role of these
resources in firm innovation is salient, particularly in high-velocity environments.
After R&D investment occurs, firms need to allocate, combine, reconfigure, and
orchestrate resources across functional departments to generate new products and
services (Teece, 2007). Internally-linked managerial resources associated with top
managers—firm tenure, team tenure, and intra-firm career variety—can contribute to this
process, leading to firm growth through the successful selling of new products and
services to customers. Thus, firm tenure, team tenure, and intra-firm career variety,
labelled as internally-link managerial resources in this research, underpin innovation
output.
Firm tenure and team tenure. Prior studies drawing on upper echelons theory treat
firm tenure and team tenure as proxies of psychological constructs that reflect the top
managers’ attitudes toward firms’ risky behaviors, such as the adoption of innovation
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). According to these studies, top
managers with long firm tenure are less likely to undertake innovative activities due to
their commitment to the status quo and their risk-averse propensities (Bantel & Jackson,
1989). In contrast, short-tenured top managers tend to invest more in R&D to prove
themselves as competent (Chen, Hsu, & Huang, 2010; Kor, 2006). However, two metaanalyses report a non-significant (Damanpour, 1991) or a significant, positive association
(Camisón-Zornoza, Lapiedra-Alcamí, Segarra-Ciprés, & Boronat-Navarro, 2004)
between firm/team tenure and firm innovation, indicating the potential necessity of taking
an alternative perspective to explain the impact on firm innovation.
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According to the capability-based perspective of firm innovation, top managers’
tenure is a proxy of their managerial resource—a type of firm-specific knowledge
possessed by managers and the common language shared among TMT members. In
particular, long-tenured top managers have undertaken various assignments compared
with less-tenured peers and thus have accumulated firm-specific expertise (Finkelstein,
1992; Damanpour & Schneider, 2006) that facilitates firm resource transformation
(Smith, Collins, & Clark, 2005). In high-velocity environments where trust and common
understanding among top managers are critical to the innovation implementation process
(Kor, 2006), a long tenure, as one manifestation of TMT managerial resources, is
beneficial to firm innovation output.
Intra-firm career variety. Managers coordinate and integrate activities internally.
Top managers who have experienced various managerial positions within firms have
accumulated cross-functional, firm-specific expertise (Finkelstein, 1992; Damanpour &
Schneider, 2006). In addition, the managers expand the network of ties within firms and
develop a better understanding of routines across functional departments. By linking
individuals from different functional departments and sharing firm-specific knowledge
and routines, top managers who have high intra-firm career variety can achieve better
internal coordination and resource integration (Teece et al., 1997), thus facilitating
innovation output.
In summary, top managers accumulate firm-specific knowledge with prolonged
tenure and contribute to the development of cross-functional routines by taking various
managerial positions within firms. These experiences and skills can enhance firms’
resource transformation capabilities, especially during the innovation implementation
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process, and therefore are critical to innovation output, especially in high velocity
environments. After reviewing externally- and internally-linked resources associated with
top managers in this section, the next section examines TMTs as integrated groups and
discusses the group characteristics of these managerial resources that underlie firm
innovation.
2.2.4.2

Group-Level TMT Characteristics
To achieve the greatest return, TMT members must work together to identify new

opportunities, explore possible solutions, and implement innovation strategies (Bantel &
Jackson, 1989). While externally- and internally-linked resources reflect the individuallevel competencies of top managers, group-level characteristics—such as the composition
of TMT managers’ knowledge, experiences, and skills—reflect a wide range of
cognitions and beliefs and yield a stronger explanation of organizational behavior
(Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2015) and firm innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Crossan &
Apaydin, 2010). Among these characteristics, TMT diversity is a salient measure.
The existing literature argues that TMT demographic diversity (e.g., age,
education, tenure, and functional background; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Kor, 2006; Qian,
Cao, & Takeuchi, 2013; Talke, Salomo, & Kock, 2011) is a critical predictor of firm
innovation. However, opposite effects are suggested in prior studies, and empirical
analysis yields less consistent findings. For example, while most literature suggests a
positive relationship between TMT demographic diversity and firm innovation, Kor
(2006) argues the opposite, noting that TMT functional diversity mitigates firm R&D due
to divergent demands on firm resource allocation within TMTs. Concerning empirical
findings, Kor (2006) reports a negative but non-significant relationship between TMT
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functional diversity and R&D. Such an association is also observed for various forms of
TMT diversity (e.g., tenure diversity and functional diversity) in a number of other
studies (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Camelo et al., 2010; Daellenbach & McCarthy,
1999). Not surprisingly, TMT diversity is a highly controversial topic in organizational
studies (Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Nielsen, 2010).
According to the capability-based perspective, top managers jointly conceptualize
the business and shape innovation strategies (Kor & Mesko, 2013; Prahalad & Bettis,
1986). The composition of TMT managerial resources influences firm innovation
behavior through resource allocation and utilization (Ndofor et al., 2015). For example,
the diversity of TMT managerial resources may be beneficial because of the wide range
of cognitions possessed by TMT members that gives rise to task conflicts and leads to
new idea generation. TMT diversity may also generate interpersonal, affective conflicts
detrimental to decision making and group integration (Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Certo
et al., 2006; Ensley et al., 2002). While the beneficial effect is more likely to be observed
in complex, non-routine decision making, such as innovation decisions in changing
environments, the detrimental impact is salient in routine decisions that require fewer
diverse perspectives (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Certo et al., 2006; Hambrick & Mason,
1984).
The cohesion within TMTs can mitigate the above-mentioned negative effect of
TMT diversity (Certo et al., 2006) that is largely dependent on the exchange systems used
to guide interactions among TMT members. Cohesion, as an important trait of integrative
teams (Bollen & Hoyle, 1990; Long & Mathews, 2011), can mitigate affective conflicts
and enhance cognitive conflicts, thus contributing to effective coordination and new idea
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creation within teams (Ensley et al., 2002). However, the development of group cohesion
is determined by the nature of interactions, which are guided by exchange systems (e.g.,
generalized vs. restricted) employed within TMTs (Long & Mathews, 2011). Generalized
exchange systems are grounded in norms that value long-term reciprocal interactions and
focus on group-interests. In contrast, restricted exchange systems are based on
contractual arrangements and rely on short-term utilitarian calculations of self-interest
(Ekeh, 1974). TMTs in which generalized exchange systems are present tend to develop
high levels of cohesion and trust (Long, 2011; Long & Mathews, 2011) and in turn to
mitigate affective conflicts that arise from TMT diversity and contribute to task conflicts
that are beneficial to creative thinking. Accordingly, TMT diversity can be a positive
predictor of firm innovation, especially when generalized exchange systems are used for
interactions within TMTs.
In summary, top managers are critical determinants of firm innovation (Bantel &
Jackson, 1989; Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Helfat & Martin, 2015). This section reviews
substantial TMT managerial resources that underlie firm innovation and categorizes them
into externally-linked resources (i.e., prior organizational experiences and external
connections) and internally-linked resources (i.e., firm tenure, team tenure, and intra-firm
career variety). This section further explores group-level characteristics of TMTs (e.g.,
TMT diversity) that underlie firm innovation. The next section highlights the leading
figure in TMTs— the CEO of the firm— to explore the unique role of a CEO in firm
innovation.
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2.2.5

CEOs’ Managerial Capabilities
The leading role of CEOs in firm innovation has been explored in numerous

studies (Hambrick, 1994; Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, & Veiga, 2008; Peterson, Martorana,
Smith, & Owens, 2003). Grounded in the argument that CEOs have significant power,
authority, and discretion in firm decision making, prior studies suggest that CEOs’
demographic characteristics (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Kitchell, 1997), leadership styles
(Chen, Tang, Jin, Xie, & Li, 2014; Kang, Solomon, & Choi, 2015), focus on or attitudes
toward innovation (Musteen, Barker, & Baeten, 2010; Yadav et al., 2007), and promotion
type (i.e., promoted from within or hired from the outside; Balsmeier & Buchwald, 2015)
are predictors of firm innovation. While these studies identify CEOs’ leading role in firm
innovation and distinguish them from other TMT members, little effort has been
conducted to understand the interactions between CEOs and TMTs or to explore the
integrated effects of CEOs and TMTs on firm innovation.
The literature on dynamic capabilities provides valuable insights to advance the
understanding of the interactions between CEOs and TMTs. According to these studies,
firms’ competitive advantage is primarily based upon dynamic managerial capabilities
(Adner & Helfat, 2003: 1012). Among the many capabilities, CEOs’ capability to
configure and orchestrate other TMT members is identified (Kor & Mesko, 2013), which
is critical to understanding strategic leaders’ integrated role in innovation (Bergh,
Aguinis, Heavey, Ketchen, Boyd, Su, Lau, & Joo, 2016).
The configuration of TMT resources. CEOs of firms are considered the architects
of TMTs, influencing TMT composition and diversity (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005;
Finkelstein, 1992). This managerial function is facilitated when CEOs identify, recruit,
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promote, and recombine TMT members’ managerial skills and expertise (Kor & Mesko,
2013; Shen & Cannella, 2002). During this process, CEOs employ their own beliefs
about their businesses during the TMT recruitment and promotion process to identify
managerial knowledge and skills that are required in their firm. In addition, CEOs
interact with other TMT members and influence their retention in the firm (Cannella &
Holcomb, 2005; Kor & Mesko, 2013). Therefore, through TMT members’ recruitment,
promotion, and retention, CEOs configure TMT competencies (Kor & Mesko, 2013).
The orchestration of TMT resources. CEOs have essential power and discretion to
orchestrate TMT members’ competencies (Kor & Mesko, 2013). The orchestration role
describes the process through which CEOs, acting like orchestra conductors, elicit
harmonious performance from TMT members and integrate specialized knowledge to
achieve better group-level performance (Kor & Mesko, 2013). This managerial function
can be facilitated effectively when CEOs create a salient innovative vision of the business
(Sucheta & Chen, 2014; Yadav et al., 2007), foster an organizational culture that
encourages productive interactions and mutual learning (Hernandez, 2012; Mintzberg,
2009), and enhance coordination and synergies within the TMT (Kor & Mesko, 2013).
To summarize, CEOs possess power, legitimacy, and discretion to form the vision
of the firm and implement innovation strategies (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Kitchell, 1997;
Yadav et al., 2007). Their unique role in firm behavior is partly conducted through the
configuration and orchestration of TMT competencies (Kor & Mesko, 2013). Acting as
architects of TMT competencies, CEOs influence the configuration of TMTs through
TMT recruitment, promotion, and TMT resource recombination. CEOs can also promote
strong team cooperation through effective coordination and integration. Thus, the role of
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CEOs in firm innovation is distinct from that of other TMT members, reflecting CEOs’
managerial capabilities.
2.2.6

A Summary of the Capability-Based Perspective of Firm Innovation
The preceding section provides a capability-based perspective of firm innovation.

Drawing on the RBV, prior studies suggest that the difference in innovation across firms
derives from valuable and sustainable distinctive resources and capabilities possessed by
these firms (Barney, 1991). In dynamic environments, firms need to adapt to external
changes; therefore, competitive advantage in terms of innovation primarily relies on
firms’ dynamic capabilities for opportunity sensing and seizing and resource
transforming (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2009). As such, this research draws on
the capability-based perspective of firm innovation, suggesting that firms’ competitive
advantage in terms of firm innovation comes from their dynamic capabilities.
Since TMTs are the most important group within organizations (Carpenter et al.,
2004), a number of studies argue that firms’ dynamic capabilities to innovate lie in TMT
members’ competencies (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). In addition to
externally- and internally-linked resources associated with top managers, group-level
characteristics of TMTs, such as TMT diversity, are strong predictors of firm innovation
(Crossan & Apaydin, 2010). This research reviews TMT managerial resources that
underpin firm innovation and discusses the effect of TMT diversity on firm innovation,
shedding light on the necessity of building an integrated CEO–TMT model concerning
firm innovation and of understanding the integrated behavior of CEOs and TMTs. To
achieve this goal, this research discusses CEOs’ configuration and orchestration of TMT
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competencies. In doing so, this chapter provides the theoretical foundation for Chapter III
in an attempt to explore the role of a family CEO in firm innovation.
2.3

Chapter Summary
Family firm innovation has attracted increasing research attention in the past

decade and has yielded inconsistent findings (e.g., De Massis et al., 2013; Duran et al.,
2015). While a negative relationship between family ownership and innovation input is
reported in a number of studies (e.g., Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chen & Hu,
2009), such an effect is not observed in relation to innovation output. Prior studies
suggest that family firms are able to innovate yet are unwilling (Chrisman et al., 2015)
and that they can “do more with less” (Duran et al., 2015). However, why and when
family firms have such abilities remains less clear. Drawing on the heterogeneous nature
of family involvement, this chapter reviews the impact of unique intentions and
idiosyncratic resources that arise from various types of family involvement in firm
innovation. According to the existing literature on family firm innovation, a research gap
is identified, indicating that family CEOs are critical elements in understanding family
firms’ idiosyncratic abilities of firm innovation.
This chapter expands these insights to present a capability-based view of firm
innovation. Drawing on the differences between resources and capabilities, this research
suggests that firms’ innovation-related competitive advantage comes from their dynamic
capabilities and that these capabilities derive from top managers’ competencies. In
particular, top managers’ externally- and internally-linked resources, the diversity of
these resources, and CEOs’ configuration and orchestration of these resources indicate
higher-level capabilities that facilitate firm innovation. This chapter highlights the role of
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top managers’ resources and capabilities in firm innovation, providing a framework to
explore family CEOs’ distinctive impact on firm innovation in Chapter III.
Applying this capability-based perspective to the study of family business, this
research suggests that the role of family CEOs in firm innovation is two-fold. First,
family CEOs tend to have a direct impact on firm innovation because of unique goals and
idiosyncratic resources. Chapter III draws on family business literature to develop
baseline hypotheses concerning the direct impact of family CEOs on firm innovation.
Family CEOs’ indirect impact on firm innovation is then facilitated through the
configuration and orchestration of TMT resources. When family CEOs pursue familycentered noneconomic goals, firms are less likely to recruit talented TMT members,
whereas, once hired, TMT members tend to develop idiosyncratic firm-specific
managerial resources during their retention. Chapter III explores the mediation effect of
TMT members’ managerial resources on the hypothesized family CEO–firm innovation
relationship. In addition, family CEOs tend to employ generalized exchange systems to
manage interactions among TMT members that underpin the CEOs’ orchestration of
TMT resources. Chapter III explores family CEOs’ moderating impact on TMTs’
resource–firm innovation relationship.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
The purpose of this chapter is to develop the theoretical arguments and the
hypothesized relationships to be examined. Building on the review presented in Chapter
II, a series of hypotheses are introduced. This chapter is organized into the following
sections: (3.1) overview, (3.2) CEO type and firm innovation, (3.3) the family CEO’s
configuration of TMT resources and firm innovation, (3.4) the family CEO’s
orchestration of TMT resources and firm innovation, and (3.5) chapter summary.
3.1

Overview
The primary objective of this research is to further the current understanding of

family CEOs’ distinctive role in firm innovation by exploring the idiosyncratic
capabilities associated with family management. This research draws on a capabilitybased perspective of firm innovation to explore the idiosyncratic resources and
capabilities deriving from family management (family CEO) that underlie firm
innovation. In particular, it employs both a direct and an indirect model to examine
family CEOs’ unique role in firm innovation.
Drawing upon a capability-based perspective of firm innovation, this research
contends that firm innovation is one manifestation of a firm’s capability for new
opportunity sensing and seizing and resource transformation. According to this
perspective, firm innovation input (i.e., R&D investment) is depicted as a sequence of
61

strategic activities undertaken to capture recognized opportunities. Through resource
transformation, strategic assets are aligned internally, and consequently, innovation
output is achieved and firm sales are increased (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Sirmon et al.,
2011). From this perspective, low levels of innovation input observed in family firms can
be the result of family CEOs’ inability to identify and seize new opportunities. On the
other hand, such firms can do better with firm innovation output due to the idiosyncratic
managerial capabilities for resource recombination and integration associated with family
CEOs. The main effects of family CEOs on firm innovation are developed in section 3.2.
In large firms, CEOs are rarely the sole decision makers but neither do they share
equal power and legitimacy with other TMT members in decision making. Despite
CEOs’ leading role in TMTs, the existing literature is restricted to exploring the impact
of either party on firm innovation, rarely allowing both or addressing how CEO–TMT
interactions influence critical decision making and firm behavior (Ling et al., 2008;
Peterson et al., 2003). In addition to acknowledging the direct effects of CEOs on
innovation, this research distinguishes CEOs from other TMT members, suggesting that
the role of CEOs in firm innovation is also indirect, via the configuration and
orchestration of other TMT members’ competencies. In particular, this research argues
that family CEOs configure TMT resources distinctively; therefore, firms managed by
such CEOs have different TMT resource endowments and/or constraints that mediate the
relationship between CEOs and firm innovation. The hypotheses are developed in section
3.3.
Further, CEOs play a key role in orchestrating TMT competencies. Like orchestra
conductors, CEOs combine and integrate the specialized and diverse knowledge of TMT
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members to achieve greater performance (Kor & Mesko, 2013). During this process,
family CEOs tend to use generalized exchange systems, leading to cohesive and
integrative behavior on the part of TMTs and contributing to the pursuit of new
opportunities and resource transformation in changing environments. In this way, family
CEOs behave distinctively concerning the orchestration of TMT competencies. This
research argues that family CEOs moderate the relationship between TMT managerial
resources and firm innovation; the moderating effect derives from idiosyncratic
managerial capabilities associated with family CEOs. The moderating effect of family
CEOs on the TMT resource–firm innovation relationship is hypothesized in section 3.4.
A summary of hypothesized relationships is presented in Table 3.1. A research
model of this study is illustrated in Figure 3.1 and a summary (section 3.5) is provided at
the end of this chapter.
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Table 3.1

Hypothesized Relationships

Main effect: CEO type and firm innovation
H1

A family CEO-managed firm has less innovation input than a professional CEOmanaged firm.

H2

A family CEO-managed firm has greater innovation output than a professional
CEO-managed firm.

Mediation effect: TMT managerial resources as mediators (configuration role of family
CEO)
H3

Externally-linked TMT resources (i.e., prior organizational experiences and
external connections) partially mediate the relationship between the presence of
a family CEO and firm innovation input, such that a family CEO-managed firm
has lower levels of such resources than one that is professionally managed, with
these TMT resources being positively related to innovation input.

H4

Internally-linked TMT resources (i.e., firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm
career variety) partially mediate the relationship between the presence of a
family CEO and firm innovation output, such that a family CEO-managed firm
has higher levels of such resources than one that is professionally managed, with
these TMT resources being positively related to innovation output.

H5

Family involvement in the TMT strengthens the relationship between the
presence of a family CEO and externally-linked TMT resources (i.e., prior
organizational experiences and external connections), such that the relationship
is more negative when family members are involved in the TMT.

H6

Family involvement in the TMT strengthens the relationship between the
presence of a family CEO and internally-linked TMT resources (i.e., firm tenure,
team tenure, and intrafirm career variety), such that the relationship is more
positive when family members are involved in the TMT.

Moderating effect: Family CEO as moderator (orchestration role of family CEO)
H7

A family CEO positively moderates the relationship between externally-linked
TMT resources (i.e., prior organizational experiences and external connections)
and innovation input.

H8

A family CEO positively moderates the relationship between internally-linked
TMT resources (i.e., firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm career variety) and
innovation output.
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Figure 3.1
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Research Model of Family CEO and Firm Innovation

3.2

CEO Type and Firm Innovation
CEO type and innovation input. According to the capability-based perspective of

firm innovation, innovation input is contingent upon the extent to which firms recognize
innovation opportunities and the extent to which firms take activities to seize these
opportunities. Top managers’ prior experience, knowledge, skills, and social connections
are critical predictors for opportunity sensing and seizing activities (Kor & Mesko, 2013).
Compared to professional CEOs, family CEOs are argued to have constrained managerial
resources, which undermine innovation opportunity sensing and seizing with respect to
innovation input.
Identifying innovation opportunity requires a variety of cognitive capabilities.
Perception, one specific type of cognitive capability underlying opportunity sensing,
denotes the mental activities entailing the selection and the interpretation of relevant
information (American Psychological Association, 2009). Shaped by an individual’s
prior knowledge and expectation, the cognitive capability of perception affects an
individual’s information filter and quick recognition of emerging opportunities (Helfat &
Peteraf, 2015). Family CEOs, selected from a small pool of qualified candidates within
the family, are usually promoted to the CEO position in a faster way than their
professional counterparts and lack substantial working experiences outside the firm
(Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). As a contrast, professional CEOs selected from an open
candidate-pool tend to have diverse prior organizational experiences and more social
connections, which help to shape their new perceptions on business and contribute to new
opportunity recognition.
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After recognizing innovation opportunities, decision-making is required
concerning seizing these opportunities. Opportunity seizing entails reasoning and
problem-solving activities, including the justification of an investment and the acquisition
of required resources (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Unlike their professional counterparts,
family CEOs tend to justify an innovation investment by using both economic and
noneconomic criteria. For instance, the family CEO’s emotional attachment to the firm
arises from a deep embeddedness in the businesses; family CEOs may preserve these
emotional attachments (e.g., control of their firm) in the firm at the expense of other
shareholders’ economic benefits (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, 2011). Given the fact that
firm innovation is risky, the requirement of financial capital and human capital indicates
the loss of family control to some extent (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). When family CEOs
justify or reason the recognized opportunities, the propensity to preserve their gained
emotional attachment may lead to family CEOs’ conservative decisions that distract firms
from economic requirements (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011; Miller et al., 2014). As a result,
family CEOs’ noneconomic concerns shape firms’ resource allocation decisions, which
lead to the development or underdevelopment of capabilities in terms of firm innovation
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Due to these reasons, firms managed by family CEOs
are less likely to seize recognized innovation opportunities, leading to low levels of
innovation input in these firms than in firms managed by professional CEOs.
In summary, this research hypothesizes a direct relationship between CEO type
and firm innovation, suggesting firm-level consequences (i.e., decision-making
concerning innovation input) of CEO type. Compared to professional CEOs hired by both
family and nonfamily firms, family CEOs are constrained in sensing and seizing
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innovation opportunities due to their limited perceptions and the family-related reasoning
process. As a result, firms managed by family CEOs tend to invest less in innovation
input than those managed by professional CEOs.
H1: A family-CEO-managed firm has less innovation input than a professionalCEO-managed firm.
CEO type and innovation output. After making the decision to seize opportunities
through R&D activities, a firm needs to facilitate resource recombination and integration,
through which R&D investments can be converted into new products to increase sales.
From this perspective, the essence of firm innovation is resource (re)combination and
integration, the success of which largely depends on synergies during the process of
newness generation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Integration is difficult and costly,
requiring deep firm-specific tacit knowledge, a culture of fostering knowledge sharing,
and effective governance mechanisms to facilitate required activities. Unlike general
knowledge, which can be acquired outside the firm, firm-specific knowledge is less
transferrable (Grant, 1996). It is only when the CEO gains a deep understanding of the
firm that best practices can be adopted. An organizational culture that is fueled by longterm commitment and characterized by trust can disseminate knowledge throughout the
firm (De Long & Fahey, 2000; Kankanhalli, Tan, & Wei, 2005), leading to effective
resource integration and (re)combination.
Family CEOs can enhance firm innovation output in a distinctive manner. In such
firms, the family and the business are intricately intertwined (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003).
Familiness, as a bundle of unique, inseparable, synergistic, and deeply embedded
resources and capabilities (Habbershon et al., 2003), is often explored by considering
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family involvement in top managerial positions (Minichilli et al., 2010). For family
CEOs, the interactions between the family, the business, and the individual give rise to
idiosyncratic, firm-specific, and tacit knowledge, primarily due to the family CEOs’ deep
embeddedness in the business (Habbershon et al., 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). For
instance, the early active involvement of children in the firm to gain a strategic education
in the business enables the later generation to undergo enriching work experiences that
are relevant for critical positions within the firm (Cabrera-Suárez, De Saá-Pérez, &
García-Almeida, 2001; Jaskiewicz, Combs, & Rau, 2015). Family CEOs, with firmspecific tacit knowledge that has a lesser degree of transferability, enable the adoption of
best practices in terms of innovation and help to deliver superior new products to
customers, which contribute to innovation output.
Second, family CEOs are more likely to nurture a strong firm culture that
encourages knowledge-sharing activities and enhances resource integration.
Organizational culture—as one specific type of strategic resource that generates a
sustainable competitive advantage for firms (Barney, 1986)—can promote learning, risk
taking, and innovation (e.g., De Long & Fahey, 2000). Firms managed by family CEOs
can build a distinctive and hard-to-imitate organizational culture due to the ambiguity of
their origin and the families’ embeddedness in their firms’ history and dynamics
(Gersick, 1997). Unlike professional CEOs, family CEOs are the ideal person to foster a
stewardship atmosphere (Davis et al., 2010) that encourages knowledge sharing within
firms (Carnes & Ireland, 2013). In addition, family CEOs can create strong ties within the
firm to enhance interactions among individuals in the firm (Arregle et al., 2007; Long,
2011; Pearson et al., 2008; Sharma, 2008). Consequently, the strong culture within the
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firm promotes knowledge-sharing and resource combination (Carnes & Ireland, 2013),
further contributing to innovation output.
Family management, as a governance mechanism, coordinates resource
recombination and integration in an effective way (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Carney,
2005). To achieve superior innovation output, firms need a clear vision and efficient
routines through which their current activities can be extended into new streams and
resources can be reconfigured and recombined to meet the new requirements (Sirmon,
Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). When a family member takes the CEO position of a firm,
interactions between the family and the business occur on a constant basis and the
resource-enriching capabilities can be enhanced. The control systems taken by the family
CEO increase the efficiency of resource recombination and integration (Carnes & Ireland,
2013), yet another factor that plays a part in superior innovation output.
In summary, this section hypothesizes a direct relationship between CEO type and
innovation output. Compared to professional CEOs hired by both family and nonfamily
firms, family CEOs have substantial, firm-specific tacit knowledge gained through deep
embeddedness in their firms. They tend to foster a strong organizational culture that
encourages knowledge sharing and to employ effective governance mechanisms to
coordinate internal activities. Even though family firms managed by family CEOs may
invest less on R&D, these firms can be more efficient than those managed by
professional CEOs in terms of innovation output at the given innovation input level.
H2: A family-CEO-managed firm has greater innovation output than a
professional-CEO-managed firm.
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3.3

Family CEOs’ Configuration of TMT Resources and Firm Innovation
This section distinguishes the CEO’s leading role in the TMT and explores family

CEOs’ configuration of TMT resources. Family CEOs’ influence on firm innovation is
partially mediated through TMT managerial resources; this mediation effect is manifested
as family CEOs’ configuration role. This role is fulfilled through family CEOs’
managerial discretion with respect to recruiting and promoting TMT members and
developing TMT resources during their retention (Kor & Mesko, 2013). Compared to
those hired by professional-CEO-managed firms, TMT members recruited, promoted,
and retained by family-CEO-managed firms tend to have different characteristics in terms
of their managerial competencies, which are manifested as managerial resource
endowments and constraints in family firms. Therefore, in addition to the direct impact
on firm innovation, family CEOs influence TMT managerial resource configurations
such that the latter partially mediate the relationship between family CEOs and firm
innovation. In particular, this research explores the family CEO’s configuration of TMT
externally and internally linked resources, hypothesizing a mediation effect of TMT
resources in relation to the family CEO and firm innovation relationship. The discussion
is also extended to a specific situation in which family members other than family CEOs
are involved in TMTs, in an attempt to explore the joint impact of family CEOs and
family involvement in TMTs on TMT resource configuration.
Configuration of TMT externally-linked resources. Compared to professional
CEOs, family CEOs tend to develop strong emotional attachments to their firm (GómezMejía et al., 2011). Emotions usually arise as an inseparable part of daily organizational
work (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). These emotional attachments are not exclusively
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possessed by family CEOs; however, family CEOs tend to feel them particularly strongly
due to the family-related vision of the firm and the perception of firm history with blurred
boundaries between families and firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Chua et al., 1999; Zellweger
& Astrachan, 2008). These distinctive emotional attachments—manifested as family
CEOs’ belonging, affect, sense of family legacy, and security of career in firms—play a
critical role when family-CEO-managed firms recruit and promote TMT members with
the purpose to reinforce the family control or sustain family harmony (Chrisman et al.,
2012). Further, the intention to preserve these emotional attachments influences firms’
critical strategic decisions, such as those to do with diversification, IPOs, and R&D
investment (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & Kintana, 2010;
Zellweger et al., 2012). As a consequence, family firms managed by family CEOs may
pursue family-centered noneconomic benefits deviated from economic concerns
(Chrisman et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Such pursuits shape firms’ capabilities
in the long run (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006) and reduce the attractiveness of firms
to talented managers, impeding the recruitment and promotion of competent top
managers in the firms to a great extent (Chrisman et al., 2014).
In addition, compared to professional CEOs, family CEOs have great potential to
sustain family control through transgenerational succession arrangement (Long &
Chrisman, 2014; Zellweger et al., 2012), which affects the interests of relevant
stakeholders (Daspit, Holt, Chrisman, & Long, 2016). Taking a nonfamily manager hired
by a family CEO-managed firm as an example of these relevant stakeholders, the
transgenerational succession intention eliminates the possibility of a nonfamily TMT
member being promoted to the CEO position, which demotivates nonfamily TMT
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members due to the perceived limited career potential. This is further evidence that
family CEOs have a group-level influence on TMT resource endowments or constraints.
The hiring of top managers with widely diverse career backgrounds is among the
most striking trends in large firms (Crossland et al., 2014). TMT members’ diverse career
experience and their current external connections (i.e., directorship in other firms) are
regarded as specific managerial resources that help to create novelty in firms (Crossland
et al., 2014). Firms managed by family CEOs are less likely to recruit such talented TMT
members due to differing interests between family CEOs and nonfamily TMT members
and the limited career development potential for the latter.
In summary, this research argues that, in addition to firm-level consequences (i.e.,
firm innovation), CEO type has an impact on TMT resources in terms of influencing the
TMT recruitment and promotion processes, such that firms managed by family CEOs are
less likely to recruit and promote competent individuals with a variety of experiences and
skills. Because externally-linked TMT resources—such as prior organizational
experiences and external connections—are beneficial to firm innovation input, this
research hypothesizes that such resources mediate the negative relationship between
family CEOs and innovation input.
H3: Externally-linked TMT resources (i.e., prior organizational experiences and
external connections) partially mediate the relationship between the presence of a
family CEO and firm innovation input, such that a family-CEO-managed firm has
lower levels of such resources than one that is professionally managed, with these
TMT resources being positively related to innovation input.
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Configuration of internally-linked TMT resources. The presence of family CEOs
in firms may lead to resource constraints during the TMT recruitment process; however,
TMT members hired by firms can eventually develop idiosyncratic resources or
capabilities due to family CEOs’ distinctive role in TMT resource combination. In
particular, family CEOs tend to create a strong family firm identity and stewardship
atmosphere (Davis et al., 2010; Zellweger et al., 2010) on one hand, to retain competent
TMT members. On the other hand, family CEOs have salient managerial discretions and
are motivated to monitor other TMT members, which may increase top management
change caused by the leave of incapable TMT members. Thus, family-CEO-managed
firms tend to have diverse TMTs in terms of firm tenure and team tenure. Furthermore,
during their tenure, TMT members tend to develop a wide variety of intrafirm managerial
experiences due to family CEOs’ willingness to encourage TMT members’ on-the-job
learning and family CEOs’ firm-specific knowledge to appoint TMT members to
appropriate managerial positions to achieve better synergy.
Firm identity describes how individuals within a firm develop a shared
understanding of it, by which the firm can be distinguished from others (Ashforth &
Mael, 1989). Family business studies suggest that a salient family firm identity is one
manifestation of idiosyncratic familiness generated through family involvement; this
identity can also be shared among nonfamily members (Zellweger et al., 2010).
Compared to professional CEOs, family CEOs tend to influence the firm’s identity
formation process in a distinctive way. For instance, family CEOs tend to define the
business as part of the family’s legacy, imprint family-related personal values on the
organizational culture, and create the means by which the firms become distinctive
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(Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005). Through this process, firms managed by family
CEOs are more likely to develop a stronger family-related identity than their
professionally managed counterparts. As touched on above, this powerful identity can be
extended to nonfamily managers (Karra, Tracey, & Phillips, 2006; Zellweger et al.,
2010), creating a feeling of unity and leading to a long tenure of capable TMT members.
Compared to professional CEOs, family CEOs are more motivated and capable to
monitor other TMT members and, thus, to run the business in an effective way (Miller &
Le Breton-Miller, 2006). On the one hand, a family CEO, usually having concentrated
wealth in the firm, has strong intentions to manage and monitor other top managers
(Carney, 2005). On the other hand, engaging in daily managerial practices, a family CEO
has more inside information to monitor these top managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
For high-technology firms, top managers need to take actions quickly in response to
changing environments. The lack of adaptiveness is a signal that the top manager is
incapable in an industry with high-velocity. Thus, the salient managerial discretion and
effective monitoring effects associated with a family CEO may lead to the exit of
incapable TMT members.
Taken together, the presence of a family CEO leads to a more diverse TMT in
term of tenure: long tenure for capable top managers and short tenure for incapable ones.
While long tenure can increase TMT members’ firm-specific knowledge and team-shared
language (Finkelstein, 1992; Damanpour & Schneider, 2006), short-tenured TMT
members can bring new managerial insights into the firm and the top management team
(e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Thus, TMTs consisting of
managers with diverse tenure reflect a combination of a wide range of managerial
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cognition and a bundle of heterogeneous firm-specific knowledge and team experience,
which are beneficial for a firm to transform resources to capture innovation opportunities
and to achieve innovation output (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Camelo et al., 2010).
Furthermore, due to family CEOs’ strong identification with the firms, the job
security they enjoy naturally fosters long-term commitment (Davis et al., 2010; Eddleston
& Kellermanns, 2007). With a long-term orientation, family CEOs tend to initiate
farsighted investments that may take the form of investing in people through on-the-job
learning to create knowledge within the firm. Such practices can enrich managers’ intrafirm experience by encouraging their intra-firm exploration of a broader array of tasks
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Compared to their professional counterparts, family
CEOs usually have more firm-specific knowledge and a clearer vision due to their high
involvement in the firm (Carney, 2005). Family CEOs’ better understanding of the firm,
and their salient managerial discretion, enable them to promote managers to the
appropriate positions and to enrich their intra-firm career experiences. Taken together,
family CEOs are superior at encouraging TMT members’ on-the-job learning and
increasing TMT members’ tacit knowledge of the firm through a variety of intrafirm
career arrangements for these TMT members. Such intra-firm experiences help to
increase TMT members’ understanding of routines across functional departments and to
enhance cross-functional coordination, which are critical for transforming resources to
innovation outputs within the firm.
In summary, this section argues that, in addition to firm-level consequences (i.e.,
firm innovation), CEO type has an impact on internally-linked TMT managerial resource
configuration during TMT members’ retention in firms. Family CEOs tend to create
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idiosyncratic resource configurations in firms, which are denoted as familiness and take
the form of TMT members’ diverse tenure and intrafirm career variety. Such TMT
managerial resource configurations have firm-level outcomes such as effective strategy
implementation and resource integration (Gupta, 1984). Because the essence of firm
innovation can be viewed as resource (re)combination and integration (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990), internally-linked TMT resources, such as a diverse tenure and intrafirm
career variety, can lead to superior innovation output. Thus, this research hypothesizes
that internally-linked TMT resources mediate the positive relationship between family
CEOs and firm innovation output.
H4: Internally-linked TMT resources (i.e., firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm
career variety) partially mediate the relationship between the presence of a family
CEO and innovation output, such that a family-CEO-managed firm has higher
levels of internally-linked TMT resources than one that is professionally
managed, with these TMT resources being positively related to innovation output.
Family involvement in TMTs. Now that the relationships between the presence of
family CEOs, TMT resources, and firm innovation have been proposed, the extent to
which family is involved in TMTs will be examined to assess the degree to which family
involvement in TMTs influences family CEOs’ configuration of TMT resources. First,
high levels of family involvement in management may lead to less diverse organizational
experiences, cognitive capabilities, and social connections within the TMT due to family
members’ similar background. In addition, with the presence of family CEOs, the
appointment of family members to top management positions is usually regarded as the
consequence of asymmetric altruism (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). Family involvement in
77

both the selection of a CEO and TMT members strengthens families’ intentions to
preserve the control of the firm within the family (Berrone et al., 2012), leading to the
desire of transgenerational succession. Such intentions erode the attractiveness of firms in
the eyes of competent managers. As a consequence, family involvement in TMTs has an
impact on the recruitment process for the latter, such that firms are less likely to recruit
skilled members with substantial and diverse career experiences. Given the negative
relationship between family CEOs and externally-linked TMT resources, as proposed in
Hypothesis 3, this section hypothesizes that family involvement in TMTs strengthens this
negative association.
H5: Family involvement in the TMT strengthens the relationship between the
presence of a family CEO and externally-linked TMT resources (i.e., prior
organizational experiences and external connections), such that the relationship
is more negative when family members are involved in the TMT.
The presence of family ties in TMTs also influences interactions among TMT
members (Ensley & Pearson, 2005; Long & Mathews, 2011). Family business studies
suggest that high levels of family involvement foreshow the use of generalized social
exchange systems, which underpin interactions within firms’ dominant coalitions (Long
& Mathews, 2011). In contrast to restricted exchange systems that assume individuals are
self-interested and egoistic, their generalized counterparts draw on the self-actualizing
assumption of mankind and elicit reciprocal and altruistic behaviors within firms (Ekeh,
1974; Long & Mathews, 2011). At the extreme end in which firms are purely dominated
by coalitions of family members, interactions therein are more likely to be guided by the
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generalized model, which nurtures mutual trust, strong social capital, and altruistic
behavior (Long, 2011; Long & Mathews, 2011).
Family involvement in TMTs tend to influence the extent to which generalized
exchange systems are used to guide interactions therein. Because the presence of such
systems has positive consequences for TMT interactions, such as cohesion, enhanced
trust, improved cooperation, and stronger relationships (Long & Mathews, 2011), as well
as effective on-the-job learning and firm-specific knowledge gaining. Such outcomes are
more likely to exist during capable top managers’ tenure in firms, rather than in the
process of TMT recruitment. Given the presence of family CEOs, family involvement in
TMTs, by encouraging the use of such exchange systems in firms’ dominant coalitions,
may lead to prolonged firm tenure and diversified intrafirm career experiences of capable
TMT member. However, family involvement in TMTs also may increase top
management change caused by the leave of incapable top managers, leading to more
diverse TMTs in terms of firm tenure and team tenure. Thus, this section hypothesizes
that family involvement in TMTs strengthens the positive relationship between family
CEO and internally-linked TMT resources.
H6: Family involvement in the TMT strengthens the relationship between the
presence of a family CEO and internally-linked TMT resources (i.e., firm tenure,
team tenure, and intrafirm career variety), such that the relationship is more
positive when family members are involved in the TMT.
3.4

Family CEOs’ Orchestration of TMT Resources and Firm Innovation
CEOs’ orchestration of TMT resources is the process through which they, acting

like orchestra conductors, elicit harmonious performances from TMT members and
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integrate their specialized knowledge to achieve enhanced outcomes (Kor & Mesko,
2013). This concept is borrowed from conceptual work on resource orchestration (Sirmon
et al., 2011) and asset orchestration (Helfat et al., 2009), which are employed to describe
how managers effectively utilize firm resources and capabilities to achieve firm-level
results. According to these studies, although each action and resource is important, it is
the synchronization of actions and/or complementarities of resources that are critical to
firm value creation. Similar to managers’ roles in asset orchestration, the CEO’s
orchestration of TMT resources has firm-level consequences (Kor & Mesko, 2013). For
instance, CEOs can improve firm innovation by increasing cognitive conflicts and
decreasing affective conflicts within TMTs; while both types of conflicts are associated
with TMT diversity, the former is beneficial to the creation of newness and the latter is
detrimental to its implementation (Certo et al., 2006; Nielsen, 2010). During this
orchestration process, family CEOs interact with TMT members and the group-level
integrations can give rise to firm-level consequences in terms of innovation input and
output.
Similar to asset orchestration, the effectiveness of the CEO’s orchestration of
TMT resources depends on several mechanisms; these mechanisms have distinctive
impact on firm innovation input and output in family-CEO-managed firms compared to
professional-CEO-managed firms. First, family CEOs tend to create an effective common
language within the TMT, which helps to enhance knowledge-sharing activities and
increase knowledge integration. Second, family firms are usually described as high-trust
organizations (Jones, 1983), which are primarily observed between a family CEO and the
TMT members (Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & Becerra, 2010; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006).
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Third, family CEOs tend to coordinate TMT members internal activities effectively due
to the use of generalized exchange systems. The tendency of these CEOs to use
generalized exchange systems to guide interactions within TMTs not only has grouplevel consequences, such as TMT cohesion and integration, but may also yield firm-level
outcomes (Long & Mathews, 2011). Concerning firm innovation, family CEOs increase
cohesion within TMTs, allowing firms to achieve efficient coordination; further, cohesion
within TMTs—as one result of such systems—can mitigate the negative effects (e.g.,
affective conflicts) and enhance the positive results (e.g., cognitive conflicts) of their
diversity (Certo et al., 2006). As a consequence, compared to professional CEOs, family
CEOs orchestrate TMT resources uniquely and have a positive moderating impact on the
TMT resource–firm innovation relationship thus contributing to both innovation input
and output.
In summary, this section argues that family CEOs orchestrate TMT managerial
resources distinctively, so that, given the endowments (constraints) of these resources,
family CEO-managed firms achieve more in terms of both innovation input and output.
Since family CEOs tend to develop a common language among the TMT, nurture a
strong high-trust organizational culture, and use a generalized exchange system, the firms
can adapt to changing environments rapidly and effectively, thus achieving higher levels
of outcomes in terms of innovation input and output (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004).
This research hypothesizes that family CEOs moderate the relationship between TMT
managerial resources and firm innovation.
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H7: A family CEO positively moderates the relationship between externallylinked TMT resources (i.e., prior organizational experiences and external
connections) and innovation input.
H8: A family CEO positively moderates the relationship between internally-linked
TMT resources (i.e., firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm career variety) and
innovation output.
3.5

Chapter Summary
Drawing on the family business literature reviewed in Chapter II and utilizing a

capability-based perspective of firm innovation presented in the same chapter, this
chapter develops a series of hypotheses to explore the role of family CEOs in firm
innovation. This research hypothesizes that, in addition to the direct impact on firm
innovation, family CEOs configure and orchestrate TMT resources distinctively, such
that (a) TMT resources mediate the relationship between family CEOs and firm
innovation and (b) family CEOs moderate the relationship between TMT resources and
firm innovation. Chapter IV describes the methodology to be employed, including a
description of the sample and variables, as well as specifying the models. These
hypotheses are tested and results are presented in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY, ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of
methodology, statistical analyses, empirical results, and post hoc tests of this research. A
general overview of methodology is provided first, followed by a description of the data
analysis. Building from the hypotheses introduced in Chapter III, this chapter presents the
results from testing the hypothesized relationships in the research model and from
additional post-hoc tests. The results presented in this chapter will provide the foundation
for an integrated discussion of the effects of family CEOs on firm innovation in Chapter
V. This chapter is organized into the follow sections: (4.1) methodology, (4.2)
descriptive statistics, (4.3) empirical results, (4.4) post hoc tests, and (4.5) chapter
summary.
4.1
4.1.1

Methodology
Sample
This research drew its sample from publicly traded firms in high-technology

industries that are listed on the United States stock markets. The definition of a hightechnology industry comes from the AeA, the largest association of high-tech companies
in the U.S., which has been used in prior studies on firm innovation (e.g., Gómez-Mejía
et al., 2014; Li et al., 2008). AeA delineates two broad high-technology categories: hightechnology manufacturing (three digit SIC codes 357, 365, 366, 367, 381, 382, 384 and
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386) and high-technology services (three digit SIC codes 481, 482, 484, 489 and 737). To
control the variation caused by different innovation input and/or output patterns between
manufacturing and service industries, this research draws on this categorization and
focuses on high-technology manufacturing industries. Firms in these industries are ideal
for research into firm innovation, as their survival and profitability are critically
dependent on their ability to create and commercialize innovations quickly and
efficiently.
Following prior studies on top management and firm innovation (e.g., Crossland
et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013), the analysis period
spans five years, from 2010 to 2014. A five-year analysis period allows sufficient time
for the researcher to observe both TMT resource configuration changes (e.g., Crossland
et al., 2014; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013) and firm innovation patterns (Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2014). Applying this analysis period (2010-2014), this research identified 893 hightechnology manufacturing companies publicly trading in the U.S. stock market. After the
removal of inactive companies, non-U.S.-based companies, and companies for which
R&D data are unavailable, 425 high-technology manufacturing companies remained in
the sample pool.
The sample size of prior studies exploring CEO career and TMT characteristics
generally ranges from 150 to 250 (e.g., Crossland et al., 2014; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013).
A preliminary power analysis indicates that, assuming that an effect size ranges between
0.1 and 0.2 with the p-value at 0.05, a sample size ranging between 2063 and 523 can
decrease the probability of Type II error to 0.1. Thus, a sample size of 250 firms with a
five-year analysis period can generate about 1250 observations, fitting in the above84

mentioned range of sample size. This research randomly selected 250 firms from the
above-mentioned high-technology manufacturing industries that report R&D expenses in
their annual report. The sample composition is listed in Table 4.1. Data were obtained
from Compustat, firms’ annual reports (10-K) and proxy statements (DEF 14A), and
other sources such as Mergent Online and the company’s website. A panel data set was
constructed and used in this research to determine how family CEOs have a distinctive
impact on firm innovation, as compared to their professional counterparts hired in family
and nonfamily firms.
Table 4.1
SIC
357
365
366
367
381
382
384
386
Total

4.1.2
4.1.2.1

Sample Composition: High-Technology Manufacturing Industries

High-Technology Manufacturing Industries
Computer and office equipment
Household audio and video equipment
Communication equipment
Electronic components and accessories
Search and navigation equipment
Measuring and controlling devices
Medical instruments and supplies
Photographic equipment and supplies

# of randomly Selected Companies
34
5
22
75
4
36
74
0
250

Measures
Dependent Variable
Firm innovation is the dependent variable in this research. By employing a firm

innovation input-output model, this research measured innovation input and innovation
output separately. Following prior studies (e.g., Block, 2012; Balkin, Markman, &
Gómez-Mejía, 2000; Latham & Braun, 2009), this research used the natural logarithm of
R&D spending in year t as a proxy for innovation input. Sales are a proximal output of
R&D (e.g., Patel & Chrisman, 2014) and sales of innovative products are used as a
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measure of innovation output in prior studies (e.g., Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Faber
& Hessen, 2004). This research focuses on high-technology firms, in which innovative
products account for total sales to a great extent. In addition, innovation in these firms
takes the form of product innovation and process innovation, both of which can
contribute to firm sales. Thus in this research, the natural logarithm of total sales in year t
was used as a proxy for innovation output.
4.1.2.2

Independent Variable
Family CEO is the independent variable in this research and is measured as a

binary variable (Minichilli et al., 2010). This research used two steps to code family CEO.
First, all the sample firms were identified as family or non-family firms. Family firms
were identified based on family involvement in ownership and management (e.g.,
Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Villalonga
& Amit, 2006). The following criteria were applied in this first step: (1) a family owns
5% or more of the firm’s stock and (2) at least one family member (a person related by
blood or marriage to the owning family) is involved in the TMT. For instance, a firm was
identified as a family firm when the brother(s), the spouse, or a later generation of the
founder is involved in the TMT but the family owns at least 5% of the firm’s stock. The
information about family relationships among directors and executive officers can be
found in a firm’s annual reports and/or proxy statements. For non-family firms, family
CEO was coded as “0”. Second, for a family firm, when a member of the owning family
(i.e., a person related by blood or by marriage to the owning family) holds the CEO
position of the firm, family CEO was coded as “1”; otherwise, family CEO was coded as
“0”.
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4.1.2.3

Mediator and Moderator Variables
TMT has been defined in various ways in previous literature (e.g., Certo et al.,

2006). Following prior studies (e.g., Crossland et al., 2014), this research distinguished
CEO from other TMT members and defined TMT as the group of top executives holding
the non-CEO senior management positions, such as President, Chief Operational Officer
(COO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Executive Vice President (EVP), Senior Vice
President (SVP), and General Vice President (GVP), which are listed in 10-K filings and
proxy statements. Family involvement in TMT was measured by counting the number of
family members involved in the TMT (Minichilli et al., 2010).
TMT members’ managerial resources were measured based on a manual data
collection process. Multiple sources were used for data collection, including proxy
statements (DEF 14A) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
corporate histories extracted from the company’s website, and/or through Internet search.
A two-step process was used for TMT managerial resource data collection. The first step
included the data collection of each individual TMT members’ managerial resources. The
choice of the measures of these resources primarily drew on the method used in
Crossland et al. (2014) and Certo et al. (2006). For proxies of externally-linked TMT
resources, external connections were measured as the sum of current organizational titles
(e.g., directorship in other firms) that an individual has outside the firm, and prior
organizational experiences were measured as the sum of organizations that an individual
worked for, as a TMT member, before joining the focal firm. For proxies of internallylinked TMT resources, firm tenure was measured as the number of years that have
elapsed since an individual joined the firm, team tenure was measured as the number of
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years since an individual was included in the TMT, and intrafirm career variety was
measured as the sum of top managerial positions that an individual has experienced
within the firm.
The second step of data collection generated group-level measures. Prior studies
typically use the amount (e.g., the sum or the average) or the diversity of TMT
managerial resources for group-level measures (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Certo et al.,
2006; Chen et al., 2010; Kor, 2006; Young et al., 2001). This research chose the amountapproach to calculate external connections, prior organizational experiences, and
intrafirm career variety. The reason for choosing the amount-approach is that the
individual-level measure for these three variables reflects the accumulation of intrapersonal knowledge and/or the gained experience variety. For instance, external
connections and prior organizational experiences reflect a top manager’s boundaryless
career experiences across firms (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1994; O’Mahony & Bechky,
2006); the more these externally-linked resources are possessed by a firm, the better the
firm recognizes innovation opportunities. This research sums individual-level external
connections and prior organizational experiences to have the group-level measures. The
measure of individual-level intrafirm career variety reflects a top manager’s intrapersonal knowledge and expertise gained through vertical and hierarchical moves within
the firm; thus, the average of individual-level intrafirm career variety is calculated as the
group-level measure of this variable. Prior studies suggest that TMT diversity is a
promising measure for group-level attributes, especially for TMT firm tenure and team
tenure (e.g., Banel & Jackson, 1989; Certo et al., 2006). Following prior studies, this
research calculated the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean)
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as the measure of the diversity of TMT firm tenure and team tenure (Allison, 1978;
Carpenter, 2002; Crossland et al., 2014).
4.1.2.4

Control Variables
This research used a number of control variables, which can be categorized into

three sets. The first set of control variables includes (1) family ownership, measured as
the percentage of overall ownership held by the family for family firms and 0 for nonfamily firms, (2) firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total equity
lagged at t – 1, (3) firm performance, measured as return on assets (ROA) lagged at t – 1,
(4) firm age, measured as the current year minus the year of the firm’s founding, (5)
managerial ownership, measured as the percentage of overall ownership held by the
CEO. These variables are widely used in studies in which firm-level outcomes (e.g.,
Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014) and TMT composition characteristics
(e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013) are the dependent variables of the model. Following prior
literature, this research included these variables in all the testing models.
The second set of control variables are those widely used in models when firm
innovation input and output are the dependent variables (e.g., Block, 2012; Chrisman &
Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). This set of control variables includes (1)
organizational slack lagged at t – 1, which consists of absorbed slack, measured as the
assets/liability ratio, potential slack, measured as the debt/equity ratio, unabsorbed slack,
measured as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, and (2) sales growth,
measured as the average rate of sales growth over the last three years.
This research controlled the variables critical to TMT characteristics (e.g., Nielsen
& Nielsen, 2013) when TMT resource configuration is the dependent variable. This set of
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control variables includes (1) board independence, measured as the percentage of
independent directors on board, (2) CEO educational background, measured as “1” when
the CEO’s educational background is primarily related to natural science and
engineering, “2” when the CEO’s educational background is primarily related to business
and management, and “3” when the CEO’s educational background is primarily related to
other disciplines such as psychology and law, (3) CEO firm tenure, measured as the
number of years that have elapsed since the CEO joined the firm, (4) CEO duality,
measured as “0” when the CEO did not take any dual role, “1” when the CEO was also
either the Chairperson or the President of the company, and “2” when the CEO is also
both the Chairperson and the President of the company, (5) CEO managerial resource
variables (i.e., CEO prior organizational experiences, CEO external connections, CEO
tenure, and CEO intrafirm career variety). The reason for controlling CEO managerial
resource variables is based on the fact that the CEO, assuming a critical role of
configuring TMT competencies (Kor & Mesko, 2013), was not included in the
calculation of team-level TMT resource variables (i.e., prior organizational experiences,
external connections, firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm career variety) in this
research. Thus, this research controlled the respective variables for CEO when the TMT
managerial resource variables were the dependent variables in a model.
A summary of variables and measures is presented in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2

Summary of Variables and Measures

Variable
Dependent variable
Innovation input
Innovation output
Independent variable
Family CEO

Measure/Description
Natural logarithm of R&D spending
Natural logarithm of total sales

A binary variable (1, if a family member takes the CEO position of the
firm; 0, otherwise)
Mediator (TMT managerial resources)
External connections
Sum of TMT members’ current directorship and/or other connections
outside the firm
Prior organizational
Sum of organizations that TMT members were hired as a top manager
experiences
before joining the firm
Firm tenure
Coefficient of variation of TMT members’ firm tenure
Team tenure
Coefficient of variation of TMT members’ team tenure
Intrafirm career variety
Average of TMT members’ managerial positions held within the firm
Moderator
Family involvement in TMT
Number of family members in the TMT
Control variables
Family ownership
Percentage of shares owned by the family
Firm size
Natural logarithm of a firm’s one year lagged total assets
Firm performance
One year lagged return on total assets (ROA)
Firm age
Number of years elapsed since a firm’s founding
Managerial ownership
Percentage of shares owned by the CEO
Absorbed slack
One year lagged assets/liability ratio
Potential slack
One year lagged debt/equity ratio
Unabsorbed slack
One year lagged ratio of current assets/current liabilities
Sales growth
Average of the percentage of sales growth over the last three years
Board independence
Percentage of independent directors on board
CEO educational
A categorical variable (1, if the CEO’s educational background is
background
primarily related to science and engineering; 2, if the CEO’s educational
background is primarily related to business and management; 0,
otherwise)
CEO firm tenure
Count of the years since the CEO joined the firm
CEO duality
A categorical variable (1, if the CEO also holds the Chairperson or the
President position; 2, if the CEO also holds the Chairperson position and
the President position; 0, otherwise)

4.2

Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4.3. In general, 24% of the sample is

family-CEO-managed firms. Specifically, 41% of the sample is family firms, in which
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62% are managed by a family CEO. These numbers are consistent with prior family
business studies using publicly traded firms as the sample (Block, 2012; Chrisman &
Patel, 2012). On average, these firms have been in business for 31.04 years. The mean of
innovation input and innovation output is lower in family-CEO-managed firms, as
compared to professional-CEO-managed family and non-family firms. The mean of
externally-linked TMT resources (i.e., TMT external connections and TMT prior
organizational experiences) in family-CEO-managed firms is higher than those in
professional-CEO-managed family firms but lower than those in their nonfamily
counterparts. The mean of internally-linked TMT resources (i.e., TMT firm tenure, TMT
team tenure, and TMT intra-firm career variety) in family-CEO-managed firms is lower
than professional-CEO managed family and non-family firms.
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Table 4.3

Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
ALL Sample

Innovation input
Innovation output
Family CEO
TMT external connections
TMT prior org experiences
TMT firm tenure
TMT team tenure
TMT intrafirm career variety
Family involvement in TMT
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
Absorbed slack
Potential slack
Unabsorbed Slack
Sales growth
Board independence
CEO educational background
CEO firm tenure
CEO duality
CEO tenure
CEO external connections
CEO prior org experiences
CEO intrafirm career variety
Observations

Mean
Std.
2.85
2.34
5.03
2.59
0.24
0.43
0.61
1.80
10.16
7.95
0.60
0.28
0.70
0.28
2.61
0.95
0.05
0.24
9.52
17.39
4.98
2.33
-42.10
271.83
31.04
21.58
6.76
13.38
111.31
576.04
45.51
415.57
4.19
4.44
20.28
135.04
74.89
15.64
1.42
0.74
13.43
10.35
1.16
0.57
9.26
8.36
0.66
1.14
2.22
1.89
3.47
2.13
1092

Family-CEOManaged Firm
Mean
1.54
3.83
1.00
0.42
7.38
0.52
0.52
2.36
0.13
25.29
3.89
-80.95
27.38
21.68
74.00
19.15
3.66
13.51
65.97
1.27
19.31
1.42
15.88
0.43
1.89
3.34

Std.
2.07
2.01
0.00
1.39
5.07
0.27
0.30
0.96
0.33
22.56
1.74
463.78
17.81
20.56
170.89
484.46
3.11
80.40
16.75
0.67
11.59
0.64
10.72
0.90
2.03
2.63
278

ProfessionalCEO-Managed
Family Firm
Mean
Std.
1.67
1.82
3.90
1.80
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.93
7.30
6.41
0.59
0.31
0.57
0.28
2.67
0.79
0.08
0.34
19.57
16.43
3.81
1.88
-51.13
285.76
37.12
25.25
3.00
3.41
100.06 328.62
11.06
514.56
5.45
5.64
11.14
38.96
68.46
16.68
1.58
0.75
12.09
10.77
0.97
0.54
6.57
6.26
0.40
0.92
2.07
1.79
3.60
1.67
172

Nonfamily Firm
Mean
3.78
6.01
0.00
0.83
11.88
0.63
0.62
2.70
0.00
0.07
5.79
-20.67
32.05
1.62
130.45
64.86
4.03
22.55
80.27
1.43
11.54
1.11
7.24
0.84
2.33
3.54

Std.
2.17
2.57
0.00
2.13
8.41
0.28
0.27
0.95
0.07
0.89
2.32
126.99
22.14
1.62
737.77
359.32
4.56
161.43
12.51
0.76
8.56
0.51
5.71
1.27
1.83
2.04
642

The correlation matrix is provided in Table 4.4. Family CEO is negatively
correlated with firm innovation input, innovation output, and all proxies of externallylinked and internally-linked TMT resources. TMT external connections, TMT prior
organizational experiences, and TMT intrafirm career variety are positively correlated
with both innovation input and innovation output.
Concerning the correlation between family CEO and control variables, family
CEO is positively correlated with CEO firm tenure, CEO tenure, CEO duality, family
ownership and managerial ownership, while the correlation between family CEO and
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other control variables, such as board independence, firm performance, firm age and
unabsorbed slack, is negatively significant.
Concerning the correlation between firm innovation and control variables, CEO
external connections, CEO intrafirm career variety, board independence, firm size, firm
performance, firm age, potential slack are positively correlated with firm innovation input
and innovation output. Managerial ownership, family ownership, absorbed slack and
unabsorbed slack are negatively correlated with innovation input and innovation output.
While CEO tenure is negatively correlated with innovation input, the correlation between
CEO firm tenure and innovation output is positive.
Concerning the correlation between TMT resource variables and control
variables, TMT external connections are positively correlated with CEO external
connections. TMT prior organizational experiences are positively correlated with CEO
prior organizational experiences. TMT intrafirm career variety is positively correlated
with CEO intrafirm career variety. CEO firm tenure is negatively correlated with TMT
firm tenure, while CEO tenure is negatively correlated with TMT team tenure.
Among control variables, family ownership is negatively correlated with TMT
resources (i.e., TMT prior organizational experiences, firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm career variety) and CEO resources (i.e., CEO external connections and intra-firm
career variety). The correlation between family ownership and family involvement in
TMT is positive; such positive correlation is also observed between family ownership and
several CEO-related variables, such as CEO (firm) tenure and CEO duality. The highest
variance inflation (VIF) estimated in conjunction with hierarchical regression model is
4.85, indicating the concern for multicollinearity is very low in this study.
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Mean
2.85
5.03
0.24
0.61
10.16
0.60
0.70
2.61
0.05
1.42
13.43
9.26
1.16
0.66
2.22
3.47
6.76
74.89
9.52
3.85
-42.1
31.04
111.3
45.51
4.19
20.28

1
1.00
0.84***
-0.32***
0.20***
0.36***
0.02
0.11***
0.21***
-0.08**
-0.20***
0.01
-0.13***
0.00
0.26***
-0.01
0.18***
-0.35***
0.47***
-0.41***
0.77***
0.17***
0.09**
-0.11***
0.09**
-0.09**
0.01

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

1 Innovation input
2 Innovation output
3 Family CEO
4 TMT external connections
5 TMT prior org experiences
6 TMT firm tenure
7 TMT team tenure
8 TMT intrafirm career variety
9 Family involvement in TMT
10 CEO educational background
11 CEO firm tenure
12 CEO tenure
13 CEO duality
14 CEO external connections
15 CEO prior org experiences
16 CEO intrafirm career variety
17 Managerial ownership
18 Board independence
19 Family ownership
20 Firm size
21 Performance
22 Firm age
23 Absorbed slack
24 Potential slack
25 Unabsorbed slack
26 Sales growth

Table 4.4

95

3
1.00
-0.06*
-0.20***
-0.14***
-0.14***
-0.15***
0.19***
-0.12**
0.32***
0.45***
0.26***
-0.11***
-0.10**
-0.03
0.64***
-0.32***
0.53***
0.02
-0.08**
-0.10***
-0.04
-0.03
-0.07*
-0.03

2
1.00
-0.27***
0.16***
0.24***
-0.01
0.02
0.23***
-0.04
-0.06
0.12***
-0.03
0.04
0.28***
-0.09**
0.25***
-0.25***
0.39***
-0.28***
0.86***
0.24***
0.23***
-0.27***
0.13***
-0.18***
-0.07*
1.00
0.13***
0.05
-0.01
0.20***
-0.01
0.08†
-0.07*
-0.10***
-0.02
0.13***
0.01
-0.04
0.03
-0.09**
-0.02
-0.01
-0.02
-0.06*
0.02
0.01
-0.01
0.08**

4

1.00
0.25***
0.18***
-0.10***
-0.04
-0.05
-0.27***
-0.15***
-0.11***
0.11***
0.32***
-0.13***
-0.14***
0.20***
-0.19***
0.29***
0.09**
-0.21***
-0.02
0.03
0.00
0.06*

5

1.00
0.57***
-0.11**
0.00
0.04
-0.19***
-0.15***
-0.07*
0.00
0.17***
-0.09**
-0.09**
0.08*
-0.08*
-0.05
0.01
0.06*
0.01
0.03
-0.01
0.00

6

1.00
0.02
-0.02
-0.03
0.00
-0.06†
-0.05†
0.01
0.07*
-0.04
-0.17***
0.10**
-0.18***
0.09
-0.09**
0.04
0.05
0.01
0.05
0.03

7

1.00
-0.02
0.00
0.14***
-0.02
0.01
0.19***
-0.01
0.24***
-0.15***
0.07*
-0.15***
0.15**
0.05
0.24***
0.06*
-0.04
-0.01
-0.06†

8

Mean
0.05
1.42
13.43
9.26
1.16
0.66
2.22
3.47
6.76
74.89
9.52
3.85
-42.1
31.04
111.3
45.51
4.19
20.28
Mean
74.89
9.52
3.85
-42.1
31.04
111.3
45.51
4.19
20.28

9
1.00
0.12**
0.13***
0.19***
0.05†
0.06†
0.04
-0.04
0.12***
-0.08**
0.19***
0.05
0.01
-0.05†
-0.02
0.01
-0.05†
-0.01
22
1.00
-0.47***
0.19***
0.29***
0.20***
-0.07*
0.10***
0.03
0.03

Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; † p<0.10

18 Board independence
19 Family ownership
20 Firm size
21 Performance
22 Firm age
23 Absorbed slack
24 Potential slack
25 Unabsorbed slack
26 Sales growth

9 Family involvement in TMT
10 CEO educational background
11 CEO firm tenure
12 CEO tenure
13 CEO duality
14 CEO external connections
15 CEO prior org experiences
16 CEO intrafirm career variety
17 Managerial ownership
18 Board independence
19 Family ownership
20 Firm size
21 Performance
22 Firm age
23 Absorbed slack
24 Potential slack
25 Unabsorbed slack
26 Sales growth

Table 4.4 (Continued)

96

11
1.00
0.75***
0.21***
-0.03
-0.49***
0.33***
0.20***
-0.01
0.18***
0.15**
0.09**
0.30***
-0.07*
0.02
0.05†
-0.10**
24
1.00
0.39***
-0.06
-0.14**
-0.33***
0.07
0.09†

10
1.00
-0.05
-0.14***
-0.09*
0.03
-0.05
0.08†
-0.02
-0.13***
-0.03
-0.26***
0.00
0.03
0.00
-0.06
0.02
0.01
23
1.00
-0.13*
-0.02
-0.04
-0.04
-0.02
0.02
-0.05†

1.00
0.09**
-0.15***
0.08*
0.10***
-0.08**

1.00
0.27***
-0.07*
-0.28***
0.06†
0.34***
-0.07*
0.27***
0.11*
0.07*
0.07*
-0.04
0.05†
0.11***
-0.07*
25

12

1.00
-0.09**
0.03
-0.02
-0.11***

1.00
0.04
-0.09**
0.23***
0.20***
-0.04
0.12***
0.02
0.05
0.14***
-0.02
0.01
0.03
-0.01
26

13

1.00
-0.03
0.24***
0.39***

1.00
0.05†
0.11***
-0.06*
0.13***
-0.12***
0.15**
0.02
0.10***
-0.02
0.02
-0.08**
0.03
23

14

1.00
-0.01***
-0.03***

1.00
-0.34***
-0.16***
0.00
-0.17***
-0.13**
-0.16***
-0.26***
-0.03
0.01
-0.13***
0.00
24

15

1.00
0.27***

1.00
-0.04
0.05
-0.02
0.16**
0.06†
0.23***
-0.03
0.03
-0.05
-0.05
25

16

1.00

1.00
-0.37***
0.79***
-0.14**
-0.04
-0.12***
-0.03
-0.02
-0.04
-0.04
26

17

4.3

Empirical Results
The panel data structure usually does not meet the assumption of OLS regression

(e.g., exogenous covariates, uncorrelated errors, and homoscedastic errors); thus, OLS
regression may generate biased and inconsistent estimates (Hausman & Taylor, 1981).
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression with fixed-effect (FE) or random-effect
(RE) models is widely used to cure correlation and/or heteroscedastic error issues. This
research used the Hausman test to specify whether a FE or RE regression model is
appropriate (Judson & Owen, 1999). For all the hypothesis tests, Hausman test suggested
the use of FE models. Durbin-Watson (DW) test was used to test potential error serial
correlation for time serial data (Judson & Owen, 1999). Empirical results presented in
this study are based on the use of Stata 13.0.
4.3.1

Direct Effect – CEO Type and Firm Innovation
This research hypothesizes that the presence of a family CEO has a direct impact

on firm innovation input and innovation output (Hypothesis 1). This research used
Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.5 to test Hypothesis 1. Model 1 included all control variables.
In Model 1, firm size, firm age, managerial ownership, absorbed slack and potential slack
were positively related to firm innovation input, indicating that the larger the firm size,
the longer the firm age, the more managerial ownership, the more slack resources, the
higher levels of innovation input a firm had. However, the relationship between
managerial ownership and firm innovation input was nonlinear, indicated by the negative
effect of the square item of managerial ownership. This nonlinear relationship is
consistent with findings in prior studies, which suggest management retrenchment
associated with high levels of managerial ownership (e.g., Morck et al., 1988).
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Unabsorbed slack and sales growth were negatively related to innovation input. Model 2
regressed firm innovation input on family CEO and control variables. In Model 2, family
CEO was negatively related to firm innovation input (β=-0.303, p-value=0.007),
suggesting that a family-CEO-managed firm had less innovation input than a
professional-CEO managed firm. Specifically, the empirical results indicate that, ceteris
paribus, a family-CEO-managed firm invested 26% less in innovation input than a
professional-CEO-managed firm (e-0.303-1). Hypothesis 1 is supported.
In this research, the presence of a family CEO is hypothesized to have a positive
direct impact on firm innovation output (Hypothesis 2). Model 3 in Table 4.5 regressed
firm innovation output on control variables. In Model 3, firm size, firm performance, firm
age, absorbed slack, and potential slack were positively related to firm innovation output.
Unabsorbed slack was negatively related to innovation output. To test Hypothesis 2,
Model 4 regressed firm innovation output on family CEO and control variables. Shown in
Table 4.5, family CEO was positively related to firm innovation output (β=0.303, pvalue=0.001). In support of Hypothesis 2, a family-CEO-managed firm had greater
innovation output than a professional-CEO managed firm. The empirical results suggest
that, given innovation input, a family-CEO-managed firm had 35% greater innovation
output than a professional-CEO-managed firm (e0.303-1).

98

Table 4.5

Family CEO and Firm Innovation: Direct Impact

Intercept
Family CEO
Control variables:
Log(R&D)
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
(Managerial ownership)2
Absorbed slack
Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics

Innovation Input
Model 1
Model 2
-0.384
-0.430
(0.266)
(0.266)
-0.303**
(0.111)

0.004
(0.006)
0.473***
(0.038)
-0.0003
(0.0008)
0.031
(0.007)
0.027**
(0.010)
-0.001***
(0.0002)
6.73E-05†
(3.65E-05)
0.001***
(8.07E-05)
-0.011*
(0.0054)
-0.0002*
(0.0001)
947
0.285
28.83***

0.003
(0.006)
0.484***
(0.038)
-0.0003
(0.0008)
0.031***
(0.007)
0.045***
(0.012)
-0.001***
(0.0002)
6.64E-05†
(3.63E-05)
0.0006***
(8.04E-05)
-0.012*
(0.005)
-0.0002†
(0.0001)
947
0.293
27.12***

Innovation Output
Model 3
Model 4
3.553***
3.611***
(0.227)
(0.226)
0.303***
(0.092)
0.033
(0.028)
-0.004
(0.005)
0.290***
(0.035)
0.001*
(0.0007)
0.014**
(0.006)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.0003†
(0.0002)
0.0001†
(8.03E-05)
0.0003***
(6.99E-05)
-0.036***
(0.005)
-1.36E-05***
(0.00001)
946
0.242
20.93***

0.037
(0.029)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.278***
(0.035)
0.001*
(0.0007)
-0.014*
(0.006)
-0.011
(0.010)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0002†
(7.98E-05)
0.0002***
(6.95E-05)
-0.036***
(0.005)
-1.57E-05
(0.0001)
946
0.254
20.36***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.

4.3.2

Configuration Effect – TMT Managerial Resources as Mediators
TMT managerial resources are hypothesized to partially mediate the relationship

between family CEO and firm innovation (Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4). This research
followed a procedure outlined in Baron and Kenny (1986), which consists of three steps.
First, this research regressed the dependent variable on the independent variable (shown
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in Model 2 and Model 4 in Table 4.5); second, the mediator was regressed on the
independent variable (i.e., family CEO); third, the dependent variable was regressed on
both the mediator and independent variable. Model 5 through Model 7 in Table 4.6 were
employed to test the partial mediation effect of externally-linked TMT resources on the
relationship between family CEO and innovation input (Hypothesis 3). Model 8 through
Model 11 in Table 4.7 were used to test the partial mediation effect of internally-linked
TMT resources on the relationship between family CEO and innovation output
(Hypothesis 4).
To test Hypothesis 3, the first step was shown in Model 2, Table 4.5. As the
second step, this dissertation regressed two proxies of externally-linked TMT resources
on family CEO and control variables, which was shown in Model 5 and Model 6 in Table
4.6. In Model 5, when TMT external connections was used as a proxy for externallylinked TMT resources, CEO duality had a significant positive effect on TMT external
connections, while the CEO’s own external connections and CEO firm tenure were
negatively related to TMT external connections. Family CEO had a marginal negative
effect (β=-0.594, p-value=0.081), indicating that a family-CEO-managed firm has less
TMT external connections than a professional-CEO-managed firm. In Model 6, when
TMT prior organizational experiences were used as a proxy of externally-linked TMT
resources, firm size, firm age, and managerial ownership were positively related to
externally-linked TMT resources. Family CEO had a marginal negative effect (β=-3.038,
p-value=0.068), indicating that TMT members have fewer prior organizational
experiences in a family-CEO-managed firm than in a professional-CEO-managed firm.
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Model 7 in Table 4.6 regressed innovation input on family CEO, TMT external
connections, TMT prior organizational experiences, and control variables. Consistent
with Model 2, firm size, firm age, managerial ownership, absorbed slack and potential
slack still remained a positive effect on firm innovation input, while potential slack had a
negative effect. TMT external connections were positively associated with firm
innovation input in Model 7 (β=0.032, p-value=0.067), while TMT prior organizational
experiences did not have a significant effect. In Model 7, the effect of family CEO on
firm innovation (β=-0.297, p-value=0.007) was decreased from -0.303 to -0.297 and the
significance level had no change (p-value=0.007). Hypothesis 3 is supported by using
TMT external connection as a proxy of externally-linked TMT resources. Put in a
different way, externally-linked TMT resources (using TMT external connections as a
proxy) partially mediates the negative relationship between family CEO and firm
innovation input.
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Table 4.6

Family CEO and Innovation Input: Externally-Linked TMT Resources as
Mediator

Intercept
Family CEO
TMT external connections

TMT External
Connections
Model 5
-0.444
(0.926)
-0.594†
(0.339)

TMT Prior Org
Experiences
Model 6
-4.202
(4.541)
-3.038†
(1.662)

Innovation Input

0.022
(0.021)
-0.060
(0.084)
0.0009
(0.002)
0.039
(0.025)
0.075
(0.047)
-0.001
(0.001)

-0.037
(0.102)
0.978*
(0.415)
-0.008
(0.010)
0.286*
(0.124)
0.572*
(0.231)
-0.007
(0.005)

0.004
(0.005)
-0.176
(0.143)
-0.042***
(0.013)
0.688***
(0.154)
-0.183***
(0.065)

0.014
(0.025)
0.208
(0.695)
-0.078
(0.066)
0.563
(0.690)

-0.003
(0.006)
0.501***
(0.039)
-0.0001
(0.0007)
0.025***
(0.007)
0.052***
(0.012)
-0.001***
(0.0002)
8.68E-05*
(3.67E-05)
0.0006***
(7.93E-05)
-0.019**
(0.006)
-0.0002
(0.0001)

TMT prior org experiences
Control variables:
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
(Managerial ownership)2
Absorbed slack
Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Board independence
CEO educational background
CEO Firm tenure
CEO duality
CEO external connections
CEO prior org experiences
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics

517
0.089
3.06***

0.273
(0.227)
503
0.060
1.92*

Model 7
0.264
(0.269)
-0.297**
(0.110)
0.032†
(0.018)
0.001
(0.003)

907
0.298
22.33***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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This research followed the same three-step procedure to test Hypothesis 4. The
first step to test Hypotheses 4 is shown in Model 4 (Table 4.5). As the second step, Model
8 through Model 10 in Table 4.7 regressed three proxies of internally-linked TMT
resources on family CEO and control variables. In Model 8, when TMT firm tenure was
used as a proxy of internally-linked TMT resources, a negative association was found
between family ownership and TMT firm tenure, indicating that the more family
ownership, the lower levels of TMT firm tenure diversity. In Model 9, when TMT team
tenure was used as a proxy of internally-linked TMT resources, firm performance and
CEO duality had a negative effect on this internally-linked TMT resource, indicating that
a TMT with more homogeneous team tenure was more likely to be found in a firm with
better performance and CEO duality. In Model 10, family ownership, performance, and
firm age were positively associated with TMT intrafirm career variety, while managerial
ownership and CEO educational background had a negative effect. As shown in Model 8
through Model 10, family CEO did not have a significant effect on internally-linked TMT
resources.
Model 11 in Table 4.7 regressed innovation output on family CEO, TMT firm
tenure, TMT team tenure, and TMT intrafirm career variety. Consistent with Model 4,
family CEO, firm size, firm age, and potential slack remained a positive effect on firm
innovation output. However, a significant association between internally-linked TMT
resources and innovation output was not found in Model 11. Hypothesis 4 is not
supported.
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Table 4.7

Family CEO and Innovation Output: Internally-Linked TMT Resources as
Mediator

Intercept
Family CEO
TMT firm tenure diversity

TMT Firm
Tenure
Model 8
0.975***
(0.276)
0.093
(0.105)

TMT Team
Tenure
Model 9
1.002***
(0.292)
-0.086
(0.108)

TMT Intrafirm
Career Variety
Model 10
1.463**
(0.494)
-0.094
(0.173)

TMT team tenure diversity
TMT intrafirm career variety
Control variables:
Log (R&D)
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
(Managerial ownership)2
Absorbed slack

-0.017**
(0.006)
-7.36E-04
(0.027)
-0.001†
(0.0006)
-0.013†
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.014)
1.86E-06
(0.0003)

-0.009
(0.006)
0.006
(0.028)
-0.001*
(6.56E-04)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.005
(0.015)
1.39E-05
(3.19E-04)

0.032**
(0.011)
0.006
(0.043)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.054***
(0.013)
-0.045†
(0.024)
8.32E-04
(5.17E-04)

0.002
(0.002)
0.028
(0.042)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.043
(0.040)

-7.16E-04
(1.83E-03)
-0.025
(0.044)
5.73E-04
(0.005)
-0.078†
(0.042)

455
0.060
1.91*

461
0.043
1.34

-0.003
(0.003)
-0.155*
(0.074)
-0.005
(0.008)
0.043
(0.074)
0.010
(0.033)
527
0.107
3.83***

Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Board independence
CEO educational background
CEO Firm tenure
CEO duality
CEO intrafirm career variety
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics
Note:

Innovation
Output
Model 11
3.257***
(0.252)
0.208*
(0.102)
0.003
(0.065)
0.012
(0.060)
0.003
(0.028)
0.054
(0.038)
-3.13E-05
(0.005)
0.356***
(0.041)
9.03E-04
(7.23E-04)
0.018**
(0.007)
-0.018†
(0.011)
2.81E-04
(2.29E-04)
2.20E-04
(1.48E-04)
3.78E-04***
(7.85E-05)
-0.059***
(0.007)
8.49E-05
(1.02E-04)

811
0.311
18.18***

1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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This research hypothesizes that family involvement in TMT moderates the
relationship between family CEO and TMT managerial resources (Hypothesis 5 and
Hypothesis 6). Models 12 and Model 13 in Table 4.8 were used to test the moderating
effect of family involvement in TMT on the relationship between family CEO and
externally-linked TMT resources (Hypothesis 5). In Model 12, TMT external connections
were regressed on family CEO, family involvement in TMT, and the two-way interaction
of family CEO and family involvement in TMT, as well as control variables. CEO duality
consistently remained a positive association with TMT external connections, while CEO
firm tenure and CEO external connections, as control variables, had a negative effect on
TMT external connections. However, the two-way interaction effect was not significant
in Model 12. In Model 13, when TMT prior organizational experiences was used as a
proxy of externally-linked TMT resources, firm size and managerial ownership were
positively related to TMT prior organizational experiences. However, the two-way
interaction effect of family CEO and family involvement in TMT remained nonsignificant in Model 13. Hypothesis 5 is not supported.
Model 14 through Model 16 were used to test the moderation effect of family
involvement in TMT on the relationship between family CEO and internally-linked TMT
resources (Hypothesis 6). In Model 14, when TMT firm tenure was used as a proxy of
internally-linked TMT resources, family ownership was negatively related to TMT firm
tenure, while the two-way interaction of family CEO and family involvement in TMT did
not have a significant effect. In Model 15, family performance had a negative effect on
TMT team tenure; however, the effect of the two-way interaction of family CEO and
family involvement in TMT remained non-significant. In Model 16, family ownership,
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firm performance and firm age were positively associated with TMT intrafirm career
variety, while CEO educational background had a negative effect on TMT intrafirm
career variety. The two-way interaction of family CEO and family involvement in TMT
did not have a significant effect on TMT intrafirm career variety. In sum, Hypothesis 6 is
not supported.
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Table 4.8

Family CEO and TMT External Resources: Family members in TMT as
Moderator

Intercept
Family CEO
Family involvement
in TMT
Family
CEO*Family
involvement in
TMT
Control variables:
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial
ownership
(Managerial
ownership)2
Board independence
CEO educational
background
CEO Firm tenure
CEO duality
CEO external
connections
CEO prior org
experiences
CEO intrafirm
career variety
Number of
observations
Within R2
F-statistics

TMT
External
Connections
Model 12
-0.307
(0.933)
-0.340
(0.402)
0.562
(0.574)
-0.492
(0.727)

TMT Prior
Org
Experiences
Model 13
-4.270
(4.572)
-3.178
(1.962)
-2.042
(2.771)
-1.238
(3.624)

TMT Firm
Tenure

TMT Intrafirm
Career Variety

Model 14
0.975***
(0.277)
0.122
(0.130)
-0.058
(0.158)
-0.123
(0.219)

TMT
Team
Tenure
Model 15
1.003***
(0.292)
-0.153
(0.130)
-0.144
(0.165)
0.139
(0.225)

0.020
(0.021)
-0.064
(0.084)
8.88E-04
(0.002)
0.041†
(0.025)
0.069
(0.048)
-9.90E-04
(0.001)
0.004
(0.005)
-0.296†
(0.176)
-0.040**
(0.013)
0.667***
(0.157)
-0.201**
(0.066)

-0.043
(0.103)
0.992*
(0.416)
-0.008
(0.010)
0.281*
(0.124)
0.617*
(0.239)
-0.007
(0.005)
0.015
(0.025)
0.241
(0.848)
-0.080
(0.066)
0.693
(0.715)

-0.017**
(0.006)
-4.46-04
(0.027)
-0.001†
(0.0006)
-0.013†
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.015)
-4.19E-05
(3.08E-04)
0.002
(0.002)
0.019
(0.050)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.039
(0.041)

-0.009
(0.006)
0.007
(0.028)
-0.001*
(0.0007)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.016)
1.86E-05
(3.28E-04)
-5.89E-04
(0.002)
0.004
(0.052)
0.002
(0.005)
-0.071†
(0.043)

0.032**
(0.011)
0.005
(0.043)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.055***
(0.013)
-0.048†
(0.025)
8.81E-04†
(5.27E-04)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.193*
(0.092)
-0.006
(0.008)
0.030
(0.076)

0.297
(0.234)

Model 16
1.468**
(0.495)
-0.010
(0.208)
0.251
(0.296)
-0.095
(0.372)

517

503

455

461

0.018
(0.034)
527

0.093
2.74***

0.061
1.68†

0.061
1.64†

0.047
1.24

0.109
3.34***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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4.3.3

Orchestration Effect – Family CEO as Moderator
This research hypothesizes that family CEO has a positive moderating effect on

the relationship between externally-linked TMT resources and innovation input
(Hypothesis 7). According to the research model shown in Figure 3.1, family CEO is the
independent variable (Hypothesis 1) and TMT externally-linked resources mediate the
relationship between CEO type and firm innovation (Hypothesis 3). In Hypothesis 7, this
study suggests that the independent variable (i.e., family CEO) moderates the relationship
between the mediator (i.e., externally-linked TMT resources) and the dependent variable
(i.e., innovation input), which is a specific case of moderated mediation effect. This
specific type of model has been described (e.g., James & Brett, 1984; Preacher, Rucker,
& Hayes, 2007) and used in prior studies (e.g., Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001)1.
Employing the regression model described in these prior studies, Models 17 and Model
18 in Table 4.9 test the moderating effect of family CEO. In Model 17, family CEO had a
negative effect (β=-0.277, p-value=0.013) on firm innovation input, while the association
between TMT external connections and innovation input was not significant. The
interaction of family CEO and TMT external connections did have a positive but not
significant effect on firm innovation input. In Model 18, the effect of family CEO on
innovation input was negative (β=-0.529, p-value<0.001), while TMT prior

While the regression model of this specific type of moderated mediation effect has been described and
theoretically justified in prior studies (e.g., James & Brett, 1984; Preacher et al., 2007), critics still exist
partly due to the raised ambiguity for explaining the interaction effect of the independent variable and the
mediator (Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011). For instance, Jacoby and Sassenberg (2011) admit that the
interaction effect of the independent variable and the mediator is relevant for explaining the variance of
dependent variable. Whereas, they point out the explanation of the variance should be careful: a significant
interaction effect of the independent variable and the mediator may indicate the impact of a variable
unexamined in the model or a non-linear impact of the mediator on the dependent variable. A solid
theoretical justification should be built to articular the main effect of the independent variable and the
moderating effect on the mediator-dependent variable relationship.
1
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organizational experiences did not have a significant effect on innovation input. In
support of Hypothesis 7, the effect of the two-way interaction of family CEO and TMT
prior organizational experiences on firm innovation input was positive and significant
(β=0.026, p-value=0.009). This suggests that top managers’ prior organizational
experiences, as one type of a firm’s externally-linked TMT resources, contribute to
innovation input in family-CEO-managed firms, while this effect could not be found in
professional-CEO-managed firms. Hypothesis 7 is supported by using TMT prior
organizational experiences as a proxy of externally-linked TMT resources. This
moderating effect is plotted in Figure 4.1.
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Table 4.9

Externally-Linked TMT Resources and Innovation Input: Family CEO as
Moderator
Innovation Input
Model 17
Model 18
-0.389
-0.251
(0.269)
(0.268)
-0.277*
-0.529***
(0.111)
(0.140)
0.025
(0.019)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.065
(0.059)
0.026**
(0.010)

Intercept
Family CEO
TMT external connections
TMT prior org experiences
Family CEO*TMT external connections
Family CEO*TMT prior org experiences
Control variables:
Family ownership

-0.003
(0.006)
0.498***
(0.039)
-2.40E-04
(7.50E-04)
0.029***
(0.007)
0.049***
(0.012)
-0.001***
(2.49E-04)
7.33E-05*
(3.69E-05)
6.04E-04***
(8.00E-05)
-0.015**
(6.08E-03)
-2.19E-04
(1.22E-04)
923
0.296
22.52***

Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
(Managerial ownership)2
Absorbed slack
Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics

-0.001
(0.006)
0.501***
(0.039)
-1.72E-04
(7.43E-04)
0.026**
(0.007)
0.054***
(0.012)
-0.001***
(2.48E-04)
8.79E-05*
(3.66E-05)
6.13E-04***
(7.92E-05)
-0.020**
(0.006)
-2.01E-04†
(1.21E-04)
907
0.301
22.72***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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Innovation input

3.1
3
2.9

2.8
2.7
2.6
2.5

Low

High

TMT prior organizational experiences
Family CEO
Figure 4.1

Professional CEO

CEO Type, TMT Prior Organizational Experiences and Innovation Input

This research hypothesizes that family CEO has a positive moderating effect on
the relationship between internally-linked TMT resources and firm innovation output
(Hypothesis 8). Models 19 through Model 21 in Table 4.10 were used to test the
moderating effect of family CEO. Firm size, firm age and potential slack remained a
positive effect on firm innovation output in Model 19 through Model 21, while the
association between unabsorbed slack and innovation output was negative. In Model 19,
the effect of two-way interaction of family CEO and TMT firm tenure on innovation
output was significantly positive (β=0.275, p-value=0.048). In Model 20, the interaction
of family CEO and TMT team tenure had a marginal positive effect on innovation output
(β=0.241, p-value=0.076). In Model 21, the interaction of family CEO and TMT
intrafirm career variety had a significant positive effect on firm innovation output
(β=0.162, p-value=0.014). The results suggest that TMT firm tenure, team tenure, and
intra-firm career variety, as three proxies of internally-linked TMT resources, contributed
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to innovation output in family-CEO-managed firms, while such effect was not observed
in professional-CEO-managed firms. Hypothesis 8 is supported. The moderating effects
of family CEO on the relationship between internally-linked TMT resources and
innovation output are plotted in Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
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Table 4.10

Internally-Linked TMT Resources and Innovation Output: Family CEO as
Moderator

Intercept
Family CEO
TMT firm tenure
TMT team tenure

Model 19
3.273***
(0.245)
0.016
(0.140)
-0.028
(0.054)

TMT intrafirm career variety
Family CEO*TMT firm tenure
Family CEO*TMT team tenure
Family CEO*TMT intrafirm career
variety
Control variables:
Log(R&D)
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
(Managerial ownership)2
Absorbed slack
Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics

0.275*
(0.139)

0.048
(0.038)
0.002
(0.005)
0.354***
(0.040)
8.43E-04
(7.20E-04)
0.019**
(0.007)
-0.017
(0.011)
2.75E-04
(2.27E-04)
2.45E-04†
(1.48E-04)
3.79E-04***
(7.79E-05)
-0.060***
(0.006)
7.62E-05
(1.02E-04)
811
0.315
19.91***

Innovation Output
Model 20
3.455***
(0.249)
0.043
(0.141)
-0.026
(0.051)

0.241†
(0.136)

0.065†
(0.038)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.348***
(0.041)
8.83E-04
(7.33E-04)
0.014*
(0.007)
-0.004
(0.010)
-1.58E-04
(2.14E-04)
1.65E-04
(1.53E-04)
3.37E-04***
(7.94E-05)
-0.059***
(0.006)
7.63E-05
(1.04E-04)
833
0.309
19.94***

Model 21
3.770***
(0.232)
-0.054
(0.171)

-0.028
(0.026)

0.162*
(0.066)
0.036
(0.028)
-0.007
(0.005)
0.295***
(0.036)
0.001*
(6.79E-04)
0.011†
(0.006)
-0.015
(0.010)
-1.78E-05
(2.02E-05)
1.26E-04
(8.07E-05)
2.59E-04***
(6.88E-05)
-0.046***
(0.005)
3.69E-05
(1.02E-04)
938
0.273
18.99***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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CEO Type, TMT Firm Tenure and Innovation Output

Innovation output

5.7
5.6
5.5
5.4
5.3

Low

High
TMT team tenure

Family CEO
Figure 4.3

Professional CEO

CEO Type, TMT Team Tenure and Innovation Output
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Innovation output
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Figure 4.4
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A summary of the hypothesized relationships and empirical results are presented
in Table 4.11. Of the eight hypotheses in this research, four were fully supported, one
was marginally supported, and three were not supported. A deeper investigation into the
relationships was conducted in the following section using post hoc analysis.
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A family CEO-managed firm has greater innovation output than a professional CEO-managed firm.

H2

Family involvement in the TMT strengthens the relationship between the presence of a family CEO and
internally-linked TMT resources (i.e., firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm career variety), such that the
relationship is more positive when family members are involved in the TMT.

H6

A family CEO positively moderates the relationship between internally-linked TMT resources (i.e., firm tenure, Supported (firm tenure,
team tenure, and intrafirm career variety) and innovation output.
intrafirm career
variety; team tenure,
marginally)

H8

Supported (TMT prior
org experiences)

A family CEO positively moderates the relationship between externally-linked TMT resources (i.e., prior
organizational experiences and external connections) and innovation input.

H7

Moderating effect: Family CEO as moderator (orchestration role of family CEO)

Family involvement in the TMT strengthens the relationship between the presence of a family CEO and
Not supported
externally-linked TMT resources (i.e., prior organizational experiences and external connections), such that the
relationship is more negative when family members are involved in the TMT.

H5

Not supported

Internally-linked TMT resources (i.e., firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm career variety) partially mediate Not supported
the relationship between the presence of a family CEO and firm innovation output, such that a family CEOmanaged firm has higher levels of such resources than one that is professionally managed, with these TMT
resources being positively related to innovation output.

H4

Supported (TMT
external connections,
marginal)

Externally-linked TMT resources (i.e., prior organizational experiences and external connections) partially
mediate the relationship between the presence of a family CEO and firm innovation input, such that a family
CEO-managed firm has lower levels of such resources than one that is professionally managed, with these
TMT resources being positively related to innovation input.

H3

Mediation effect: TMT managerial resources as mediators (configuration role of family CEO)

Supported

A family CEO-managed firm has less innovation input than a professional CEO-managed firm.

H1

Supported

Result

Hypothesized Relationships and Results

Main effect: CEO type and firm innovation

Table 4.11
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4.4

Post Hoc Tests
This research conducted post hoc tests for two reasons. First, empirical results did

not support relationships hypothesized in Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6. Post hoc tests were
conducted in this section to explore potential moderating effects that may influence these
unsupported hypothesized relationships between family CEO and TMT resources. The
results of these potential moderator tests are presented in Section 4.4.1 Post Hoc Tests —
Potential Moderator. Second, this research distinguished family firms from nonfamily
firms and duplicated the empirical tests conducted in the previous section by using the
family firm subsample. The goal of the duplicated tests is to examine family firm
heterogeneity – whether the distinctive effects associated with family CEO still exist by
comparing family-CEO-managed firms with professional-CEO-managed family firms.
The results of these empirical tests are presented in Section 4.4.2 Post Hoc Tests —
Family Firm Heterogeneity.
4.4.1

Post Hoc Tests – Potential Moderator
In the previous section, the empirical tests report that family CEO had a negative

direct effect on firm innovation input (Hypothesis 1) and a positive direct effect on
innovation output (Hypothesis 2). Findings support that TMT externally-linked resources
partially mediated the relationship between family CEO and innovation input (Hypothesis
3). In addition, findings also suggest that family CEO positively moderates the
relationship between externally-linked TMT resources and firm innovation input
(Hypothesis 7) and the relationship between internally-linked TMT resources and
innovation output (Hypothesis 8). However, the empirical examination did not support
that internally-linked TMT resources mediate the relationship between family CEO and
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innovation output (Hypothesis 4). The hypothesized moderating effect of family
involvement in TMT on the relationship between family CEO and TMT resources was
not supported either (Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6). In this section, a number of tests
were conducted to examine potential moderating effects that may influence the
hypothesized relationships between family CEO and TMT resources.
Prior studies suggest that CEO duality is a salient predictor for CEO power (e.g.,
Daily & Johnson, 1997; Pathan, 2009), which may influence TMT resource
configuration. The empirical analysis in the previous section controlled the effects of
CEO duality on TMT resource configuration. However, post hoc tests conducted in this
section examined the moderating effect of CEO duality on the relationship between
family CEO and TMT resources. Results are presented in Table 4.12.
CEO duality was disaggregated into CEO duality as Chairman. In Model 1 and
Model 2 (Table 4.12), externally-linked TMT resources were regressed by CEO duality
(Chairman) and the interaction of family CEO and CEO duality (Chairman), as well as all
the variables used in previous analysis (i.e., Model 5 and Model 6 in Table 4.6).
Compared to empirical results shown in Model 5 (Table 4.6), which reported a negative
association between family CEO and TMT external connections (β=-0.594, pvalue=0.081), the association between family CEO and TMT external connections in
Model 1 (Table 4.12) became positive and non-significant and the interaction effect of
family CEO and CEO duality (Chairman) became negative (β=-1.780, p-value<0.001).
The results indicate that CEO duality (Chairman) moderates the relationship between
family CEO and TMT external connections in such a way that TMT external connections
are significantly lower only in firms managed by a family CEO who also takes the
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Chairman position. The interaction effect was plotted in Figure 4.5. However, such
moderating effect was not found for TMT prior organizational experiences.
Model 3 through Model 5 in Table 4.12 regressed internally-linked TMT
resources by CEO duality (Chairman) and the interaction of family CEO and CEO
duality (Chairman), as well as all the variables used in previous analysis (i.e., Model 8
through Model 10 in Table 4.7). The interaction of family CEO and CEO duality
(Chairman) had a positive effect on TMT firm tenure (β=0.315, p-value=0.035) and TMT
team tenure (β=0.411, p-value=0.007). The results indicate that CEO duality (Chairman)
positively moderates the relationship between family CEO and TMT firm/team tenure.
Specifically speaking, concerning TMT firm tenure, TMTs are more diverse in firms
where family CEOs take the Chairman position. Concerning TMT team tenure, TMTs
have the greatest diversity in firms where the family CEO takes the Chairman position
and have the least diversity in firms where the family CEO does not have the dual role,
while firms managed by a professional CEO are in the middle. The interaction effects of
family CEO and CEO duality (Chairman) on TMT firm/team tenure were plotted in
Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7. When using TMT intrafirm career variety as a proxy of
internally-linked TMT resources, CEO duality (Chairman) had a positive effect (β=0.315,
p-value=0.002) and the interaction of family CEO and CEO duality (Chairman) had a
negative effect (β=-0.458, p-value=0.049) on TMT intrafirm career variety. The
interaction effects of family CEO and CEO duality (Chairman) on TMT intrafirm career
variety were plotted in Figure 4.8.
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Table 4.12

Post Hoc Test – Two-Way Interaction of CEO Duality (Chairman) and
Family CEO

Intercept
Family CEO
CEO duality
(Chairman)
Family CEO*CEO
duality (Chairman)
Control variables
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial
ownership
(Managerial
ownership)2
Board independence
CEO educational
background
CEO Firm tenure
CEO external
connections
CEO prior org
experiences
CEO intrafirm career
variety
Number of
observations
Within R2
F-statistics

TMT External TMT Prior Org TMT Firm
Connections
Experiences
Tenure
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
0.213
-3.481
0.915***
(0.921)
(4.449)
(0.269)
0.560
-1.734
-0.033
(0.406)
(1.975)
(0.114)
0.259
0.999
0.003
(0.212)
(0.967)
(0.056)
-1.780***
-2.552
0.315*
(0.466)
(2.253)
(0.149)
0.007
(0.021)
-0.084
(0.084)
8.54E-04
(0.002)
0.041
(0.025)
0.046
(0.048)
-8.65E-04
(0.001)
0.002
(0.005)
0.148
(0.157)
-0.043**
(0.013)
-0.058
(0.066)

-0.051
(0.103)
0.981*
(0.415)
-0.008
(0.010)
0.285*
(0.123)
0.522*
(0.235)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.014
(0.025)
0.371
(0.755)
-0.086
(0.067)

-0.015*
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.027)
-0.001†
(0.0006)
-0.013†
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.014)
-1.81E-05
(2.99E-04)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.010
(0.044)
-0.004
(0.004)

TMT Team TMT Intrafirm
Tenure
Career Variety
Model 4
Model 5
0.887**
1.506***
(0.283)
(0.470)
-0.256*
0.077
(0.119)
(0.202)
-0.075
0.315**
(0.058)
(0.099)
0.411**
-0.458*
(0.151)
(0.231)
-0.008
(0.006)
5.12E-04
(0.028)
-0.001*
(6.53E-04)
-0.004
(0.008)
0.003
(0.016)
-1.37E-04
(3.21E-04)
-5.69E-04
(0.002)
-0.053
(0.046)
-4.63E-04
(0.005)

0.031**
(0.011)
0.010
(0.043)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.054***
(0.012)
-0.058*
(0.024)
0.001*
(0.0005)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.183*
(0.079)
-0.009
(0.008)

0.255
(0.230)

517

503

455

461

0.010
(0.032)
527

0.076
2.38**

0.062
1.85*

0.072
2.12*

0.054
1.57†

0.131
4.42***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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Post Hoc Tests – Family Firm Heterogeneity
The empirical analysis in Section 4.3 examined the differences between family-

CEO-managed firms and professional-CEO-managed firms with regard to TMT
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resources and firm innovation. Nevertheless, the differences found in the previous section
may be attributed to the distinctiveness caused by family ownership. In this section, this
research separates family firms from nonfamily firms, first, and conducts the same
empirical analysis by using the family firm subsample. The findings of the duplication
tests provide convincing evidence for the results reported in Section 4.3 on the one hand,
and facilitated examinations of family firm heterogeneity on the other hand.
Post hoc tests using a family firm subsample further support Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 2. The empirical results are provided in Table 4.13. In Model 1, innovation
input was regressed by all the control variables. In Model 2, family CEO was negatively
associated with innovation input (β=-0.458, p-value=0.006), suggesting that family firms
managed by a family CEO had less innovation input than family firms managed by a
professional CEO. Specifically, the empirical results indicate that family firms managed
by a family CEO invested 37% less than family firms managed by a professional CEO (e0.458

-1).
In Model 3, innovation output was regressed by all the control variables. In Model

4, family CEO was positively associated with innovation output (β=-0.243, pvalue=0.033), suggesting that, given innovation input, family firms managed by a family
CEO had more innovation output than family firms managed by a professional CEO.
Specifically, the empirical results indicate that, given innovation input, family firms
managed by a family CEO had 28% greater innovation output than family firms managed
by a professional CEO (e0.243-1).
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Table 4.13

Post Hoc Test: Family Firm Heterogeneity (H1 and H2)

Intercept
Family CEO
Control variables
Log(R&D)
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
CEO Shares
CEO Shares* CEO Shares
Absorbed slack
Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics

Innovation Input
Model 1
Model 2
-0.623
-0.561
(0.615)
(0.608)
-0.458**
(0.166)

0.002
(0.008)
0.540***
(0.075)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.005
(0.016)
0.032*
(0.016)
-8.36E-04*
(3.59E-04)
5.29E-04†
(2.90E-04)
9.59E-04***
(1.94E-04)
-0.011
(0.009)
-2.25E-04
(4.64E-04)
373
0.229
8.03***

-7.68E-04
(7.98E-03)
0.558***
(0.074)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.004
(0.015)
0.068***
(0.020)
-0.001***
(0.0004)
5.56E-04†
(2.86E-04)
9.43E-04***
(1.91E-04)
-0.011
(0.009)
-1.81E-04
(4.59E-04)
373
0.250
8.17***

Innovation Output
Model 3
Model 4
3.689***
3.686***
(0.437)
(0.434)
0.243*
(0.114)
0.016
(0.038)
-0.008
(0.006)
0.276***
(0.056)
0.003**
(0.001)
-0.010
(0.011)
0.021†
(0.011)
-6.44E-04*
(2.49E-04)
6.72E-04***
(2.01E-04)
9.53E-05
(1.37E-04)
-0.025***
(0.007)
1.40E-04
(3.22E-04)
372
0.276
9.34***

0.022
(0.038)
-0.007
(0.006)
0.263***
(0.056)
0.003**
(0.001)
-0.010
(0.011)
0.002
(0.014)
-3.56E-04
(2.82E-04)
6.57E-04**
(2.00E-04)
9.95E-05
(1.36E-04)
-0.026***
(0.007)
1.26E-04
(3.20E-04)
372
0.289
9.06***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.

Post hoc tests using family firm subsample did not support Hypothesis 3 through
Hypothesis 5. Model 5 through Model 7 in Table 4.14 duplicated the tests for Hypothesis
3 that are presented in Table 4.6. Model 8 through Model 11 in Table 4.15 duplicated the
tests for Hypothesis 4 that are presented in Table 4.7. Model 12 through Model 16 in
Table 4.16 duplicated the tests for Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 that are presented in
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Table 4.8. However, using family firm subsample, findings marginally supported
Hypothesis 6. In Table 4.16, the interaction of family CEO and family involvement in
TMT was positively related to TMT team tenure (β=0.847, p-value=0.079). Results
indicate that, regarding TMT team tenure, TMTs have more diverse tenure in family
firms managed by family CEOs and when other family members are involved in the TMT
than family firms managed by professional CEOs or having no other family involvement
in TMT. The interaction effect was plotted in Figure 4.9.
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Table 4.14

Post Hoc Test: Family Firm Heterogeneity (H3)

Intercept
Family CEO
TMT external connections

TMT External
Connections
Model 5
1.234
(1.072)
-0.064
(0.259)

TMT Prior Org
Experiences
Model 6
3.031
(8.367)
-1.524
(2.042)

Innovation Input

0.011
(0.014)
0.012
(0.082)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.024
(0.028)
0.079*
(0.037)
-0.001†
(7.53E-04)

-0.107
(0.106)
0.334
(0.658)
0.012
(0.017)
0.323
(0.231)
0.539†
(0.290)
-0.007
(0.006)

-1.18E-04
(0.004)
0.091
(0.147)
-0.013
(0.014)
-0.555*
(0.224)
-0.028
(0.100)

-0.006
(0.033)
-1.106
(1.088)
-0.152
(0.116)
0.087
(1.716)

-0.008
(0.008)
0.573***
(0.077)
-9.18E-04
(0.001)
-0.010
(0.016)
0.082***
(0.022)
-0.002***
(4.23E-04)
6.01E-04*
(2.94E-04)
9.22E-04***
(1.90E-04)
-0.023*
(0.011)
-2.50E-04
(4.49E-04)

TMT prior org experiences
Control variables:
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
(Managerial ownership)2
Absorbed slack
Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Board independence
CEO educational background
CEO Firm tenure
CEO duality
CEO external connections
CEO prior org experiences
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics

208
0.137
1.83*

-0.590†
(0.352)
204
0.074
0.90

Model 7
-0.005
(0.625)
-0.474**
(0.165)
-0.010
(0.064)
0.002
(0.009)

354
0.261
6.85***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; †
p<0.10.
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Table 4.15

Post Hoc Test: Family Firm Heterogeneity (H4)

Intercept
Family CEO
TMT firm tenure diversity

TMT Firm
Tenure
Model 8
0.598
(0.587)
0.045
(0.128)

TMT Team
Tenure
Model 9
-0.797
(0.668)
-0.182
(0.131)

TMT Intrafirm
Career Variety
Model 10
2.120**
(0.839)
0.080
(0.192)

TMT team tenure diversity
TMT intrafirm career variety
Control variables:
Log (R&D)
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
(Managerial ownership)2
Absorbed slack

-0.014*
(0.007)
0.036
(0.046)
-3.80E-04
(0.001)
-3.52E-04
(0.017)
-0.012
(0.019)
1.66E-04
(3.84E-04)

-0.004
(0.007)
0.133**
(0.047)
-0.002†
(0.001)
0.042†
(0.022)
0.003
(0.023)
-3.62E-06
(4.52E-02)

0.024*
(0.010)
0.051
(0.059)
4.20E-04
(0.002)
0.042*
(0.021)
-0.045†
(0.026)
7.49E-04
(5.49E-04)

-8.17E-04
(0.003)
0.017
(0.074)
-0.006
(0.009)
0.197†
(0.112)

-0.003
(0.003)
0.033
(0.097)
-0.033†
(0.020)
0.227*
(0.110)

162
0.140
1.53

162
0.190
2.20*

-0.003
(0.003)
-0.056
(0.104)
-0.011
(0.013)
-0.408*
(0.163)
-0.056
(0.052)
213
0.171
2.44**

Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Board independence
CEO educational background
CEO Firm tenure
CEO duality
CEO intrafirm career variety
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics

Note:

Innovation
Output
Model 11
2.371***
(0.592)
0.150
(0.136)
0.284†
(0.160)
-0.151
(0.145)
0.128
(0.080)
0.037
(0.062)
-0.001
(0.007)
0.485***
(0.082)
0.002†
(0.001)
-0.007
(0.015)
-0.012
(0.017)
2.01E-04
(3.55E-04)
6.02E-04**
(2.10E-04)
4.44E-04**
(1.58E-04)
-0.055***
(0.013)
-6.74E-05
(3.43E-04)

269
0.338
6.18***

1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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Table 4.16

Post Hoc Test: Family Firm Heterogeneity (H5 & H6)

TMT External TMT Prior Org
Connections
Experiences
Model 12
Model 13
Intercept
1.523
5.374
(1.128)
(9.303)
Family CEO
-0.209
-0.492
(0.318)
(2.597)
Family involvement
-1.678†
3.085
in TMT
(0.935)
(8.746)
Family CEO*Family
-0.613
-3.774
involvement in TMT
(0.657)
(6.459)
Control variables:
Family ownership
0.004
-0.126
(0.014)
(0.113)
Firm size
0.026
0.305
(0.082)
(0.680)
Performance
6.82E-04
0.013
(0.002)
(0.017)
Firm age
-0.023
0.306
(0.028)
(0.247)
Managerial
0.129**
0.545
ownership
(0.043)
(0.356)
(Managerial
-0.002*
-0.007
2
ownership)
(8.48E-04)
(0.007)
Board independence
-8.69E-04
-0.012
(0.004)
(0.035)
CEO educational
0.235
-2.882
background
(0.322)
(2.523)
CEO Firm tenure
-0.019
-0.147
(0.014)
(0.118)
CEO duality
-0.660**
0.496
(0.236)
(1.827)
CEO external
0.006
connections
(0.101)
CEO prior org
-0.519
experiences
(0.517)
CEO intrafirm career
variety
Number of
208
204
observations
Within R2
0.164
0.078
*
F-statistics
1.91
0.81

TMT Firm TMT Team TMT Intrafirm
Tenure
Tenure
Career Variety
Model 14 Model 15
Model 16
0.447
-1.253†
2.345**
(0.619)
(0.702)
(0.878)
-0.065
-0.287
0.297
(0.178)
(0.182)
(0.235)
-0.443
0.189
1.173†
(0.692)
(0.813)
(0.691)
0.436
0.847†
-0.259
(0.475)
(0.477)
(0.465)
-0.014†
0.001
(0.007)
(0.007)
0.033
0.125**
(0.047)
(0.046)
-5.48E-04
-0.002†
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.004
0.046†
(0.018)
(0.025)
-0.016
-0.031
(0.026)
(0.027)
2.26E-04
5.72E-04
(4.93E-04) (5.15E-04)
-5.53E-04 -4.67E-04
(0.003)
(0.003)
0.274
0.270
(0.296)
(0.284)
-0.002
-0.035
(0.010)
(0.024)
0.171
0.209†
(0.117)
(0.118)

0.024*
(0.011)
0.035
(0.060)
6.11E-04
(0.002)
0.041†
(0.021)
-0.066*
(0.031)
0.001†
(6.21E-04)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.377
(0.233)
-0.008
(0.014)
-0.311†
(0.173)

162

162

-0.067
(0.052)
213

0.148
1.35

0.229
2.30*

0.189
2.33**

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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TMT team tenure
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Family CEO

No family involvement in TMT
Family involvement in TMT
Figure 4.9

Family Firm Heterogeneity: Family Involvement in TMT as Moderator

Findings support Hypothesis 7 by using a family firm subsample. Results are
provided in Table 4.17. In Model 17, family CEO was negatively associated with
innovation input (β=-0.469, p-value=0.005); however, TMT external connections and the
interaction of family CEO and TMT external connections did not have a significant effect
on innovation input. In Model 18, family CEO was negatively associated with innovation
input (β=-0.853, p-value<0.001), and the interaction of family CEO and TMT prior
organizational experiences had a positive effect on firm innovation input (β=-0.042, pvalue=0.008). The results in Model 18 suggest that, using a family firm subsample,
family CEO still positively moderated the relationship between externally-linked TMT
resources (using TMT prior organizational experiences as a proxy) and innovation input.
The interaction effect was plotted in Figure 4.10.
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Table 4.17

Post Hoc Test: Family Firm Heterogeneity (H7)
Innovation Input
Model 17
Model 18
-0.236
-0.024
(0.635)
(0.605)
-0.469**
-0.853***
(0.167)
(0.215)
-0.055
(0.103)
-0.015
(0.011)
0.084
(0.131)
0.042**
(0.016)

Intercept
Family CEO
TMT external connections
TMT prior org experiences
Family CEO*TMT external connections
Family CEO*TMT prior org experiences
Control variables:
Family ownership

-0.008
(0.008)
0.574***
(0.078)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.016)
0.081***
(0.022)
-0.002***
(0.0004)
5.39E-04†
(3.04E-04)
9.21E-04***
(1.93E-04)
-0.019†
(0.011)
-2.65E-04
(4.57E-04)
359
0.254
6.70***

Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
(Managerial ownership)2
Absorbed slack
Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics

-0.006
(0.008)
0.588***
(0.076)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.007
(0.015)
0.084***
(0.021)
-0.002***
(0.0004)
6.31E-04*
(2.77E-04)
9.69E-04***
(1.88E-04)
-0.025*
(0.011)
-2.73E-04
(4.42E-04)
354
0.282
7.60***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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Figure 4.10
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Family CEO
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Family Firm Heterogeneity: Family CEO, TMT Prior Organizational
Experiences and Innovation Input

Post hoc tests using a family firm subsample support Hypothesis 8. The empirical
results are provided in Table 4.18. In Model 19 and Model 20, family CEO was not
significantly associated with innovation output; neither was the interaction of family
CEO and TMT firm/team tenure. In Model 21, the interaction of family CEO and TMT
intrafirm variety had a positive effect on firm innovation output (β=0.188, pvalue=0.022). The results confirm the findings presented in section 4.3 by using TMT
intrafirm career variety as a proxy of internally-linked TMT resources — family CEO
positively moderated the relationship between internally-linked TMT resources and
innovation output. The interaction effect was plotted in Figure 4.11.
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Table 4.18

Post Hoc Test: Family Firm Heterogeneity (H8)

Intercept
Family CEO
TMT firm tenure
TMT team tenure

Model 19
2.689***
(0.578)
0.071
(0.200)
0.034
(0.157)

TMT intrafirm career variety
Family CEO*TMT firm tenure
Family CEO*TMT team tenure

0.168
(0.215)

Family CEO*TMT intrafirm career
variety
Control variables:
Log(R&D)
Family ownership
Firm size
Performance
Firm age
Managerial ownership
(Managerial ownership)2
Absorbed slack
Potential slack
Unabsorbed slack
Sales growth
Number of observations
Within R2
F-statistics

0.021
(0.062)
5.20E-04
(0.007)
0.480***
(0.082)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.015)
-0.017
(0.017)
2.75E-04
(3.50E-04)
6.08**
(2.03E-04)
4.67E-04**
(1.59E-04)
-0.059***
(0.013)
-7.82E-05
(3.46E-04)
269
0.325
6.29***

Innovation Output
Model 20
3.428***
(0.571)
-0.069
(0.213)
-0.178
(0.144)

0.275
(0.213)

0.043
(0.063)
-0.009
(0.006)
0.460***
(0.084)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.015
(0.014)
0.008
(0.017)
3.88E-04
(3.30E-04)
5.74E-04**
(2.16E-04)
3.47E-04*
(1.60E-04)
-0.056***
(0.012)
-5.86E-05
(3.60E-04)
284
0.327
6.77***

Model 21
4.013***
(0.452)
-0.184
(0.211)

-0.073
(0.057)

0.188*
(0.082)
0.020
(0.038)
-0.011†
(0.006)
0.308***
(0.059)
0.003**
(0.001)
-0.015
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.014)
-2.95E-04
(2.79E-04)
6.04E-04**
(2.01E-04)
1.15E-04
(1.37E-04)
-0.040***
(0.008)
1.05E-04
(3.14E-04)
365
0.318
8.62***

Note: 1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported; 2. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01;
*p<0.05; † p<0.10.
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Innovation output
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Figure 4.11

4.5

Professional CEO

Family Firm Heterogeneity: Family CEO, TMT Intrafirm Career Variety
and Innovation Output

Chapter Summary
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of methodology, statistical

analyses, empirical results, and post hoc tests of hypotheses developed in Chapter III. The
results provide strong evidence that a family CEO has a direct effect on firm innovation
input and innovation output and that a family CEO positively moderates the relationship
between TMT resources and firm innovation. In addition, findings marginally support
that externally-linked TMT resources mediated the negative relationship between family
CEO and innovation input. Post hoc tests conducted in this chapter explore a potential
moderator that may influence the relationship between family CEO and TMT resources
and examined family firm heterogeneity. Chapter V will discuss these results and their
theoretical and practical implications.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a discussion of findings based upon
results of the testing of hypothesized relationships in Chapter IV. Following the
discussion of findings, this chapter presents contributions and limitations of this study.
The chapter is organized into the following sections: (5.1) overview of the study, (5.2)
discussion of the findings, (5.3) contributions and implications, (5.4) limitations and
future research, and (5.5) conclusion.
5.1

Overview of the Study
Innovation is critical to firm growth, profitability, and survival (Crossan &

Apaydin, 2010; Damapour, 1991; Kimberly, 1981), especially for firms in hightechnology industries. Family business researchers suggest that family firms, as a
ubiquitous presence around the world, behave distinctively from non-family firms
regarding innovation (e.g., Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2014). Prior studies in family business describe a paradoxical phenomenon of family firm
innovation, assuming that family firms are “unwilling yet able” to innovate (Chrisman et
al., 2015) and suggest that family firms can “do more with less” (e.g., Duran et al., 2015).
However, how family firms “do more with less” remains less clear.
The goal of this study is to further the understanding in this research stream.
Employing a capability-based perspective, this research explores what unique resources
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and capabilities arise when a family member takes the CEO position and how these
resources and capabilities underlie firm innovation. Three research questions, outlined in
Chapter I, guide the examinations conducted in this study. The first research question
inquires “Why does a family CEO have a distinctive impact on firm innovation?” In
pursuit of the answer to this research question, Chapter II of this study reviews family
business literature with the aim to explore idiosyncratic resources arising from family
involvement, especially when a family members takes the CEO position of a firm. Then,
Chapter II presented a capability-based perspective of firm innovation to justify the
idiosyncratic resources arising from the presence of family CEO have an impact on firm
innovation, particularly through family CEOs’ distinctive dynamic managerial
capabilities manifested as their configuration and orchestration of TMT managerial
resources.
The second research question of this study examines “Compared to a professional
CEO, how does a family CEO have a distinctive direct impact on firm innovation?” In
pursuit of the answer to this research question, Chapter III draws upon family business
literature, distinguishing family management (i.e., family CEO) from other forms of
family involvement (i.e., family ownership and other family members’ involvement in
TMT) and exploring family CEOs’ distinctive direct impact on firm innovation.
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in Chapter III are developed to examine family CEOs’
direct impact on firm innovation.
The third research question of this study explores “Compared to a professional
CEO, how does a family CEO have a distinctive indirect impact on firm innovation?” In
pursuit of the answer to this research question, Chapter III employs a capability-based
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perspective of firm innovation, exploring how family CEOs configure and orchestrate
TMT resources distinctively and how family CEOs’ idiosyncratic managerial capabilities,
along with distinctive TMT managerial resources in these family-CEO-managed firms,
have an impact on firm innovation. Hypotheses 3 through 8 in Chapter III are developed
to examine family CEOs’ distinctive configuration and orchestration of TMT managerial
resources and how these idiosyncratic TMT resources have an impact on firm innovation.
The results of the testing of these hypotheses are presented in Chapter IV,
providing insights into these research questions. Detailed explanation for the results for
each hypothesis and their implications are presented below.
5.2
5.2.1

Discussion of the Findings
CEO Type and Firm Innovation
The first two hypotheses in this research examine family CEOs’ direct impact on

firm innovation. Hypothesis 1 is developed to examine family CEOs’ direct impact on
firm innovation input. Results of the analysis conducted in Chapter IV yield support for
Hypothesis 1, suggesting that family-CEO-managed firms invest less in R&D than
professional-CEO-managed firms. Family business literature argues that family
involvement creates idiosyncratic resources and capabilities deeply embedded within the
family, known as “familiness” (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003).
These unique resources, particularly generated through family involvement in top
executive positions (Minichilli et al., 2010), can be either distinctive or constrictive
(Habbershon et al., 2003). A family CEO, usually selected from a small pool of qualified
candidates within the family (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003), has less diverse prior
organizational experiences and external connections, thus, is less able to sense innovative
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opportunities than a professional CEO. In addition, a family CEO with the propensity to
preserve their gained emotional attachments usually employs family-related reasoning
processes to make decisions on opportunity seizing, leading to conservative innovation
investments. In accordance with these arguments, results of this study indicate that
family-CEO-managed firms invest less on R&D than professional-CEO-managed firms.
Hypothesis 2 is developed to examine family CEOs’ direct impact on firm
innovation output. Results of the analysis conducted in Chapter IV yield support for
Hypothesis 2: given innovation input, family-CEO-managed firms achieve greater
innovation output than professional-CEO-managed firms. As mentioned previously,
unique resources generated through family involvement in top executive positions
(Minichilli et al., 2010) can be either distinctive or constrictive (Habbershon et al., 2003).
When a family member takes the CEO position, the interactions between the family, the
business, and the individual give rise to idiosyncratic, firm-specific, and tacit knowledge
less transferable to other firms (Minichille et al., 2010; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). A
distinctive and hard-to-imitate organizational culture also can be created by a family
CEO, through which knowledge sharing activities are encouraged and a stewardship
atmosphere is fostered (Carnes & Ireland, 2013; Davis et al., 2010). Family involvement
in management creates efficient routines, through which current activities can be
extended into new streams and the resource-enhancing capabilities can be enhanced.
These unique constructive resources associated with a family CEO are critical to facilitate
resources recombination and integration, through which R&D investments are converted
into increased sales in an effective way. In accordance with these arguments, results of
this study indicate that, even though family-CEO-managed firms are less able to sense
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innovative opportunities and have lower levels of innovation input than professionalCEO-managed firms, they are more able to convert innovation input into innovation
output than their professional-CEO-managed counterparts.
Using a family firm subsample, this research conducts post hoc tests in Chapter
IV to compare innovation of family-CEO-managed with that of professional-CEOmanaged family firms. The hypothesized family CEOs’ direct impacts on innovation
input and innovation output keep consistent. Findings in the post hoc tests suggest that
family firms managed by a family CEO invest less than family firms managed by a
professional CEO. Given innovation input, firms managed by a family CEO have greater
innovation output than their family counterparts managed by a professional CEO. Taken
together, this research concludes that family CEO has a direct impact on firm innovation.
Specifically, family-CEO-managed firms have less innovation input but greater
innovation output than professional-CEO-managed family and non-family firms, which
aligns with findings of prior studies.
5.2.2

Family CEOs’ Configuration of TMT Resources and Firm Innovation
Hypotheses 3 through 6 explore family CEO’s configuration of TMT resources

and examine how TMT resources mediate the relationship between family CEO and firm
innovation. The CEO has a leading role in firm innovation (Hambrick, 1994), primarily
through the centrality of their leadership and the interactions with other TMT members
(Ling et al., 2008; Peterson et al., 2003). In addition to their leading role and direct
impacts on firm innovation, CEOs’ dynamic managerial capabilities underlying firm
innovation can be manifested as their configuration of TMT competencies (Kor &
Mesko, 2013). This configuration role is facilitated through CEOs’ managerial discretion
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on TMT members’ recruitment, promotion, and retention. A family CEO, compared with
a professional CEO, configures TMT competencies distinctively, leading to unique TMT
resource compositions that underpin firm innovation input and output.
Hypothesis 3 explores family CEOs’ impact on externally-linked TMT resource
configuration and examines the mediation effect of externally-linked TMT resources
concerning the negative relationship between family CEO and innovation input. The
analysis conducted in Chapter IV provides supporting findings for Hypothesis 3. Using
two proxies of externally-linked TMT resources, results indicate that family-CEOmanaged firms have lower levels of TMT external connections and prior organizational
experiences than professional-CEO-managed firms and that TMT external connections
are positively associated with firm innovation input. According to family business
literature, family CEOs usually have strong emotional attachments with their firms, such
as their belonging, affect, sense of family legacy, and security of career in the firm
(Chrisman et al., 2012), which shape their decisions on TMT members’ recruitment and
promotion. Furthermore, family CEOs tend to have intentions to sustain family control
through transgenerational succession. These intentions limit the attractiveness of these
firms to talent managers and impede the recruitment of competent top managers with
diverse career experiences and broad external connections (Chrisman et al., 2014). Thus,
family-CEO-managed firms may be less able to recruit TMT members with broad
external connections while these external connections are beneficial to sensing and
seizing innovation opportunities and to higher levels of innovation input. Taken together,
TMT external connections, as a proxy of externally-linked TMT resources, partially
mediate the negative relationship between family CEO and firm innovation input. TMT
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prior organizational experiences, while negatively associated with family CEO, have no
significant relationship with innovation input (the discussion of further examination for
this nonsignificant relationship is provided in Section 5.2.3).
Hypothesis 4 explores family CEOs’ configuration of internally-linked TMT
resources and examines the mediation effect of internally-linked TMT resources
concerning the positive relationship between family CEO and innovation output. Family
CEOs have strong identification with their firms and prefer farsighted investments and
on-the-job learning (Davis et al., 2010; Eddleston & Kellermans, 2007; Miller & Le
Breton-Miller, 2006). In accordance to this strong family identity, family CEOs have
salient intentions to provide supportive behavior toward non-family managers, which can
boost non-family managers’ sentimental bonds with the firm (Davis, Schoorman, &
Donaldson, 1997) and enhance their on-the-job learning. Using three proxies of
internally-linked TMT resources (i.e., TMT firm tenure, TMT team tenure, and TMT
intrafirm career variety), results in Chapter IV do not support Hypothesis 4 — internallylinked TMT resources do not mediate the positive relationship between family CEO and
firm innovation output. Particularly, findings indicate that family CEOs are not
significantly related to TMT firm/team tenure and TMT intrafirm career variety; these
internally-linked TMT resources are not significantly associated with innovation output.
Post hoc tests were conducted to advance the understanding of non-significant
relationships between family CEO and internally-linked TMT resources, which are
discussed below. The discussion of further exploration of non-significant relationship
between internally-linked TMT resources and innovation output is presented in Section
5.2.3.
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Concerning the relationship between family CEO and TMT resource
configuration, this research conducted post hoc tests to explore the potential moderator of
CEO duality as Chairman. When a CEO takes a dual role of Chairman, salient power
associated with CEO duality enables the CEO to preserve the emotional attachments
within the firm (Boyd, 1995; Combs, Ketchen, Perryman & Donahue, 2007) and to
influence the recruitment process of TMT members to a great extent. Results of post hoc
tests conducted in Chapter IV indicate that TMT members in firms managed by a family
CEO who also has a dual role of Chairman have lower levels of external connections than
those in other firms. On the other hand, CEO duality can foster a stewardship atmosphere
within the firm (Boyd, 1995) and influence TMT promotion and retention, leading to
enriched TMT internally-linked resources such as diverse TMT firm tenure, team tenure
and intrafirm career variety. Results of post hoc tests indicate that, in firms managed by a
family CEO who also has a dual role of Chairman, TMT members have more diverse
firm tenure and team tenure but lower levels of intrafirm career variety. Taken together,
on the one hand, TMTs in family-CEO-managed firms have distinctive externally-linked
resource configurations with the comparison to those in professional-CEO-managed
firms. On the other hand, internally-linked TMT resource configurations are distinctive in
family-CEO-managed firms only when the family CEO has a dual role of Chairman.
Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 are developed to examine the moderating effect of
family involvement in TMT on the relationship between family CEO and TMT resource
configuration. Results do not support the hypothesized moderating effect. The nonsignificant results may be caused by the fact that only a small proportion of firms
(specifically 15 firms) has family involvement in TMT. As a remedy to this issue, this
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research employed a family firm subsample, comparing family-CEO-managed firms with
professional-CEO-managed family firms, to test Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6. Finding
suggest that family firms are less able to recruit TMT members with external connections
when other family members are involved in TMT, regardless of whether a family-CEOmanaged or professional-CEO-managed firm. The tests also report a positive interaction
effect of family CEO and family involvement in TMT on TMT team tenure, suggesting
that family firms managed by a family CEO have more diverse TMT team tenure when
other family members are involved in TMT. Using a family firm subsample and taking
TMT team tenure as a proxy of internally-linked TMT resources, Hypothesis 6 is
supported: TMTs in family-CEO-managed firms have distinctive internally-linked
resource configurations by the comparison with those in professional-CEO-managed
family firms.
5.2.3

Family CEOs’ Orchestration of TMT Resources and Firm Innovation
Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8 are developed to explore the family CEO’s

orchestration of TMT resources and to examine how the family CEO moderates the
relationship between TMT resources and firm innovation. CEOs’ orchestration of TMT
competencies describes the process through which CEOs, acting like orchestra
conductors, elicit harmonious performance from TMT members and integrate specialized
knowledge to achieve better performance (Kor & Mesko, 2013). Family CEOs, compared
to their professional counterparts, have salient power, legitimacy, and discretion to
orchestrate TMT competencies to achieve better firm-level outcomes. Besides, family
CEOs can create a stewardship atmosphere within the firm and employ generalized
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exchange systems to orchestrate social exchange activities within the firm (Long &
Mathews, 2011), yielding better firm-level consequences.
Results conducted in Chapter IV indicate that even though TMT prior
organizational experiences are not significantly related to innovation input in general,
such externally-linked TMT resources have a significant contribution to innovation input
when a family member takes the CEO position. The findings suggest that family CEOs,
unlike their professional counterparts, can orchestrate TMT prior organizational
experiences in an effective way, such that TMT members can utilize their prior
organizational connections to sense and seize innovative opportunities. Such a positive
orchestration effect found in family-CEO-managed firms is not observed in professionalCEO-managed firms.
Results conducted in Chapter IV also provide evidence that even though TMT
firm/team tenure and intrafirm career variety are not significantly related to innovation
output, such internally-linked TMT resources are beneficial to innovation output when a
family member takes the CEO position. The findings suggest that family CEOs can
orchestrate TMT firm/team tenure and intrafirm career variety in a more effective way.
Thus, firm-specific tacit knowledge resources that TMT members have gained during
their retention within a family-CEO-managed firm can be synergistically coordinated and
recombined. Consequently, innovation input can be converted into greater innovation
output (i.e., increased sales) in family-CEO-managed firms than in professional-CEOmanaged firms.
Using family firm subsample, family CEOs’ distinctive effects on TMT resource
orchestration remain consistent. Even though the relationship between TMT prior
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organizational experiences and innovation input is not significant in family firms, such
externally-linked TMT resources are positively related to innovation input in firms
managed by a family CEO. Concerning internally-linked TMT resources, even though
TMT intrafirm career variety is not significantly related to innovation output in family
firms, such internally-linked TMT resources are beneficial to innovation output in familyCEO-managed firms while not in professional-CEO-managed family firms. The findings
suggest that family CEOs orchestrate TMT prior organizational experiences and intrafirm
career variety in a distinctive way by the comparison with their professional counterparts.
To summarize, a family CEO orchestrates TMT members’ prior organizational
experiences and their diverse intrafirm knowledge to sense and seize innovation
opportunities and to deliver enhanced innovation output.
5.2.4

Integrated Interpretation of the Findings
This research hypothesizes a negative direct impact of family CEO on firm

innovation input and a positive direct impact of family CEO on firm innovation output
due to unique resource constraints and endowments associated with family management.
Empirical results support such hypothesized relationships, finding that family-CEOmanaged firms have less innovation input and more innovation output than professionalCEO-managed family and non-family firms.
This research also argues that family CEOs have distinctive managerial
capabilities, manifested as their configuration and orchestration of TMT resources. In
addition to the direct impact, family CEOs have an impact on externally-linked and
internally-linked TMT resource configurations that mediate the relationship between
family CEO and firm innovation. Empirical results provide evidence that externally144

linked TMT resources, measured by TMT external connections, partially mediate the
negative relationship between family CEO and innovation input. While empirical results
do not support that family CEO is positively related to internally-linked TMT resources,
findings suggest that the relationship between family CEO and internally-linked TMT
resources is contingent upon CEO duality as Chairman. For family firms, this relationship
is also contingent upon other family members’ involvement in TMT — family
involvement in TMT positively moderates the relationship between family CEO and
internally-linked TMT resources (using TMT team tenure as a proxy).
Given TMT resource configurations, family CEOs orchestrate TMT resources
distinctively. While TMT prior organizational experiences may not be valuable resources
for professional-CEO-managed firms to sense and seize innovative opportunities, family
CEOs can create value from these resources, which are beneficial to innovation input.
Similarly, findings suggest that TMT firm tenure, team tenure, and intrafirm career
variety are not valuable resources for professional-CEO-managed firms to achieve
innovation output. However, these internally-linked TMT resources contribute to
innovation output only in family-CEO-managed firms, while such effect is not found in
professional-CEO-managed family and nonfamily firms.
5.3
5.3.1

Contributions and Implications
Theoretical Contributions
This research makes several primary contributions to the literature. First, this

research contributes to the dynamic managerial capability approach of the study of firm
innovation. Recent literature employing a capability-based perspective argues that a
firm’s competitive advantage primarily lies in the firm’s dynamic and higher-order
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capabilities (Leiblein, 2011) and idiosyncratic capabilities associated with top managers
predict a firm’s dynamic capabilities of opportunity sensing, seizing, and resource
transformation (Kor & Mesko, 2013; Teece, 2007). However, empirical investigation on
higher-order managerial capabilities underlying firm innovation is limited. Drawing on
an innovation input-output model, this research identifies various TMT managerial
resources underlying innovation input and output to advance the understanding in this
research stream. Furthermore, this research makes distinctions between managerial
resources and managerial capabilities. While resources broadly refer to all of a firm’s
assets and organizational attributes (Barney, 1991), capabilities as a special type of
resources are generated by combining and re-combining resources to make a firm
dynamic (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Drawing on this distinction, this research
conceptualizes CEOs’ managerial capabilities by examining CEOs’ impact on TMT
resource configuration and orchestration. For instance, family-CEO-managed firms have
unique TMT resource constraints; however, family CEOs can orchestrate these resources
in a distinctive way to achieve better outcomes in terms of firm innovation input and
output. In doing so, this research provides evidence that CEOs’ managerial capabilities
are higher-order capabilities, which are more firm-specific and deeply embedded in the
firm (Makadok, 2001) and reflect the firms’ ability of combining and re-combining TMT
managerial resources to make a firm dynamic (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).
Second, this research employs the RBV in general, and a capability-based
perspective in particular, to advance the understanding of family firm innovation. This
research expands on current approaches to the study of family business by examining
what distinctive resources and capabilities underlying firm innovation are generated
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through family management (i.e., family CEO) and why and how these resources and
capabilities impact firm innovation. Family business researchers drawing on the RBV
suggest that the deep embeddedness of the family in the business gives rise to unique
resources and capabilities, conceptualized as familiness (e.g., Habbershon & Williams,
1999; Habbershon et al., 2003). Familiness, however, may be difficult to capture (Ensley
& Pearson, 2005). Prior studies in family business suggest that familiness takes various
forms, such as idiosyncratic firm-specific human capital, strong social capital, salient
family firm identity, and distinctive resource re-bundling capabilities (e.g., Carnes &
Ireland, 2013; Pearson et al., 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Zellweger et al., 2010).
Empirical efforts in this research stream provide evidence that family firms behave or
perform differently from nonfamily firms and attribute the differences partially to
familiness (e.g., Ensley & Pearson, 2005; Minichille et al., 2010). This research explores
distinctive managerial capabilities associated with family CEOs, especially family CEOs’
distinctive way to configure and orchestrate TMT resources that underlie firm innovation.
In so doing, this research is among the rare efforts, if not the only, to examine unique
higher-order capabilities associated with family management. Findings in this research
create a foundation upon which other studies can explore what efficient routines and
enriched activities underlying firm innovation are developed and/or how the presence of
family CEO creates synergies and facilitates generalized social exchange within TMT.
Third, this research answers calls for deeper investigation of family firm
heterogeneity caused by distinctive efforts and abilities, which arise from various forms
of family involvement (Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2013). Prior literature on
family businesses dominantly draws on agency theory and/or behavioral agency theory,
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suggesting that family firms frame innovation as potential losses or gains to their
socioemotional wealth (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). These
studies attribute low levels of family firm innovation to controlling families’
unwillingness to innovation, thus, revealing a paradoxical phenomenon in relation to
family firm innovation: unwilling yet able to innovate (De Massis et al., 2015; Duran et
al., 2015). However, heterogeneity exists widely in family firms in terms of both
willingness and ability (Chua et al., 2012; Gedajlovic et al., 2012). This research selects a
specific empirical context, publicly traded firms in high-technology manufacturing
industries, where innovation has the most importance (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). In so
doing, this research limits the variance of firm innovation caused by owner-managers’
(un)willingness to innovate to a great extent. Findings of this research illustrate that
family firms are heterogeneous in terms of innovation resources and capabilities. Instead
of assuming that family firms are unwilling to innovate, this research provides evidence
that family firms managed by family CEOs have unique resource constraints.
Consequently, these firms are less able to sense and seize innovation opportunities and
invest less on innovation input. This research also does not assume that family firms are
able to innovate homogeneously. Instead, findings in this research indicate that family
firms managed by family CEOs have distinctive resource endowments and superior
capabilities. As a result, these managerial resources and capabilities help the firm to
convert innovation input into increased sales in a more effective way, such that these
family firms can do more with less. In so doing, this research responds to calls for further
efforts to advance knowledge about family firm heterogeneity (Chua et al., 2012) and
helps to form an integrated picture of family firm innovation (Duran et al., 2015) by
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exploring family firms’ inferior or superior capabilities concerning innovation input and
output.
5.3.2

Practical Implications
This research has practical implications for both family and nonfamily firm

innovation. First, this research indicates that firm innovation has multi-facets, denoting
both a set of activities through which a firm identifies new opportunities (Thompson,
1965) and a variety of outputs (Kimberly, 1981). Taking this multi-faceted perspective,
innovation is more than R&D investment. After the R&D investment decisions have been
made to seize identified new opportunities, resources and assets are recombined and
orchestrated within the firm and firm-specific routines and procedures are framed and
redeveloped, which are critical to achieve superior innovation output. Findings of this
research suggest that even though family firms managed by family CEOs are inferior in
sensing and seizing new opportunities and have lower levels of innovation input, familyCEO-managed firms are superior in terms of innovation output. As a result, these firms
convert innovation input into increased sales in a more effective way. Thus, instead of
focusing on investing less or more on innovation, firms may emphasize how to convert
innovation input into innovation output through resource/asset recombination and
orchestration. For instance, both family and nonfamily firms may benefit from the
creation of a stewardship-like atmosphere within the firm (Madison, 2014), which can
facilitate generalized social exchanges within the firm (Long & Mathews, 2011) and
foster high-levels of trust to achieve greater resource recombination and
technology/knowledge transferring. Furthermore, family and nonfamily firm may
highlight firm leaders’ central role in coordinating and orchestrating diverse TMT, as
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well as R&D teams, which are critical to the formation of new product development
routines and keeping the firm dynamic (Augier & Teece, 2009).
Second, findings in this research indicate that TMT resources and competencies
have various dimensions, which affect firm innovation input and output differently. Prior
studies on human capital literature distinguish the boundaryless career and withinorganization career (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1994; O’Mahony & Bechky, 2006; Salvato,
Minichilli, & Piccarreta, 2012). Boundaryless career refers to career paths beyond the
boundaries of single employment settings (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1994), which is critical
to accumulating non-firm-specific knowledge and building inter-organizational networks
(Crossland et al., 2014). As a contrast, intra-firm career refers to vertical and/or
horizontal career paths with a single employer (O’Mahony & Bechky, 2006), which is
beneficial to firm-specific knowledge accumulation. Findings in this research indicate
that TMT members with more externally-linked resources gained through a boundaryless
career path are critical for high-technology firms to identify innovation opportunities and
to enhance their competent innovation status in the industry. On the other hand, TMT
members with salient internally-linked resources gained through within-organization
career path are valuable as well, especially for high-technology firms whose goal is to
improve the conversion from R&D investments into firm sales; however, the valence of
these TMT resources is contingent upon the CEO’s managerial discretion to a great
extent. Thus, instead of exploring universal characteristics associated with highperformed TMT, both family and nonfamily firms may build their TMT with unique
compositions aligned with the innovation strategies that the firm pursues.
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Third, this research indicates that CEOs influence TMT competencies during two
stages: TMT members’ recruitment and TMT members’ promotion and retention. Family
business studies suggest that the presence of family CEO in family firms may negatively
influence TMT recruitment and result in less talented top managers being hired by these
firms (Memili, Chrisman, & Chua, 2011). Whereas, family CEOs can enhance these
TMT members’ internally-linked resources and enrich their firm-specific knowledge of
the firm during their tenure. Thus, even though less likely to hire high profile top
managers, family-CEO-managed firms can nurture a management cadre internally and
build competent professional executive teams eventually through TMT resource
configuration and orchestration. The findings also offer insights that boundaryless career
paths and within-organization career paths have distinctive effects on firm innovation
input and output. For instance, family and nonfamily firm may explore the withinorganization career routes of their managers to achieve diverse firm-specific knowledge
within the TMT on the one hand and to develop a shared language within the TMT on the
other hand, both of which are critical to the innovation input-output conversion.
5.4

Limitations and Future Research
While findings in this research provide primary contributions to the study of

family business and the literature of firm innovation, there are several limitations that
may limit the interpretation of the findings. Addressing these limitations not only helps to
represent the boundaries of this research but also provide directions for future effort.
First, this research uses firms in narrow industry sections — high-technology
manufacturing industries with three-digit SIC codes 357, 365, 366, 367, 381, 382, 384,
and 386 — to answer the research questions. This sampling design is used in studies
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exploring firm innovation, based on the justification that a firm’s ability to create and
commercialize innovations quickly and efficiently is critical to the firm’s survival and
profitability (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; Li et al., 2008). Using narrow industry sections
helps to control the great variance caused by diverse innovation patterns associated with a
variety of industries, and, thus, can enhance the reliability of the findings. However, this
approach has limitations given the potentially unique influence of family involvement
within this industry may limit generalizability. In addition, although using this sampling
design helps to control the variance of innovation patterns caused by a wide range of
industries, the sample firms are diverse. Taking firm size — one frequently examined
factor for product innovation and the allocation of R&D investment (Cohen & Klepper,
1996; Ettlie & Rubenstein, 1987) — as an example, total assets of sample firms used in
this research range from a minimum of 0.085 million to a maximum of 129 million.
Nevertheless, research using other sampling frames is needed to confirm the extent to
which results are generalizable. Furthermore, even though a preliminary power analysis
conducted before the data collection suggested that the number of observations ranging
between 2063 and 523 can decrease the probability of Type II error to 0.1 (assuming that
the effect size ranges between 0.1 and 0.2), the empirical results of this study report that
the effect size in some models is lower than what was assumed. In this study, the number
of observations changes across models and is even dramatically decreased in some
models. The low effect size and/or a small number of observations in these models
indicates the increased probability of Type II error. A study with an increased sample size
could enhance the power of the test.
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Second, this research draws on dynamic capability literature and applies a
capability-based view of innovation within the context of family firms. This research
examines the distinctiveness of the configuration and orchestration of TMT managerial
resources in family-CEO-managed firms by comparison with those in professional-CEOmanaged firms and infer that family-CEO-managed firms have superior or inferior
managerial capabilities. Therefore, this research does not empirically measure CEO’s
managerial capabilities in a direct way in this research. Further, consider the
measurement of TMT managerial resources, prior literature suggests that human capital,
social capital and cognition associated with top managers are micro-foundations of firm
dynamic capabilities (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Teece, 2007).
Following this conceptual framework, this research explores empirical measures of TMT
managerial resources that underlie firm innovation. This research employs top managers’
prior organizational experiences and external connections as proxies of externally-linked
TMT resources to capture the effect of top managers’ social connections on firm
innovation input. Firm tenure, team tenure and intrafirm career variety were used as
proxies of internally-linked TMT managerial resources to capture the effect of firmspecific knowledge on firm innovation output. It is possible that some of the results could
vary by the choice of measurement of TMT resources. Further research exploring a more
direct and/or comprehensive measure of TMT resources could contribute to the
understanding of dynamic managerial resources that underlie firm innovation. For
instance, a comprehensive measure of TMT diversity (e.g., including tenure diversity,
functional background diversity, age diversity, education diversity, and gender diversity)
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and a direct measure of TMT cross-department communication or cross-industry
experiences may provide new research insights.
Another limitation is that this research focuses on exploring the distinctiveness of
family-CEO-managed firms’ innovation ability while taking their willingness to innovate
as a given. The justification is based on the fact that innovation is critical to firm survival
and profitability especially for firms in high-technology industries. Family firms’
underinvestment on R&D may lead to not only financial losses but also socioemotional
losses to the controlling family (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014); thus, family firms’
unwillingness to innovation is largely mitigated for this reason. However, family firms’
willingness to innovate still varies among firms in high-technology industries (GómezMejía et al., 2014). Drawing on behavioral agency theory and assuming firm innovation
ability is given, the majority of family business literature argues that family firms’
willingness to innovate largely contingents upon the controlling families’ vision of the
firm, the use of corporate governance mechanism to monitor, and the pressure arising
from the firms’ performance gap or the competitors’ innovation ambitions (Chen & Hsu,
2009; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). Empirical findings in the
behavioral agency stream of study help to identify several contingency factors, such as
performance hazard and institutional ownership, and researchers attribute the moderation
effect to the variation of family firms’ willingness to innovate (Chrisman & Patel, 2012;
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). Nevertheless, firm behavior and performance are driven by
both effort and ability (Gedajlovic et al., 2012). Future studies are needed to build an
integrated model to examine the distinctiveness caused by both effort and ability
associated with family firm innovation.
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This research distinguishes the family CEO, a critical component of family
involvement, from family ownership and other family members’ involvement in TMT
and measures family CEO as a binary variable. However, family CEOs are heterogeneous
as well. Prior studies find that family-related features associated with family CEO, such
as founder family CEO, later generation family CEO, and CEO duality, can cause
variations regarding both firm behavior and performance (Chen & Hsu, 2009; Miller et
al., 2007, 2011). For instance, Miller and colleagues (2011) find that firms managed by
family-owner CEOs are more likely to take conservative strategies than firms managed
by family-founder CEOs but the former does not underperform. Whereas, later
generation CEOs can achieve enriching work experiences through a strategic education
design and early active involvement in the business, and, thus, help to sustain the firm’s
entrepreneurial legacy (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015). Research with the focus on exploring
CEO heterogeneity caused by family involvement, such as founder CEO and later
generation CEO, are potentially revealing in this research stream. Further, findings of this
research do not provide evidence that other family members’ involvement in TMT
influences TMT resource configuration. Whereas, prior studies suggest that the presence
of an apparent heir in the TMT has a positive effect on family firms’ R&D investment
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012). In addition to exploring family CEO heterogeneity, further
efforts examining other forms of family involvement, such as generational involvement,
the controlling family as the block holder, and/or family relationships, could provide new
research insights.
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5.5

Conclusion
Innovation is critical to firm growth, profitability, and survival (Crossan &

Apaydin, 2010; Damapour, 1991; Kimberly, 1981). This research draws upon capabilitybased perspective to further the understanding of firm innovation in family business
contexts. According to a capability-based perspective, firm innovation primarily
contingent upon a firm’s capability of sensing external innovation opportunities and
deploying internal resources to seize these opportunities, which is largely determined by
the top managers’ managerial resources and capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Augier
& Teece, 2009; Teece, 2012). The CEO of a firm, residing on the apex of the top
management team, has a prominent role on firm innovation due to the fact that
configuring and orchestrating TMT managerial resources is within the CEO’s managerial
discretion (Kor & Mesko, 2013). Thus, the characteristics associated with a CEO are
among the key factors to understand a firm’s adaptiveness to changing environment.
Family firms, as a ubiquitous presence around the world, behave distinctively in
general and are specifically unique with respect to innovation-related behaviors (e.g.,
Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman et al., 2015; La Porta et al., 1999). The deep
embeddedness of the family into the daily business practice, especially when a family
member takes the CEO position, creates a variety of uniqueness in family firms (Chua et
al., 1999, 2012; Habbershon et al., 2003; Minichilli et al., 2010). By extending the
analytic perspective from an agency perspective to a capability-based perspective, this
research explores distinctive capabilities and resources endowments or constraints
generated through family management (i.e., family CEO). In addition to the findings
suggesting that family CEOs have a direct impact on firm innovation, which is consistent
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with prior findings (e.g., Duran et al., 2015), results in this research also indicate that
family CEOs configure and orchestrate TMT managerial resources in a distinctive way,
giving rise to unique managerial capabilities and resource configurations in family firms.
Further efforts are needed to better understand manifestations of higher-order capabilities
underlying firm innovation and how family involvement makes them distinctive;
however, this study is one step in this direction.
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